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To support decision-making, training, and understanding complex trends in enterprise 
computer security, we have built an executable model representing the major 
components of an organization's computer security, including its machines, users, 
administrators, countermeasures, and attacks. We use "if-then" rules to express 
behaviors, incorporating the notions of “archetypes”, i.e. frequently-observed patterns 
of system behavior, and “system dynamics”, a discipline which views system 
behavior in terms of stocks and feedback loops. This thesis describes the model, and 
then discusses several archetypal behaviors and their results, namely: Symptomatic 
Fixes (or “Shifting the Burden”), Escalation, and Escalation combined with Limits to 
Growth. Simulation is used to display these behaviors quantitatively, and to show the 
effects of possible solutions. We conclude by discus ing how such results can be 
useful for practical computer security, and how this model can both feed off other 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
An enterprise computer system is highly complex, consisting of multiple hosts 
with different platforms and different applications, all networked and most likely 
connected to the Internet. These components have flaws that make the system 
vulnerable and allow attackers to exploit these vulnerabilities. 
Humans and machines form an even larger and more complex system with many 
different components and interactions. Control actions and reactions on one side of 
this system might have not only a local effect, butcould also affect the rest of the 
system, often resulting in feedback loops. These eff cts manifest themselves over 
time with different delays. The properties of the system (security being one of them) 
will emerge from its structure and all these interactions between its components. 
Some of the events in such systems are non-deterministic. This, and the fact that 
we do not have complete and fully accurate knowledge about these systems, leads to 
a level of information uncertainty that must be acknowledged and handled 
appropriately. Due to all of the above intricacies of such a system, it is extremely 
difficult to understand and analyze its emerging prope ties and the properties of the 
services it provides.  
It is a hard task to characterize and assess the security of such a system, let alone to 
predict malicious acts and to design a strategy for eliminating or at least reducing 




as national infrastructures, military or other government systems, emergency systems, 
or banks. 
Protection against attacks can be achieved by preventing, detecting, and tolerating 
them. Tolerating attacks might require the system to function in a degraded mode 
once under attack. If attacks defeat all lines of defense and eventually succeed, then 
the system must be able to recover quickly to an operational and secure state. Of 
course, all actions needed for proper prevention, detection, and tolerance have costs 
associated with them, including the price of buying and maintaining tools, the effort 
and time to install and run them, and personnel training. A strategy for security 
achievement and risk reduction can comprise a combination of the aforementioned 
actions. Given resource constraints, as well as trade-offs that might be needed 
between security on one hand and other operational properties (for example usability 
or performance) on the other hand, designing such a strategy is a very challenging 
task and requires extensive knowledge and experience. 
 
1.2 Approach 
To support this decision-making process of designin an appropriate security 
strategy, we developed a quantitative executable model of an organization’s 
operational computer security. Like all models, this is an abstraction of the real 
system, focused on representing the security-significa t aspects of the system and 
associated processes. The model targets and represents th  perspective of the person 
who must make decisions regarding actions that mustbe taken for security assurance 




for the model parameters, corresponding to different usage, vulnerabilities, attacks, 
and defense profiles. The simulator can be run and different “what-if” scenarios can 
be executed. Simulation will help a security manager, s curity engineer, or system 
administrator answer questions such as: if my enviro ment is characterized by these 
values, then what methods and tools to select and apply for managing security risks 
and satisfy the users needs of my system? How will the selected actions work 
together? What is their effectiveness and cost effici ncy? To what changes is my 
environment most sensitive? If I make specific changes in my security strategy, what 
will be their impact? What changes if my system gets attacked more/less or if the 
time to exploit changes? Should I hire more system ad inistrators? Should I spend 
more on training them? 
The model aims first at understanding security riskeduction in computer systems, 
then at diagnosing such systems and identifying their weaknesses, as well as 
prospectively examining the effectiveness of different solutions. The description of 
the behaviors this model can exhibit is founded upon the notion of system archetypes.  
 
1.3 Archetypes 
Archetypes are a concept related to systems thinking, developed in the mid 1980s, 
in an attempt to describe complex behavior and to convey ideas in an easier and more 
efficient manner. Archetypes are frequently-observed patterns of systems behavior 
and are a “natural vehicle for clarifying and testing mental models” about systems or 
situations [For61]. The systems literature describes ten distinct archetypes, as listed 




categorized into one of four “core generic” archetyp  classes: “Underachivement” 
includes Limits to Growth, Attractiveness Principle, Tragedy of the Commons, and 
Growth and Underinvestment; and “Relative Archievement” includes Success to the 
Successful. “Out-of-Control” includes Fixes that Fail, Shifting the Burden, and 
Accidental Adversaries; and lastly, “Relative Control” includes Escalation and 
Accidental Adversaries. [Wol03] acknowledges that the more common description of 
archetypes (i.e. that of [Bra02]) is more intuitive and easier to grasp and apply to 
simulation, so it is used here. Archetypes have been mainly applied in business or 
industrial processes. There has recently been some work performed at MIT in 
applying systems thinking and archetypes to systems safety [Mar03], but in security 
this is a new idea. 
Beyond the common archetypes of [Bra02], we keep in mind that other archetypes 
may be observed in security. This would not be surprising, as [Mar03]’s application 
of archetypes to safety engineering uncovered several s curity-specific archetypes. 
This thesis, however, restricts itself to the application of common archetypes to 
security. While Appendix I describes how each of the ten archetypes might be applied 
to security, this thesis gives a detailed understanding of the following archetypes: 
Symptomatic Fixes (also known as Shifting the Burden), Escalation, Limits to 
Growth, and a combination of the latter two. 
We use archetypes for understanding and modeling security aspects (needs, 
problems, actions) in the context of an enterprise that uses computers/information 
technology systems for running its business and needs to ensure the security of its 




related organizational behavior and trends and using archetypes for documenting and 
understanding the domain, the problems, and their potential solutions. Mental models 
might be able to handle archetypes in isolation, but for the entire system (which 
contains combinations of such archetypes) mental models are not adequate due to the 
complexity, non-determinism, and uncertainty of thesystem. Computer simulation is 
in fact already recommended in [Sen94] for extending o e’s grasp of archetypes. 
 
1.4 The Model 
For our model, we employ the continuous modeling feature of the Extend 
simulation environment [Ima05]. This is a graphical simulation tool that focuses on 
the levels of holding tanks and their inputs and outputs, governed by constants, 
equations, delays, and random values. (A screenshot of a holding tank and its inputs 
and outputs can be found in Appendix II.) The level of each holding tank changes at 
each simulation step, and a typical simulation run ca consist of hundreds or even 
thousands of such steps. The result is an easy-to-use way to set up and numerically 
solve systems represented by a series of differential equations. The feedback loops 
stressed by system dynamics and archetypes can easily be represented by a holding 
tank whose output is connected to its input. Thus, continuous modeling with Extend 
is a good fit for the system dynamics modeling approach described above. 
Out model consists of approximately 350 Extend basic “blocks”, such as constants 





In the model, staff-hours (of the system administrators) can be allocated to various 
tasks related to the security of a typical system. We model the following seven 
countermeasures: 
• “Firewall Efforts.”   Overseeing and maintaining the system’s firewall.  
• “Antivirus Efforts.”   Maintaining the system’s antivirus software, keeping it 
updated, resolving user issues related to the antivirus. 
• “Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Efforts.”  Maintaining the IDS, 
installing new signatures, resolving alarms. 
• “Encryption Efforts.”   Maintaining the system’s encryption software. 
•  “Enforcement Actions.”   This includes tasks such as: scanning for and 
fixing configuration vulnerabilities, which are effctively “doors” to the 
system that were inadvertently left open; monitoring the users to prevent 
unsafe practices, such as downloading viruses or using “weak” passwords 
which are easily guessed; applying proper access control to prevent 
unauthorized use; and more generally, devising and e forcing a company 
security policy. See [Dan04] for more on these tasks. All of these require no 
additional hardware or software per se, only a great deal of attention from the 
support staff (or system administrators). 
These appear as the five most prevalent “security technologies” used in Gordon’s 
survey ([Gor05a]) of 700 corporate, governmental, and cademic institutions, where 
we have subsumed Gordon’s “Access Control Lists” under our term “Enforcement 




• “Software Patches.” Downloading and installing patches to correct 
vulnerabilities in the operating system(s) and applications; resolving problems 
caused by patches. 
Lastly, we consider a somewhat different approach that has only recently been 
discussed by the security community: 
• “Tolerance Measures.”  This includes designs to t lerate an attack (rather 
than prevent or detect it), even if it succeeds. Multiple layers, graceful 
degradation of performance, and (in some instances) backups are all tolerance 
measures.  
In our current model, the effectiveness of each countermeasure is a factor only of 
the countermeasure’s presence or absence (implementd as a series of Y/N switches 
in the model) and the number of staff-hours per machine allocated to the 
corresponding task. Although the IDS and firewall seem independent of the system 
size, additional machines will mean additional alarms, which will require more 
attention. Additionally, the system has an overall vu nerability measure, which is 
reduced by the number of staff-hours per machine allocated to enforcement actions 
and software patches.  
The attacks on the system are divided into two categori s: “Simple” (or “kiddy-
script”) attacks tend to rely on known vulnerabilities and require l ttle action from 
the attacker other than downloading and running the a tack. “Sophisticated attacks” 
may involve finding new vulnerabilities, can often defeat many countermeasures, and 
usually come from a single knowledgeable attacker, such as one who might actually 




costliest type of attack according to the respondents of [Gor05a], are written by some 
very sophisticated attackers, an existing virus propagates in well-understood ways 
and can be easily defeated by the proper countermeasures; we thus include viruses in 
the “simple attack” category.  
For both categories (simple and sophisticated), a specified number of attacks are 
considered to be attempted against the system each day. (Alternatively, the simulation 
can also be set to add some random variation to the specified number of attempts.)  
Given the effectiveness of each of the various countermeasures, and the system’s 
vulnerability (or lack thereof), a fraction of those attacks will succeed. The primary 
outputs of our current model, then, are the numbers of “successful simple attacks” 
and “successful sophisticated attacks.”  Note that a result of “n successful simple 
attacks” may not appear as n separate incidents. Several of these may exploit the 
same vulnerability, turn out to be variants of the same virus, and so on. For now, the 
number of successful attacks should be taken only as our metric of the quality of 
countermeasures versus attempted attacks. 
  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the 
Symptomatic Fixes (or “Shifting the Burden”) archetype; describes one instance of it 
in computer security as we have modeled it; discusses the results of several different 
simulations based on it; and considers how this archetype might apply elsewhere in 
security. Chapter 3 goes through a similar approach wit  the Escalation archetype. 




described that describes a combination of Limits to Growth and Escalation. Chapter 5 
outlines related work, and Chapter 6 gives conclusions and some future work. This is 
followed by Appendices I, II, and III, a bibliography, and finally a list of this author’s 





































Chapter 2: Symptomatic Fixes Archetype 
 
2.1 Symptomatic Fixes Description 
In this archetype, the symptoms of a problem are observed. Rather than analyze the 
root cause of the problem, the manager (or “decision-maker”, or “actor”) attempts to 
fix the symptom. This “shifting of the burden” from the problem’s actual cause to its 
symptom often distracts the manager from the former; it can also mask the symptoms 
of the original problem, making it more difficult to diagnose.  
Armed with an understanding of this archetype, a manager will consider the 
possibility that the most readily apparent solution may not ultimately be the best one. 
Instead, time must be taken to analyze, and only then properly treat, the root cause. 
For a simple illustration in computer security, we paint a scenario in which a 
company’s computer system (or just “system”) is continually falling prey to 
successful attacks known as “kiddy-scripts.” These attacks are launched by novice 
attackers, and generally only succeed if the system contains vulnerabilities such as 
software that is not up-to-date. The successes of these attacks should be seen as a 
symptom of a deeper problem. Reducing the system’s vulnerability to thwart these 
attacks could be considered a fundamental solutions; such a fundamental solution 
would include the frequent installation of software patches. It is possible (in fact, 
likely) that implementing such a solution properly will take time and thus not yield 
dramatic gains very quickly; in the long run, however, positive effects of this solution 




reduce overall system vulnerability vis-à-vis kiddy-scripts, though it is certainly not 
the only action. 
Alternatively, it is all-too-possible for a company to instead view the successful 
attacks as the only issue here and therefore install an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) to detect the occurrence of these attacks – a symptomatic fix. The company’s 
support staff (or “system administration staff”) is then too distracted from installing 
patches. In time, many new vulnerabilities will be discovered in the software run by 
the system; once published, these will be exploited by new “kiddy-script” attacks. 
Invariably, a certain percentage of attacks do evad an IDS, and thus, as the known 
vulnerabilities in the system increase, the number of successful attacks will also 
increase, despite the company’s continued efforts to install, maintain, and improve 
their IDS. These effects are displayed in Figure 1, an “influence diagram” showing 
the effects of given variable on one another over time.  
In this diagram, we begin in the center with the problem symptom of successful 
simple attacks. In the loop beneath the symptom, we see the fundamental solution: 
increased successful simple (or “kiddy-script”) attacks cause an increased need for 
the fundamental solution of applying software patches, and, in fact, applying this 
solution will reduce the problem symptom. Such a loop can be described as “more of 
A leads to less of B leads to less of A, and so on until equilibrium is reached”, and is 
known as a “balancing loop.” Alternatively, the symptomatic solution is found in the 
loop above the problem symptom. If we focus on thisloop itself, it appears to offer 
the same advantages as the fundamental fix, sometimes more easily or more rapidly 




Unfortunately, though, we also see that an increased use of the IDS can increase a 
side effect: the distraction of the support staff from other tasks, including patch 
application. This, of course, reduces the chance of a fundamental fix being applied. 
Starting at the top of the diagram and proceeding around its periphery clockwise, we 
see: increased IDS efforts leads to an increase in support staff distraction, therefore 
less patches are applied; the problem symptom will re-emerge, and more of the 
symptomatic fix will be attempted. This loop can be described as “more of A causes 
more of B causes more of A, and so on”, and is known as a “reinforcing loop.” 
[Wol03] includes this archetype under his more generic t rm “Out-of-Control”, as a 
balancing loop is desired to control the problem syptom, but it is not obtained. 
 
Fig. 1. Influence Diagram for a “Symptomatic Fixes” Situation. 
 
2.2 Simulation Setup 
 
To see quantitative results, an Extend model was used simulating a system 
containing on the order of 200 machines, sustaining 100 simple attacks per day. A 




well the IDS has been maintained), and a certain percent will be defeated if the 
system’s software is well-patched. Note that even if we say “n% of the attempted 
attacks succeeded”, the system’s users may not observe for 100 attempted attacks, n 
separate failures, as many of these attempts might target a small set of specific 
vulnerabilities and exploit them in the same way. Similarly, no single countermeasure 
should be expected to reduce the attack success rate to 0 by itself, as there are enough 
different types of attack that any single countermeasure can be defeated. We use the 
percentage of successful attacks only as a measure of the system’s defenses and 
vulnerabilities. It is assumed that the software of this system is initially patched 
partially; therefore there is room for improvement if further patching is undertaken, 
while a loss will be felt if patching is ignored (as the discovery of new vulnerabilities 
will bring the software’s status from “partially patched” to “mostly unpatched.”) The 
model was executed for the equivalent of 6 months (real time) with different 
scenarios. (Each execution of this type runs in under 30 seconds on a conventional 
Pentium III computer running Windows 2000 Professional.)  
For examining the effect of different effort allocation to the fundamental and 
symptomatic solution, we executed the simulation for four scenarios s1, s2, s3, and 
s4. In all four scenarios, the system is under pressur  for the first d1 days while the 
rate of successful attacks rises. This is due to the discovery of additional 
vulnerabilities. On day d1+1, however, the company embarks on some course of 
action. Here we chose d1 = 9, to demonstrate the effects over several days of taking 




In our first scenario, “s1”, from day d1+1 onwards, the company has its support 
staff dedicate a certain number of staff-hours per day to installing software patches to 
all the system’s computers. This effort is held consta t throughout the six-month 
period. The “if-then” rule that describes the organiz tion’s efforts in this scenario is 
given by:  
IF: (Day> d1) 
THEN: Staff-Hours for Patches := x1.  
For the hypothetical situation that we are modeling, we considered 3 staff-hours a 
reasonable value for x1 given the description of our system. This is considere  the 
“fundamental fix” scenario, or the “solution” to the Symptomatic Fixes archetype. 
In our second scenario, “s2”, the company deploys an IDS on day d1+1. For the 
next 170 days, efforts are gradually increased to maintain and improve the IDS: as 
new attacks are discovered, new plug-ins are added; as a consequence, more alerts 
that are signaled by the IDS must be analyzed, requiring more effort (although some 
of them might be just false alarms). In an attempt to keep the IDS functioning well, 
the company increases its IDS efforts with the following rule:  
Begin with y0 staff-hours for the IDS.  
FOR: every day 
IF: (Successful Attacks today > Successful Attacks two days ago) 
THEN: increase staff-hours for IDS by y.  
We have assigned the values y0 = 1.5, y = 0.03. (This will lead to a gradual 
increase from moderate IDS effort at day ten to a strong IDS effort of approximately 




less efforts are available for patches: Staff-hours for Patches := 4 – Staff-Hours for 
IDS, to a minimum of zero. We consider this our case of “increasing efforts to the 
symptomatic fix while decreasing efforts for the fundamental solution”, or a strong 
instance of the “problem” archetype. 
Our third scenario, s3, takes this a step further: as of day d1+1, the same IDS 
efforts are made as in s2, but no patch efforts are made at all. Here we interpret the 
increasing side-effect loop in Figure 1 as the strengthening over time of the “mental 
barrier” (as [Wol03] calls it) that prevents consideration of the fundamental solution. 
Additionally, the side-effect loop is common for this archetype but not required, see 
[Sen90]. In any case, s3 is an even more extreme cas  of the problem archetype for 
Symptomatic Fixes. 
Lastly, our fourth scenario s4 considers an alternaive solution, one which the 
archetype literature concedes as sometimes viable. If the company understands its 
priorities, then it may be possible to use both the fundamental solution and a small 
dose of the quick fix. This would be codified by the following rules:  
Staff-hours for Patches := 4 – Staff-Hours for IDS, as before.  
The difference is the rule for IDS efforts:  
Begin with y0 staff-hours for the IDS.  
FOR: every day 
IF: {  
 (Successful Attacks Today > Successful Attacks two days ago) 
AND (staff-hours for IDS <= z)  },  




The value of y is the same 0.03, but y0 is now reduced to 0.2. As in s1, we assume 
that a proper effort for patches can not be made with less than three staff-hours, so we 
set z to 1. s4 can thus be described as “symptomatic fix supplementing the 
fundamental fix.”  (Note that no “burden” is being shifted per se if the company 
understands what is fundamental and what is not.)   
 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
 
 The primary outputs of these four scenarios, i.e. number of attacks successful per 
day, are plotted for comparison in Figure 2. We can also integrate under the curves of 
Figure 2, giving us the number of cumulative successful attacks for each of the four 
scenarios; these will be displayed in Table I below. 
 
Fig. 2. Successful Attacks per Day for the Four Symptomatic Fixes Scenarios 
 
Several important features can be observed in Figure 2. Firstly, when comparing 
the fundamental solution (s1) to the symptomatic fixes (s2 and s3), we see that the 
symptomatic fixes appear to do a much better job initially (e.g. looking at Day 30, s2 
and s3 are approximately 10 successful attacks lower than s1), but by the end of the 




22 successful attacks lower than s2, and 32 lower than s3. This demonstrates a 
common pattern in the performance of symptomatic fixes – while the symptomatic fix 
can cause temporary drops in the problem rate, the overall trend over time is for the 
problem rate to increase. (Diagrams similar to Figure 2 are seen in describing this 
archetype in [Sen94] and [Bra02].) While the security staff is distracted by the rises 
and falls in the performance of the IDS, the system’s current software vulnerabilities, 
as well as those newly discovered, are neglected, lea ing to a rise in the percentage of 
attacks that are successful. The overall trend is a line r increase; this is not surprising, 
as we have modeled the vulnerabilities in unpatched software as increasing linearly in 
time. Comparing s1 against s2 and s3 also stresses the importance of behavioral 
monitoring over time. Were we to stop the simulation after one month or so, our 
conclusions would be very different as to what measures are most effective!  
Focusing on s3, we see that it presents an even more extreme case of s2’s failures, 
as the patch efforts have been eliminated entirely. Lastly, we turn our attention to s4. 
Recall that s4 begins with less IDS efforts than s2 and s3; it therefore appears initially 
to allow more attacks to succeed, e.g. at Day 16, s4 is 2 successful attacks higher than 
s3, and 3 higher than s2. However, by the end of the simulation period, s4 is clearly 
the winner in reducing successful attacks. Notice as well the height for the “waves” of 
symptomatic fixes: they are greatest in s3, smaller in s2, and smaller still in s4; this 
height represents the degree of the “crisis/fix” pattern, which is lowest when the 
proper application of fundamental fixes prevents cri is action (s4), and greatest when 




s1, notice how they approach each other asymptotically – in the long run, adding the 
symptomatic fix will cease to provide any good beyond the fundamental solution. 
We now turn our attention to the effort required in each of these scenarios. s1 
consisted simply of a constant 3 staff-hours per day for patches, and nothing else. 
Figure 3 shows the efforts of the support staff, in staff-hours per day, invested in s2, 
in which IDS efforts decreased patch efforts. 
 
Fig. 3. Efforts per Day for s2, the IDS-Decreases-Patches Scenario 
 
Notice how patch efforts decrease steadily until approximately Day 120, at which 
point they stay at zero for the remainder of the simulation. Until Day 120, any efforts 
for IDS came out of efforts for patches, so total efforts were constant; after Day 120, 
the total efforts are all IDS efforts. Figure 3 further highlights the attractiveness of the 
symptomatic fix, as the initial IDS effort requires l ss staff-hours per day (less than 2) 
than what would be required of a fundamental fix (a steady 3 for s1). In the long run, 
however, staff-hours are continuously added to the IDS effort in an attempt to raise its 
results; by the time six months have passed, the company realizes that it is investing  
6 staff-hours per day into the IDS. We can also integrate the curves in Figure 3 to 
measure cumulative effort of the simulation period, t  be shown in Table I. 





Fig. 4. Efforts per Day for s3, the IDS-only Scenario 
Observe that by Day 180, approximately 6.25 staff-hours are being used for IDS 
efforts. In s2 (see Figure 3), that number was only approximately 5.8. The same rule 
produced both figures: “increase IDS efforts every day that successful attacks are 
higher than they were two days ago.” Compared to s3, s2 allowed for some patches as 
well, so there were less days when this trigger occurred, therefore less IDS efforts 
were demanded over the course of the simulation. 
Lastly, Figure 5 displays the efforts of s4, which combined IDS and patch efforts 
with an emphasis on the latter. 
 
Fig. 5. Efforts per Day for s4, the IDS-Supplements-Patches Scenario 
 
Notice how few increases are made to IDS efforts. Again, this happens because the 
trigger condition of successful attacks being too high is very rarely met, due to the 
appropriate patching strategy. 
We now compare all four scenarios in terms of their cumulative effort and 




Considering cumulative values, we see indeed that cumulative successful attacks 
are lower for s1, the fundamental solution, than for symptomatic fix scenarios s2 and 
s3. 
Table I: Cumulative Successful Attacks and Efforts for All Four Scenarios 




s1 3833 513 
s2 4007 740 
s3 5232 689 
s4 2345 684 
 
Noticing that s1 requires over 100 less staff-hours’ worth of effort than s2 or s3, 
we see that in the long run, the fundamental solution is not only more effective than 
the symptomatic fix; it is less costly as well. The only question remaining is in 
comparing s1, “fundamental solution alone”, with s4, “fundamental solution 
combined with symptomatic fix.” A company will have to decide for itself whether 
the additional 151 staff-hours of efforts are worth the reduction in 1500 successful 
attacks. How such calculations are made is touched upon in related work, below. In 
any case, simulation allows the company to consider th  effects of its actions, and 
choose its optimal course with these effects in mind. 
By analogy with these results, when other variables of interest in the system have a 
similar evolutionary trend, the Symptomatic Fixes archetype might be manifesting 
itself. In that case, the situation must be diagnosed and the real cause and the 
corresponding solution must be examined; this solution has to be applied, thus fixing 




to make sure that the diagnosis was correct and that the solution was correctly 
implemented. 
Lastly, the above simulations show the applicability of the model as a decision 
tool, by allowing one to see the effects of different proposed solutions before 
implementing them. In the example presented here, the decision was regarding the 
allocation of effort to different security efforts (IDS and patches). The model might 
also be useful in exploring and making security policies, as well as for training 
security staff.  
 
2.4 Other Instances of Symptomatic Fixes in Security 
 
We have presented only one possible instance of Symptomatic Fixes here, and thus 
we have opened the door to many related opportunities. Our simulation model 
includes many security-related tasks not described h re (such as user training, 
enforcement of the security policy, and maintaining tolerance measures such as 
backups, to name a few), and in place of the Patch Efforts described here, this 
simulation could be run with other tasks or some combination thereof, as well as 
considering more-sophisticated attacks. Just as different parties may see different 
tasks as “the” fundamental solution ([Sen94]), attacks of different sophistication may 
have different “fundamental solutions.”  
Additionally, [Sen90] finds that the best way to describe the history of a particular 
company’s strategies is by combining the Symptomatic Fixes archetype with another 
archetype, namely Limits to Growth. Thus, the applicability of this combination and 




A variant on Symptomatic Fixes described in [Sen90] and [Sen94] is known as 
Shifting the Burden to the Intervener, in which the fundamental fix involves the 
internal actors repairing problems, and the symptoma ic fix involves outsiders. This 
brings to mind some sentiments in the security community about security being 
incorporated into system design at each step of the process, rather than ignoring 
security and relying on an expert to add security features shortly before release or 
deployment.  
Lastly, there has been much discussion in the security community (see [Hun06]) 
regarding whether better security behavior should be taught to the users of a system, 
or placed entirely on the shoulders of the system ad inistrator. Similarly, in a system 
where the roles of system administrator and security officer are divided, the 
interactions between them may follow archetypal patterns. We had begun to 
document anecdotal accounts of such interactions, and our model leaves room to add 
detail to its human-factors portion of the model, including the interactions between 
users, system administrators, and security officers. Shifting the Burden to the 
Intervener could thus shed light on these human interactions.  
For additional information of Symptomatic Fixes as it pertains to security, please 







Chapter 3: Escalation Archetype 
 
3.1 Escalation Description 
 
In the Escalation archetype, each of two parties makes efforts and achieves results 
towards reaching its own well-defined goals. However, each party desires greater 
results than its counterpart. Thus, each party continues to increase its efforts, with 
neither party achieving dominance for an extended priod. This can theoretically 
continue ad infinitum.  
As an instance of this archetype in security, we investigate the action-reaction 
effects of attacks on an organization’s computer system and the organization’s 
attempts to better defend its assets, all the while advertising its strengths in an attempt 
to attract more business. We begin with a company that spends little on security 
measures, but sustains few attempted attacks because it’s not a very well-known or 
worthwhile target. While some simple “kiddy-script” attacks blindly go after any 
available computer system and can be seen as the ever-present “attack noise”, other 
simple attacks (such as a “Zombie DDoS”, see [Gib02]) are consciously directed at an 
organization by an attacker. These are more likely if the organization is better-known. 
Furthermore, an organization will be targeted by sophisticated attacks if its assets are 
valuable (e.g. credit card numbers stored on its servers), or if its defenses are 
considered formidable, in which case breaching them poses a worthwhile challenge. 
We suppose that the organization decides to attract new customers by increasing 




and/or asset desirability of the organization rise, th  motivation to attack its system is 
increased, raising both the quantity and sophistication of attempted attacks. To 
counteract these, the company increases security spending again. Alas, this furthers 
the motivation to attack, leading to another increase in attempts. This process can 
continue for several more rounds. 
These effects are displayed in Figure 6, an influence diagram showing the effects 
of given variable on one another over time. (Similar influence diagrams are drawn for 
archetypes in [Bra02].) 
 
 
Fig. 6. Influence Diagram for Escalation 
 
The upper loop in Figure 6 reads as follows: “Increasing the organization’s 
security efforts will decrease the number of successful attacks against it. An increase 
in successful attacks leads to a greater threat to the organization. The greater the 
threat, the more security efforts will be added to counter it.”  Thus, if the attackers’ 




efforts will decrease the number of successful attacks, decreasing the threat to the 
organization, decreasing the need for additional security efforts. This forms a 
“balancing” or “negative” loop, as after several rounds of such behavior, no further 
efforts will be required.  
A similar pattern is found in the lower loop: “Increased successful attacks cause 
the organization to advertise less. (We assume the resources that would have been 
funneled into advertising are now needed to recover from all of the attacks.)  
Advertising efforts increase the motivation to attack the organization, leading to more 
efforts on the part of the attackers, and therefore more successful attacks.”  Thus, the 
attacker behavior in and of itself should also form a balancing loop, as enough 
successful attacks will prevent any advertising, at which point the organization is no 
longer a very visible or worthwhile target, so attack efforts are not increased again.  
However, in our scenario, both the organization andthe attackers respond to one 
another, violating the assumptions we had made for balancing loops. Traversing the 
outermost loop of Figure 6 describes the overall behavior: an increase in the 
organization’s security efforts increase its advertising efforts (or otherwise raise its 
prominence and asset desirability), increasing the motivation and therefore the efforts 
to attack the organization, leading to a rise in successful attacks. The organization 
feels threatened and therefore increases its security efforts, and the spiral continues 
from there. As both the organization’s and the attackers’ efforts continue to increase 
in time, this forms a positive loop. The number of successful attacks, however, 
reflects the ratio of attackers’ efforts to the organization’s security efforts, and thus 




Control”, as each party’s balancing loop is used in an attempt to gain control over the 
relative quantity “success of one party / success of the other party.” 
 
3.2 Simulation Setup 
Clearly in our case, the number of successful attacks becomes the barometer of 
“success of attackers compared to success of defenders.”  Increased efforts by 
attackers over time can be modeled by an increasing number of attempted attacks, 
both simple and sophisticated. The organization’s efforts can be fulfilled by: 
introducing countermeasures that were not previously present; changing the 
allocation of support staff-hours to various tasks; training the support-staff (which, to 
a point, increases their effectiveness); and increasing the staff-hours available for 
security tasks. The latter may require hiring in the long run, but in the short term may 
often be achieved simply by encouraging overtime, reassigning personnel within the 
company, etc.  
In the simulation scenarios presented here, we have simplified by limiting the 
organization to one action, namely increasing staff-hours, and did not include other 
actions. We assume that all countermeasures are present, but they all begin with 
inadequate support staff. In time, increasing the saff-hours to each task will result in 
a greater number of attacks not successful. We havefurther simplified by scripting 
the actions of both the organization and the attackers as an automated series of “If-
Then” rules, so the simulation runs without external i tervention. The rules we use 




and they quantitatively capture the qualitative behavior described in Figure 6. These 
rules are as follows: 
The organization decides to increase efforts:  
FOR: every x1 days 
IF: (Successful Simple Attacks > x2) 
THEN: increase staff-hours allocated to Antivirus, Firewall, IDS, Enforcement   
  Actions, and Software Patches by w
v
= {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}, respectively. 
These tasks begin with 0w
v
 staff-hours allocated at the start of the simulation.  
These countermeasures and vulnerability-reduction tasks are very effective at 
preventing or detecting simple attacks. Faced with sophisticated attacks, however, 
their effects are diminished: the antivirus does not address these attacks, which aren’t 
viruses; the IDS and firewall can sometimes be deceiv d; and enforcement actions 
and software patches can only reduce known vulnerabilities, whereas the 
sophisticated attacker may discover and exploit new vulnerabilities. Thus, the 
company responds to sophisticated attacks in a different way than to simple attacks:  
FOR: every x1 days  
IF: (Successful Sophisticated Attacks > x3)  
THEN: increase staff-hours allocated to Encryption by v1 and Tolerance by v2. 
Tolerance and Encryption are allocated 0v
v
 staff-hours at the beginning of the 
simulation.  
We assume that these countermeasures are no less eff ctiv  against sophisticated 




unbreakable by any private individual with a handful of computers, no matter how 
clever, and tolerance works despite the success of the attack.  
As some tasks may require more staff-hours than others to be done well, different 
numbers can be specified for each task. In any case, decisions to increase staff-hours 
are implemented as follows: Any increase in staff-hours requires a d1 day delay to 
reassign personnel. d2 days after the increase occurs, the company advertises its 
added security efforts.  
This leads the attackers to launch additional attacks, according to the following 
assumed behavior: Begin with y1 simple attacks. Any day that advertising is present, 
increase the simple attacks by y2%.  
 Simple attacks can be increased rapidly, as this merely requires directing 
automated “kiddy-scripts” against the system. The number of sophisticated attacks, 
however, grows at a different (generally slower) rate: Begin with y3 sophisticated 
attacks. Any day that advertising is present, wait d3 days as sophisticated attacks are 
prepared; then increase the sophisticated attacks by y4%.  
In our execution, the number of simple attacks attempt d is given by the above 
rules. To allow for some randomness, we chose to let th  number of attempted 
sophisticated attacks vary by a (Gaussian) standard eviation of 5%. Additionally, if 
the number of successful sophisticated attacks is found to be between 0 and 1, then a 
random number is drawn to determine if the attack succeeds.  
We simulate a system of approximately 200 machines, choosing a simulation 
period of six months (180 days). Keeping these numbers in mind, we have run the 
simulation with the following values: x1 = 7, x2 = 4, x3 = 1, 0w
v






= {1.1, 1.3, 3.7, 1.5, 1.5}, 0v
v
 = {0.72, 0.87}, v1 = 1.8, v2 = 2.2, y1 = 20, y2 = 
29.8, y3 = 0.6, y4 = 9, d1 = 14, d2 = 5, and d3 = 2. In our opinion, these values, used 
with the above rules over a 180-day period, describe a linear progression from 
minimal attention to complete dedication vis-à-vis staff-hours for security tasks.  
 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
 
Successful attacks per day are used as our measure of “organization’s efforts vs. 







Fig. 7. Successful Attacks per Day, First Escalation Scenario 
 
Certainly from Day 90 onwards, the system reaches a sort of equilibrium, as 
successful attacks hover around 13. This is a result of the matched opposing efforts of 
the organization and the attackers. Yet while the ov rall metric (i.e. successful 
attacks) does not change much, both efforts are ongoing. Figure 8 shows the efforts of 






Fig. 8. Staff-Hours per Day, First Escalation Scenario 
 
According to the rules and the specific values of the variables described above, the 
first decision to increase staff-hours occurs at Day 7, and is implemented fourteen 
days later; thus, the first increase is seen at Day 21. After that, increases can occur as 
often as every seven days: decisions to increase are m de every seven days, and 
previous weeks’ decisions will be implemented while waiting the fourteen days for 
this week’s implementation. Overall, the organization’s efforts grow, fairly linearly, 
up to approximately 220 staff-hours per day. Assuming eight-hour days, this 
translates into twenty-seven people, which is high but not unreasonable for a system 
of 200 machines. Of course, this growth is matched by the increase in both simple 
and sophisticated attacks. Figure 9 shows the attemp ed simple attacks. 
 





The number of attempted simple attacks can rise rathe  drastically, as this only 
requires that novice users unleash their automated processes against the system. This 
reaches almost 9,000 attempted attacks on the entire system per day, or 45 attempts, 
including viruses, per machine. While we stress the behavioral trends here much 
more than the specific numerical results, these numbers can be “reality-checked” 
against some empirical findings involving honeypots. [Dac04] observed attacks from 
6,285 IP addresses over four months, averaging over two new attack sources per hour. 
Similarly, [Pou04a] observed 28,722 new attack sources over sixteen months. 
[Pou05] found 924 attack sources per day in Germany, d [Pou04b] mines a year of 
collected data and concludes with a very conservative estimate of 753 attack tools 
available to simple attackers. In light of these results, and considering that in our case, 
the organization has “begged for attacks” by advertising, our numbers seem fairly 
realistic (or in agreement with the existing empirical data.)   
Figure 10 shows the daily average of attempted sophi ticated attacks.  
 
Fig. 10. Attempted Sophisticated Attacks per Day, First Escalation Scenario 
 
The growth of attempted sophisticated attacks is much slower, as it requires higher 
human effort and expertise. 
We also observe that the linear increase in the Organization’s Efforts (i.e. staff-




attacks). This is the case because in our model, a line r growth in countermeasure 
effectiveness leads to a lower percentage of successful attacks – an exponential 
decline.  
Our simulation resulted in an overall relatively constant average number of 
successful attacks, an equilibrium of sorts between the results of the two striving 
parties (organization and attacker). Given these reults, an organization may attempt 
to “beat” this escalation by increasing its efforts beyond the values given here; or it 
may consider cutting costs by reducing its efforts, if the results will be the same. We 
therefore ask how this equilibrium is affected if we modify the values representing 
the amount and frequency of increases in security efforts. 
Firstly, we ask how much can be gained by the organization if it increases its 





 instead. Figure 11 shows the results. 
 
Fig. 11. Successful Attacks per Day: Results of 10% Increase in Efforts 
 
Compared to Figure 7, Figure 11 has a similar overall shape, but the average 
number of successful attacks hovers around 10, versus the 13 of Figure 7. Thus, by 





Secondly, we ask how much is lost if the organization does not increase its efforts 




 instead. Figure 12 shows 
the results. 
 
Fig. 12. Successful Attacks per Day: Results of 10% Decrease in Efforts 
 
Suddenly, the equilibrium has risen to approximately 25 successful attacks. (It is 
not even clear whether an equilibrium exists by the end of the period, given the 
graph’s steep climb from Day 140 onwards.)  Thus, for a company considering 
changing its efforts, simulation here has shown that a small increase in efforts will not 
do much good, but a small decrease in efforts will cause much harm. This echoes 
[Sen90]’s discussion of “leverage”, the large effects of small changes. A benefit of 
simulation is thus demonstrated. 
Lastly, we test the sensitivity of this equilibrium by modifying a different value. 
Instead of the amount of the efforts’ increase (i.e. w
v
), we change the frequency of 
increased efforts. x1, the delay between increases (if increases are required), had been 
7. We now change it to 6, and run the simulation. Intuitively, since the organization’s 
reaction is more frequent, we expect the number of successful attacks to decrease. 





Fig. 13. Successful Attacks per Day: Results of More Frequent Efforts 
 
Clearly, by Day 160, the equilibrium has been upset. The increase in attempted 
attacks is outpacing the increased efforts of the organization, and successful attacks 
begin to climb. This is due to the fact that the organization’s more frequent efforts 
consisted of security spending followed by advertising, which attracted more frequent 
efforts of the attackers that it could not match. Tis example illustrates not only the 
utility of simulation for predicting the effects ofsmall changes, but also the benefits 
of simulation in revealing unexpected behavior. This example also demonstrates a 
systems concept: sometimes the best way to survive an Escalation scenario is to not 
react as often, even if a reaction appears necessary. [Sen90] gives a case study of two 
manufacturers of a new design of stroller, both of which are making a respectable 
profit margin on their sales. Then the manufacturers ntered Escalation, lowering 
their prices in an attempt to raise market share. Little time passed before both 
manufacturers no longer had a profit margin. The risk of reaction (reduced profit 
margin) had not been weighed against the risk of no reaction (reduced market share), 
and perhaps a slower reaction may have offered the greatest overall gain. Similarly, 




opponent. Simulation thus grants the would-be entrant into Escalation the opportunity 
to pause and consider such outcomes.  
Returning to our security scenario, we had described th  increase in attacks as due 
to the organization’s advertising. While some companies (e.g. search engines) cannot 
exist without high visibility, our results behoove an organization to consider the 
effects of its advertising and whether they outweigh the risk of additional attacks. 
Additionally, the automated “if-then” rule for advertising used here was to advertise 
anytime an increase in efforts is made. While the influence diagram of Figure 6 
indicates that enough successful attacks will prevent further advertising, our if-then 
rules had assumed that point was not yet reached in the system, e.g. it only occurs 
when successful attacks reach 60 or higher. 
Alternatively, a rule can be constructed which states, “Advertise only if successful 
attacks are below a certain threshold.” Such a ruleis included as part of the 
Escalation behavior in Chapter 4.  
All of the above scenarios involved automated rules to govern the choices of both 
organization and attackers. As an alternative, the model also allows for a rule of 
“pause the simulation whenever a certain condition occurs.”  In our case, then, pauses 
may be configured, for example, whenever the successful attacks (simple, 
sophisticated, or sum of the two) exceed a threshold value. The simulation then 
pauses, and the end-user of the simulation may consider making changes such as 
introducing a new countermeasure or increasing staff-hours before resuming the 
simulation. The behavior over time of the aggregated ttackers can also be paused and 




company considering the impact of various choices that it could make, the attacker 
behavior is out of its hands and would thus presumably be represented by automated 
rules.  
Lastly, here we assume that the organization is free to increase its efforts without 
any additional constraints. Practically, such increases may carry risks other than those 
of increased attacks; such risks are described by another archetype, Limits to Growth, 
and are described in the next chapter. 
 
3.4 Other Instances of Escalation in Security 
 
On the Escalation archetype, [Sen90] lists the international arms race s the most 
obvious example of Escalation, and  [Hof05] specifies an “information technology 
security arms race.”  This arms race consists of advances in attack technology, which 
necessitate improvements in security technology. For example, [Hof05] argues that 
“with the advent of binary differs . . . patching is no longer a viable defense strategy”, 
and instead advocates recent advances in Intrusion Prevention Systems. But this 
“race” develops over the course of a decade or longer: see [Dwa05] for a timeline 
from the 1980s to today. Given the vast unpredictabli y of long-term innovation, this 
is hardly something a single organization can simulate to aid its decision-making; we 
have thus chosen not to model it here.  
[Sen90] also suggests a generic solution to this archetype’s woes: often there can 
be an agreement to reverse the cycle, as each party agrees to simultaneously “ease 




the notion of “we’ll use less security technology if ou agree to attack our computers 
less” is obviously not applicable in this case, particularly when the anonymous 
attacks, attackers, and motivations are myriad. This option is therefore not considered 
in our scenario. 
For additional information on Escalation in computer security, please see 





















Chapter 4: Limits to Growth and Escalation Archetypes, 
Combined 
 
4.1 Limits to Growth Description 
In the Limits to Growth archetype, a growing action is applied, which leads to 
increased gains or results. These gains encourage further growth, forming a 
reinforcing loop. However, the gains soon reach some natural limit, at which point the 
limiting process places downward pressure on further gains. Despite continued 
growth action, the gains will plateau and, in some cases, decline.  
As an instance of this archetype in security, we consider the effects of security 
demands on an organization’s computer staff of a fixed size. Suppose that an 
organization has a certain number of employees dedicated to various computer-
related tasks such as technical support, hardware maintenance and upgrades, and 
security-related tasks such as monitoring a firewall or an IDS, or maintaining 
antivirus software. Initially, the organization pays modest attention to security, but 
then decides to make some investment in it. Whether  investment includes 
purchasing equipment (IDS, encryption or antivirus software, and the like), security 
training, overtime, or higher salaries for employees who focus on security, it always 
involves reassigning personnel to security. Encouraged by the noticeable gains in 
security, further investments lead to more reassignments of personnel to security. 
This continues to be a good strategy until insufficient personnel are available for non-




in the computer system, forcing the security personnel to pause their efforts as these 
problems are addressed. Reassigning more employees to s curity (or demanding more 
of the current security employees) will bring no further gains; in fact, the additional 
technical problems as well as the support staff’s decreased efficiency from facing 
demands it can not meet may result in a decline in ga s. An influence diagram for 







Fig. 14. Influence Diagram for Limits to Growth 
 
Traversing the left side clockwise reads: “security investments increase the staff’s 
security efforts, decreasing the number of successful attacks. More successful attacks 
would decrease the management’s perceived benefit of security investments. More 
perceived benefits of investments leads to further investments.” Reversing the double 
negative yields: “investments leading to efforts leading to gains in security (i.e. less 
successful attacks), increasing the perceived benefit of investments and therefore 
leading to further investments” – this is a reinforcing loop. The right-hand loop, 
however, describes how increasing the staff’s security efforts can conflict with non-
security-related tasks, due to a personnel shortage. As indicated by the upward arrow, 




conflicts will cause problems that diminish the staff’s security efforts. A balancing 
loop is thus formed, as security efforts will (uncosciously) decrease as long as the 
conflict of resources with non-security tasks is present. Given a constant number of 
attempted attacks, implementing this archetype should result in a continuous 
reduction of successful attacks (i.e. increase of gains for security investments) until 
insufficient personnel are available for other tasks; at that point, the number of 
successful attacks will cease to fall further, and may in fact begin to rise. [Wol03] 
includes this archetype in the category “Underachievement”, as a reinforcing loop is 
desired for growth, but it is not successful. 
The simulation model can incorporate this Limit to Growth with the following 
property: Some value p is the highest percentage of staff efforts that can optimally be 
reallocated to security with no ill effect. If total demand for security efforts exceed 
(p/100)*SysAdminCapacity, then the “effective” hours for security are given by the 
SysAdminCapacity, minus some constant k times the excess demand. In the 
simulation described below, we have used p = 23 and k = 1.2, believing these values 
to be a reasonable description of a typical system. 
 
4.2 Combined Archetypes 
While the use of an archetype can present a complex system in readily-grasped 
terms, a given scenario or story may not neatly fit into a given archetype. The general 
archetypes of [Sen90], [Sen94], and [Bra02] are uniq e only in that they have been 
frequently observed in diverse settings, and that tey provide useful “building blocks” 




beginning with the influence diagram of one easily-observed archetype (or simply a 
balancing or reinforcing loop), then “widening and deepening” the diagram by adding 
additional “loops” to describe the observed behavior. Thus, a combination of 
archetypes is often the simplest way to grasp a system’  behavior when two or more 
different behavior patterns are exhibited simultaneously. (Such a combination, that of 
Limits to Growth with Shifting the Burden, can be found in [Sen90].) 
Observe that both Escalation and Limits to Growth hinge on the organization’s 
security investments and successful attacks; we thus connect their influence diagrams 
through these values. The resulting combined diagram is shown in Figure 15.  
Fig. 15. Influence Diagram for Combined Limits to Growth and Escalation 
 
Observe that the two influence diagrams largely address different issues, except for 
the upper-left-hand corner of Figure 15, which links successful attacks to security 




attacks increase the threat, increasing investments), Limits to Growth assumes a 
“negative” effect (successful attacks decrease perceived benefit, reducing 
investments). 
In combining the two archetypes it becomes clear tht both patterns may be true 
for different organizations with different cultures, or for different levels of 
management. Additionally, recall that an the influenc  diagram shows only 
“increases” and “decreases”, but quantitatively some links may be stronger than 
others. Thus, both patterns may be present within a si gle organization; a visible shift 
from increases to decreases in investment, or vice versa, will occur at times when the 
weight of one pattern exceeds that of the other. For example, when the organization’s 
management first invests in security, its perceived benefit is low, so further 
investments hinge on a reduction in attacks; later, s curity investments are believed 
an appropriate cure if successful attacks rise; finally, successful attacks may reach 
some upper limit at which point the management begins to lose its faith in 
investments and reduce them.  
The overall trend of this combined archetype, when vi wed in terms of successful 
attacks, will look as follows: a stable oscillation (due to Escalation) until security 
efforts exceed their optimal value (for the given staff size), followed by a rise in 
successful attacks (from Limits to Growth). At this point, several possibilities exist: 
the organization may continue (for a short duration) to advertise, leading to further 
attempted attacks; it may follow the “threat” pattern and push for more security 
investments; and/or it may follow the “perceived benefit” pattern and reduce security 




successful attacks will be followed by either a leveling off or a rise in successful 
attacks; the former would occur if the organization halts both advertising and 
investments, keeping attempted attacks constant. The highest risk, leading to a 
significant increase in successful attacks, occurs if the organization continues 
advertising, raising the attempted attacks, as its continued investments cause more 
woes for its computer staff, further diminishing their effective efforts.  
 
4.3 Simulation Setup 
The behavior of the organization’s management (which invests in security and 
demands staff-hours for it) and the aggregated attackers (who attempt the attacks) are 
then given by a series of rules (similar to those of Section 3.2), following the 
escalatory behavior described above. Here we demonstrate one possible outcome by 
assuming that the perceived benefit or “faith” in investments is held constant, and 
thus the decision regarding further investments is determined only by the threat to the 
organization. This decision is modeled by the following rule: The simulation begins 
with an initial demand of 0w  staff-hours for security. Every x1 days, { IF (Successful 
Simple Attacks > θ1), THEN increase staff-hours demanded for “simple” security 
tasks by w . Additionally, IF (Successful Sophisticated Attacks > θ2), THEN increase 
staff-hours demanded for “sophisticated” security tasks by v.} A delay of 1d  days is 
incurred for personnel reallocation.  
(The description of tasks as “simple” or “sophistica ed”, as well as the task-by-task 




The organization’s advertising efforts are modeled by the following rule: Every x2 
days, IF (Successful Simple Attacks < θ3), THEN decide to advertise. A delay of d2 
days is incurred before the advertising occurs.  
Lastly, the aggregated attackers’ response is modeled as follows: The initial value 
of Simple Attacks Attempted / Day is a0. Each day, IF (Advertising occurs), THEN a 
delay of d3 days occurs as the word spreads and new attack tools are accumulated, 
where upon Simple Attacks Attempted / Day is increased by a%. The initial value of 
Sophisticated Attacks Attempted / Day is b0. Each day, IF (Advertising occurs), 
THEN a delay of d4 of days occurs as the word spreads and new attacks re 
engineered, whereupon Sophisticated Attacks Attempted / Day is increased by b%.  
We simulate a system of approximately 200 machines. We have chosen a period of 
six months (180 days) for our simulation. Successful attacks per day are used as our 
measure of “attackers’ gains vs. organization’s gains.”  
With these values in mind, we first simulated a “baseline scenario” characterized 
by the following values: x1 = 7, x2 = 7; w0 = 29.8, w= 9.1, v = 1.6; θ1 = 6, θ2 = 2, θ3 = 
18; d1 = 14, d2 = 1, d3 = 2, d4 = 7; a0 = 15, a = 26; b0 = 0.6, b = 7. These values 
describe, in our opinion, an organization’s 180-day progression from minimal 
security efforts to full security efforts; a realistically aggressive advertising campaign; 
common delays for each action described; and a progression in terms of attack 
attempts from the minimal attack “noise” received by an inconspicuous organization 





4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 16. 
Fig. 16. Successful Attacks per Day, Escalation with Limits to Growth 
 
The number of successful attacks seems to oscillate f irly stably until 
approximately Day 145, at which point it rises dramatically. Until Day 145, the 
number of successful attacks hovers at about 11, which is this system’s equilibrium of 
escalation: security efforts, followed by advertising, followed by new attack attempts, 
followed by further security efforts. Around Day 145, however, the Limits to Growth 
archetype emerges: the demand for staff-hours exceeds th  optimal load the staff can 
bear, the staff’s performance deteriorates, and successful attacks rise. Note that 
successful attacks exceed θ3=18, the organization’s threshold for cessation of 
advertising, at approximately Day 155.  
Correspondingly, the number of attempted attacks (simple plus sophisticated) is 
shown in Figure 17 
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Fig. 17. Attempted Attacks per Day, Escalation with Limits to Growth 
 
The number of attempted attacks escalates as often as every seven days (the 
organization’s wait time between advertisements) until approximately Day 155. At 
that point, the company halts its advertising, and  constant 1925 attacks per day are 
attempted for the remainder of the period. Yet, returning to Figure 16, successful 
attacks are found to rise several times between Days 155 and 180. As the organization 
continues to reallocate staff to security and increase its demands on them, the 
personnel shortage for other tasks leads to more technical problems, sidetracking the 
increasingly overwhelmed security staff; attempted attacks thus become successful as 
the state of the countermeasures deteriorates and system vulnerability rises. Limits to 
Growth leads here to a decline in gains, not to a plateau. 
By examining the behavior of the system, one can realiz  the problem of the 
increase in “successful attacks” around day 145. In response to this problem, the 
organization should take some action. Below we show  the use of simulation can 
support decisions regarding what action best fits the goals and context of a given 
organization. 
Firstly, as our system was described, the increase in attempted attacks came not 




advertising. While this may not be the case for all organizations, certainly any 
organization considering advertising must weigh potential benefits (such as increased 
clientele) against the possibility of (and its preparedness for) Escalation.  
Secondly, even when Escalation is called for, it may be wise to escalate less 
strongly. The organization’s rule for increasing security efforts was given as: “Every 
x1 days, if successful (simple, sophisticated) attacks are greater than (θ1, θ2), increase 
efforts by (w, v).” Increasing the period x1 (i.e. reducing the frequency of possible 
escalation), raising the thresholds θ1 and θ2 (reducing the frequency of when 
escalation is called for), and/or reducing w and v (the quantities of escalation when it 
is employed) are all possible solutions. When a threat is perceived, the effect of 
reaction must be weighed against the risk of no action, and sometimes the greatest 
overall gain is achieved by a slower or weaker reaction. Similarly, when we turn to 
Limits to Growth, it is noted that if the limits will not be (or cannot be, as in [Mar03]) 
removed, then reducing the growth action will delay the onset of the limiting factors, 
as well as slowing the deterioration of growth once the limits manifest themselves. A 
reduction solution thus heeds both archetypes. To see which of these three reductions 
is most effective here, all three were simulated: rucing the frequency of increased 
efforts, raising the threshold for increased efforts, and reducing the quantity of efforts. 
Experimenting with each solution individually as well as combined with others, we 
found that our system responded most favorably to simply reducing the quantity of 
escalationw by 30%: each time the organization decides to increase its security 
efforts, it does so by 6.4 staff-hours, as opposed to the 9.1 of the baseline case. The 
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Fig. 18. Results of Reduced Escalation (Successful Attacks per Day) 
Note that the equilibrium number of successful attacks has risen to about 15 (as 
opposed to the 11 in Figure 16), but there is no dramatic climb in successful attacks 
by Day 180. The weaker reaction has not pushed demands on the staff beyond their 
point of optimality in these six months. This approach can thus be thought of as 
“partly losing Escalation, but winning Limits to Growth.” Note as well that the 
number of successful attacks reaches θ3=18, the advertising threshold, several times, 
leading to less advertising and thus less attempted attacks. Integrating Figures 16 and 
18, we find that the number of cumulative successful attacks is less for reduced 
escalation (~2650) than for full escalation (~2800). Given a particular organization’s 
structure, goals, and priorities, the above tradeoffs (equilibrium number of attacks, 
rise in attacks, advertising opportunities, cumulative attacks) should be considered to 
find whether reduced escalation is more in its interest than full escalation.  
Thirdly, a solution commonly found for Limits to Growth is to cease the growth 
action, and instead concentrate on removing the limiting condition. In our case, this 
would translate into hiring additional support staff. [Sen90] stresses the concept of 
“leverage”, i.e. an organization’s efforts will yield maximal gains if it carefully 
chooses where and when to apply those efforts. While hiring too early is prohibitively 




gains will begin. Additionally, the stronger the limit has become, the harder it is to 
remove it; in our case, once the support staff is overwhelmed with demands, it will 
not have time to introduce new hires to the intricacies of the computer system. Thus, 
the point of highest leverage for hiring is when it will take effect just before the 
demands on personnel exceed their optimal load. This requires great prediction skills 
on the part of the manager, including a sense of “feedback” regarding the support 
staff’s load. Otherwise, the best strategy is to hire as soon as possible once a decline 
in gains is visible. This also requires the manager to realize that indeed, gains have 
diminished since the optimal personnel load was reach d. As opposed to the previous 
strategies, which are executed before-the-fact, this strategy describes how an 
organization might now respond to problems. Following full escalation, Figure 16 
showed a rise in attacks around Day 145. Figure 19 shows the results if the 
organization responds rapidly and additional personnel are available as of Day 155. 
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Fig. 19. Full Escalation, with Hiring at Day 155 
 
The oscillations and steep rise occur as in Figure 16, followed by a steep drop in 
attacks due to the hiring. Integrating, we find a total of approximately 1,880 




comes with the cost of hiring.) The sooner the hiring, the less of the peak around Day 
150; the longer the wait to hire, the greater the peak.  
Figures 16, 18, and 19 have shown the results of the three above scenarios in terms 
of the number of successful attacks. An organization must also consider factors such 
as labor costs, and thus Figure 20 displays the cumulative staff-hours employed for 
each scenario: “baseline” (full escalation, without hiring), “reduced escalation”, and 
“escalation with hiring.” Note that the efforts of “baseline” and “hiring” will coincide 
until Day 155, at which point the curve for “hiring” will grow more steeply. 
Fig. 20. Cumulative Staff-Hours for Each Scenario 
 
Thus, given the number of successful attacks and number of staff-hours employed, 
both per-day and cumulatively, an organization can o sider its best options as it 
encounters this combination of archetypes.  
For additional information on the combination of Escalation and Limits to Growth 
as it occurs in security, please see [Ros06c], fromwhich this chapter was excerpted. 
Chapter 5:  Related Work 
 

















5.1 System Dynamics and Archetypes  
System dynamics thinking is introduced in [For61]. An introduction to archetypes 
can be found in [Sen90], with added details and recommendations in [Sen94], while 
[Bra02] extends this work to list ten different archetypes. [Wol03] argues that all 
existing archetypes can be included in one of four “co e generic” archetype categories 
such as “Underachievement” or “Out-of-Control”; however, [Wol03] acknowledges 
that the more-specific, more-familiar ten archetypes (such as “Escalation” or “Limits 
to Growth”) are more rapidly applied to real systems, and we have thus used them 
here. [Mar03] applies systems thinking and archetypes to safety engineering. Some 
archetypes found in safety are clearly those seen els where (such as “Eroding 
Goals”), but others seem unique to safety. (This is the case partly because safety 
measures can be a victim of their own success – when no accidents occur, there can 
be pressure to reduce safety measures.) For now we have focused on the more-
common archetypes of [Bra02] regarding security, but fut re work may find that new 
archetypes apply to safety as well.  
5.2 Sources of Data  
Empirical data regarding computer security are still fairly rare as of now. 
Anecdotes detailing attacks and their responses, such as [Gib02], are very illustrative 
of the attacker/defender interaction, but few such anecdotes have been published. 
Some information regarding what is general practice in the security world today 
can be found in [Gor05a], a survey of several hundred organizations. For example, 
our model includes IDSs but not biometrics because the former is found to be 




Most data on attacks are gathered from analyzing “honeypots” or “honeynets”, 
systems designed to be attacked. Such studies include o r own laboratory’s [Pan05], 
as well as [Dac04], [Pou04a], [Pou04b], and [Pou05].  
Hypothesized attacker behavior is described in [Jon97], based on empirical 
findings from controlled attack experiments. This focuses on the behavior of the 
individual attacker, while more data are needed on the aggregated effects of multiple 
attackers. 
To help meet the dearth of empirical data regarding security, nine teams are 
collaborating on the projects DETER and EMIST [Baj04]. DETER involves building 
a massive (currently approximately 200 machines, intended to reach 1000 machines) 
“researcher- and vendor-neutral” network testbed for emulating various types of 
attacks, countermeasures, and network topologies. Meanwhile, the EMIST project 
seeks to formalize methodologies for measuring these ffects. Combined, these 
projects should provide a wealth of useful, unbiased, and well-accepted emulated 
attack data. Both studies will enrich our model with quantifiable values, e.g. honeynet 
findings might show that 20 buffer-overflow attacks of a certain type are attempted 
each day, and the DETER/EMIST findings would tell us that the attack will succeed 
80% of the time if the network has Topology A but only 60% of the time with 
Topology B. 
Regarding user factors, [Lar03a] uses surveys to understand Internet usage, and 
[Lar03b] conducts studies with test websites to investigate users’ privacy behaviors 








5.3 Economics and Security 
 
[Cam03] considers the effects of public disclosure regarding security breaches on a 
company’s stock prices. [Gor02], [Gor05b], and [Bod05] all use economic analysis in 
determining how much security investment is worthwhile for a company, given its 
priorities; however, details are not provided as to what should be done specifically 
with the investments. This provides the connection p i t to our model. 
Economic requirements are also used to lead to assumptions or specifications for 
related computer security, e.g. determining the subjective cost and total welfare 
regarding network routing [Fei05] or requirements on trusted platforms placed by 




5.4 Other Modeling Approaches in Security 
 
One approach in security has been to probabilistically quantify an attacker’s 
behavior and its impact on a system’s ability to prvide certain security-related 
properties. Attempts have been made to build models that take into account both the 
attacker and the system being validated. A general model of an intrusion-tolerant 
system is proposed in [Gon01] to describe security exploits by considering attack 
impacts; the system state is represented in terms of failure-causing events. [Jha01] 
proposes a combination of state-level modeling, formal logic, and Bayesian analysis 




quantify system survivability. Finally, Ortalo et al. [Ort99] propose modeling known 
vulnerabilities in a system using a “privilege graph”. By combining a privilege graph 
with simple assumptions concerning an attacker’s behavior, the authors then obtain an 
“attack state graph.” Parameter values for such a graph have been obtained 
experimentally; once obtained, an attack state graph can be analyzed using standard 
Markov techniques to obtain several probabilistic measures of security. [Ste04] uses a 
probabilistic model for validating an intrusion-tolerant system that combined 
intrusion tolerance and security, allowing the designers to make choices that 
maximize the intrusion tolerance before they implement the system. Compared to 
these models, the model presented here is more generic i  its inclusion of other 
human elements such as users and system administrator . Additonally, other than 
[Ort99] which uses data collected empirically to assess some of the parameters values 
in the model, the other ones are not developed to easily be linked to empirical data. 
Cyberciege ([Nav06], [Irv05]), developed by the Naval Postgraduate School, is a 
computer game with a very engaging user interface and virtual world, intended for 
training students to understand security engineering. Cyberciege focuses on detailed 
access control, user-by-user, for a small number of users. Each piece of hardware is 
hand-selected from a list of fictional brands (e.g. “BitFlipper router”), and physical 
security measures are implemented on a user-by-user basis. The determination of 
whether an attack succeeds is by comparing asset deirability and how well standard 
procedures have been followed. Cyberciege’s level of detail models the role of an 




model abstracts one level higher, to the manager who oversees several hundred 
machines. 
In a similar vein, Fred Cohen & Associates offer a security simulator [Coh06] on 
their website (http://all.net/games/index.html). Fully described in [Coh99], this 
simulator gives examples of how a single attack of varying sophistication might 
succeed against different computers with different countermeasures. The defender 
strength, i.e. to what degree the defender does the right thing, is specified as a 
percentage by the user before running the simulator. If an attack succeeds, the dollar 
loss due to the attack is estimated based on the atacker profile, e.g. how much will a 
successful attack by a private investigator cost? Our approach attempts to add in more 
empirical data, as described in Section 5.2. Additionally, our work extends the 
“defender strength” idea by allowing for strengths of each countermeasure: a system 
may have a 90% effective firewall but only a 70% effective IDS. Furthermore, rather 
than specify a value for defender strength, the user of our model inputs managerial 
decisions such as how much effort is allocated to which security tasks and how 
skilled the staff is – the model then uses these inputs to determine the resulting 












The archetype and results of simulation execution presented here show the value of 
systems dynamics modeling for enterprise security. The evolution over time of two 
slightly different “what-if” scenarios may result in very different pictures, reinforcing 
the value of simulation. Systems thinking, combined with simulation, can assist an 
organization in placing its efforts in the places that will give the most “leverage” to 
their goals, and in diagnosing and solving problems. This approach thus leads to a 
more enlightened weighing of costs vs. benefits for the proposed decisions that an 
organization might make.  
System dynamics simulation is also an intuitive and powerful tool for 
understanding computer security, as well as for training professionals. In time, our 
model will mesh with much other research currently being done by others, leading to 
gains in a wide variety of directions. 
 
6.2 Future Work 
 
A great deal of future work remains as well, including:  
• “Deepening” the simulation model with more detail, e.g. where linear rates 
had been assumed, perhaps logarithmic or exponential would be more 
accurate. The documentation of the simulation model alr ady reveals several 




• “Broadening” the model to include such factors as: 
o User details describing their interaction with the security policy. 
o Asset properties. Currently we only show successful attacks; future 
work can link this to system availability, confidentiality, and integrity. 
o Internal attacks. Currently it is assumed that the fir wall is X% 
effective against all simple attacks, for example, which assumes that 
all simple attacks come from outside the firewall.  
• Obtaining additional empirical data for use as parameters in the simulation 
model. Sources for such data, including work from our wn research group, 
are described in Section 5.2. 
• Modeling other instances of the above archetypes, modeling other archetypes, 
other combinations of archetypes, and looking for new archetypes. Appendix I 
gives a few ideas for modeling other archetypes. 
• Documenting real-world case studies in security, using archetypes to explain 
the situations, and using simulation to suggest improvements. (For example, 
[Sen94] first describes the story of an airline’s failure, applies archetypes to 
describe it, and then builds a simulator through which it is shown, for 
example, that had the airline not cut its ticket prices quite so steeply, it would 
not have gone bankrupt.) We have already begun interv ewing one system 
administrator and documenting his case study, but otaining the necessary 






Appendix I: Archetypes 
 
 
Here we briefly describe each of the ten archetypes of [Bra02], giving one possible 
example from security.  
 
Shifting the Burden, or Symptomatic Fixes. We witness a problem symptom, 
and rather than think about the root cause, we try to fix the symptom. Doing so 
distracts us from the actual cause of the problem, or masks the symptoms so it’s 
harder to diagnose the problem. Suppose a system is continually falling victim to 
successful “script-kiddy” attacks (symptom). The company may install an I.D.S. to 
catch the attacks (symptomatic fix), when in reality the attacks wouldn’t make it into 
the system if the company had a good firewall, and wouldn’t succeed if they kept 
their vulnerabilities down. (Fundamental fixes.)  
Fixes that Fail. Here, the attempted fix actually worsens the underlying problem 
in time. The newly-installed I.D.S may have a high false-alarm rate and require a 
great deal of the sysadmin’s attention. The sysadmin is now too busy to attend to 
other duties (such as addressing vulnerabilities), so the number of successful attacks 
actually increases.  
Success to the Successful. There is a tendency to believe that if putting some 
money into Approach A yields good results, then putting more money into Approach 
A (and ignoring Approach B) will further improve results. For example: for an 
investment of $100, a Host-Vulnerability-Scanner will yield more improvements than 
an IDS. But continued investment into the Host-Vuln-Scanner (diverting funds from 




Limits to Growth . Increased efforts and investments produce increased results, 
until the system reaches its natural limit. At that point, results will either plateau or 
decline. For example, given an inexperienced sysadmin staff of a fixed size, training 
them will result in significant gains to the network’s security. But eventually, their 
size (rather than skill) becomes the limiting factor, so further training will accomplish 
nothing.  
Attractiveness Principle. Increased efforts are no longer producing results, with 
two different limits fighting growth. The manager must decide which limit to address 
first/more. Suppose we have a simultaneous investment in both more/better sysadmin 
staff, and some technology (maybe a firewall). At some point, the Return on 
Investment will drop; at that point, we must decide which factor is more of a limiting 
one.  
Growth and Underinvestment. A successful approach may initially seem to fail 
if it wasn’t given proper investment/support/capacity. For example, a company may 
double its system size; if the SysAdmin size (which is the capacity in our case) is kept 
constant, overall performance will drop. If, instead, the SysAdmin size is properly 
increased, the company will see a gain.  
Eroding Goals. If a goal is not immediately met, it can be tempting to reduce the 
initial goal. A manager may try for an Availability (or confidentiality, etc.) Level of 
3, find that the expenses next month are too high, so s/he drops the goal to Level 2. 
The next month, the company is hit with a massive attack, causing more loss than had 




catches 100% of all attacks. What, that gives too many false alarms?  Okay, maybe 
90%. Still too many alarms?  Okay, maybe set it to 80%.”)    
Escalation. Party A puts in more efforts, yielding more result ; this threatens Party 
B, who does likewise, and so on. (The U.S./ U.S.S.R. arms race during the Cold War 
is a good example.)  If a company increases its security efforts and publicizes how 
secure it is, or otherwise makes itself more of an attractive target, it will receive more 
sophisticated attacks, which will require more security investments, and so on.  
Accidental Adversaries. Two parties initially agree towards cooperation, but then 
Party A perceives an offense (often unintentional) from Party B; it then retaliates, and 
the situation escalates from there. An example herewould be the SysAdmin and User, 
who agree they want the company to succeed, but then the user accidentally breaches 
the security policy, leading the SysAdmin to impose a harsher security policy and 
other enforcement measures. The user (or another user) may become annoyed and 
retaliate.  
Tragedy of the Commons. If two efforts independently consume a common 
resource without respecting one another, both will see reduced gains as the resource 
runs out. In our case, if a company decides to invest more in IDS as well as Host-
Checking-Tool, but maintains the size of its SysAdmin (which is the “common” 







Appendix II: Model Screenshots 
 
The basic building blocks for continuous modeling in the Extend simulation 
environment include holding tanks, constants, and equations, to name a few. 
As one example, we show a simplified version of how the antivirus software 
effectiveness is modeled. Suppose that this system needs its virus definitions updated 
on a daily basis; if so, an antivirus that has been totally neglected for too long of a 
period will become close to useless, as it fails to catch the majority of viruses 
circulating the Internet today. Thus, antivirus effectiveness is reduced each day by 
some average “daily loss rate” which describes the occurrence of new viruses, and 
increased each day by the number of staff-hours updating its definitions (or otherwise 
maintaining it) that day. The effectiveness is then measured on a 0-to-1 scale and 











Fig. 21. Sample Screenshot of Holding Tank, Equation, and Constant Blocks 
 
Notice the number of staff-hours in, subject to some function, the holding tank for 




tank are given, limited to the range between 0 and 1, and output as today’s “antivirus 
level.” 
To allow for greater abstraction, all of the above blocks can be inserted into a 




Staff-Hrs per Machine 
per Day for Antivirus
 
Fig. 22. Sample Hierarchical Block, Antivirus 
 
Here we see only the input and the output; the remaining holding tank, equation 
block, etc. are all hidden inside the hierarchical block. 
 In our model, a certain number of attacks of a given sophistication level are 
attempted each day. Depending on the effectiveness of the various countermeasures 
and the system’s vulnerabilities, a certain number succeed. Another hierarchical 
block, which performs this evaluation, is shown in F gure 23. 
Fig. 23. Sample Hierarchical Block, Simple Attack Success 
The block on the far-right of Figure 23 is an output lotter, used to generate many of 
the figures presented in this thesis. 
The model has a great deal of constant parameters; for example, the antivirus daily 





ConfigVulnLevel, loss if ignored .05, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 1.5 / machine 
NetVulns, loss if ignored .04, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.6 / machine 
AppVulns, loss if ignored .004, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.13 / machine 
AppVuln, loss from new S/W 0.8
ToleranceLevel, loss if ignored .1, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.67 / machine 
EncryptionLevel, loss if ignored .001, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.067 / machine 
Antiviruslevel, loss if ignored .02, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.4 / machine 
FirewallLevel, loss if ignored .033, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.66 / machine 
IDSLevel, loss if ignored .05, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 2 / machine 
Fig. 24. Sample from Spreadsheet with Parameter Values 
Lastly, while certain parameter values (such as antivirus loss rate) reflect the 
reality of the system, others (such as machine size, taff size and the presence of 
countermeasures) reflect decisions that a manager might ake. To allow for easy 
“what-if” simulation, these parameters were extracted o a user-friendly Graphical 













Appendix III: Model Documentation 
 
 
OVERVIEW:   The end-user of the model sets several sliders and switches to 
describe the system, countermeasures, allocation of sysadmin to various tasks, and 
attacks. The end-user can then see the costs of this configuration. A certain number of 
attacks are then attempted on the system each day; given the details of the system and 
its countermeasures, the end-user can see how many of those attacks succeed, or how 
many were blocked by a given countermeasure. The end-user can also track the 
effectiveness of a given countermeasure over time.  
 





Table II: Slider Inputs for the Model Graphical User Interface 
Name in Model Type Meaning 




Slider, 0-80 Personnel-hours (or “man-hours”) of System 
Administration and Security Officer staff 
employed per day. A SysAdminSize of 40 
describes 5 people working 8 hrs/day each 
day, or 10 people working 4 hrs/day, etc. 
SysAdminSkill Slider, 1-5 Average overall skill of the System 
Administration and Security Officers Staff. 
The 1-5 scale is ours.  
SysAdmin Motivation Slider, 1-5 How motivated the SysAdmin staff is to 
protect the system; we impose a 1-5 scale. 
New Software is 




Interval (in days) between installation of new 
software (which contains new vulnerabilities). 





Further descriptions of the system, e.g. Windows vs. Linux, would be a critical 
step in adding detail to the model; it will hopefully be considered in a future 
implementation. 
 
COUNTERMEASURE INPUTS:   We include several common 
countermeasures. In the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey of 494 
U.S. corporations, universities, government bodies, etc., the most common security 
technologies used (Fig. 16), by percentage of respondents, were: Antivirus software 
(99%); Firewalls (98%); Server-based access control lists (71%); Intrusion detection 
(68%); Encryption for data in transit (64%). We view the access control lists as part 
of the “SysAdmin’s Enforcement Actions” and not a separate technology per se, as it 
is built into most operating systems today. For simplicity’s sake, we chose to include 
both data-in-transit encryption and file-encryption as “encryption software.”   
A significant countermeasure not described directly in the CSI/FBI survey is the 
emerging field of attack tolerance (as opposed to prevention or detection). This could 
include designs for graceful degradation under attack; redundancy and diversity (in 
some cases); and other technologies allowing the system to succeed despite the 
attack. We thus include a countermeasure entitled “olerance mechanisms.”   
Additionally, as 70% of the survey respondents (Fig. 17 in the FBI survey) 
identified some type of network security training for their users as important, we have 




Lastly, we have included vulnerability-scanning tools which can assist the system 
administrator in finding vulnerabilities to fix. These include host-configuration 
vulnerability scanning tools, such as FERRET; and network-vulnerability scanning 
tools, such as NESSUS.  
For all of the above countermeasures, we presently assume that they are either 
present in full strength, or not at all. (They’re controlled by binary switches.)  Future 
implementations of the model may modify this. The countermeasures are given in 
Table III. 
COST/EXPENSE EQUATIONS & OUTPUTS: Given the above descriptions, 
we can now compute the system’s expenses. (For now, we simply tally the number of 
successful attacks, rather than describing the monetary loss they cause the company; 
this too will hopefully be improved in a future model.)   
Table III: Countermeasures Included in the Model 
Name in Model Type Meaning 
A Firewall? Y/N Switch “1” if the system has a firewall; “0” if it 
doesn’t.  




Y/N Switch “1” if an Intrusion Detection System is 
present. 
Encryption Software? Y/N Switch “1” if encryption software is installed. 
Tolerance 
Mechanisms? 
Y/N Switch “1” if tolerance mechanisms are present. 
A Host-Vulnerability 
Scanning Tool? 
Y/N Switch “1” if the sysadmin uses a tool such as 





Y/N Switch “1” if the sysadmin uses a tool such as 
NESSUS to check for network vulnerabilities. 
User Training for 
Better Security 
Practices? 







Expenses reflect all the money spent on the system over the duration of the 
simulation (usually ~100 days). StaffCost is the cost per day of employing the 
sysadmin staff. PurchaseCost is the cost to purchase the various countermeasures, 
which we assume is a one-time payment. We then have: 
Expenses = (StaffCost * Time) +  PurchaseCost.  
    ($)        =  ($/day) * (days)   +   ($) 
In Extend terms, Expenses is an accumulating tank; StaffCost is the input, and 
PurchaseCost is the initial level. 
 
StaffCost = STAFFCOSTPERHOUR * SysAdminSize.  
     ($)  =  ($/hr) * (personnel-hours)  
The cost of employing the sysadmin staff per day. We assume an average cost of 
$35 per personnel-hour.  
For PurchaseCost, we assume that Tolerance Measures, Encryption Software, and 
an Antivirus must be purchased for every machine in the system to be effective. (The 
effects of installing an antivirus on only half, 1/3, etc. of the machines would be 
another interesting question for future work.)   
Per-system purchase costs = SystemSize *  
{ (Tolerance Measures?)*TOLCOST + (Encryption  Software?)*ENCRYPTCOST  
+ (Antivirus?)* ANTIVIRUSCOST }. 




We simply assume for now that tolerance measures cost $300/system. For 
encryption software, PGP is very commonly used (try Google searches for 
“encryption software” and the like); the most basic version of PGP Desktop 
Professional 9 costs $200; we have used the value $220 to allow for a few more 
features. For the antivirus, Norton Antivirus, one of the most popular products on the 
market, costs $40 /machine in the 5-user pack. (Sources: manufacturer’s websites.)   
We do not include the host-configuration or network-vulnerability scanning tools 
in costs or expenses, as the most popular products used (i.e. FERRET and NESSUS) 
are available for free. The remaining two PurchaseCost items are the firewall and 
IDS, whose cost is independent of the size of the system behind them.  
PurchaseCost = per-system purchase costs + (A Firewall?)* FIREWALLCOST + (An 
IDS?)* (IDSCost). 
     ($)  = ($)           +(1/0)*$   + (1/0)* $. 
We assume that a high-quality firewall costs $10,00 given Dr. Cukier’s 
experience with proprietary firewalls. For the IDS cost, we take the price of the Cisco 
4250, which is $30,000. 
  
SYSADMIN ALLOCATION: We describe the SysAdmin staff’s “capacity” to 
maintain and protect the system as a function of its size, skill, and motivation: 
TotalSysAdminCapacity = SysAdminSize * SysAdminMotivation * ln( 
SysAdminSkill + 1). 
(Note that TotalSysAdminCapacity is measured in pseudo-personnel hours, as it 




phenomenon that beyond a certain point, additional training accomplishes very little. 
We use (skill+1) so that a skill level of 1, the lowest, doesn’t result in an ln(1) = 0 
term.) 
The end-user then decides what percentage of the TotalSysAdminCapacity should 
be dedicated to what task, using the sliders in the gre n box. The sysadmin needs to 
spend time and attention to deal with any given countermeasure (or its side effects!). 
We refer to these as “countermeasure efforts.”  Obviously, more efforts are needed 
during deployment than afterwards, but for now, we simply describe “efforts-per-
day.”  (One approach would be to consider an average effort over the product’s 
lifetime, including its deployment, but this again is for future work.)    The order of 
the various efforts is consistent with that of the model, but it has no particular 
significance.  
“Antivirus Efforts” consist primarily of keeping all of the antivirus definitions up-
to-date. The percentage of TotalSyadminCapacity dedicated to Antivirus Efforts is 
called Antivir%.  
“Firewall Efforts” consist of tasks needed to maint the firewall, primarily 
through applying new patches as firewall vulnerabilities are discovered. (Firewall%). 
“IDS Efforts” consist of maintaining the intrusion detection system, mostly by 
downloading new signatures. (IDS%). 
“Encryption Efforts” consist of updating and maintai ing the encryption software 
(quite possibly including helping users who run into difficulty using it). (Encrypt%).  
“Enforcement Actions” include setting proper access control; monitoring the 




users. For example, if a user tried using a “weak” (i.e. easily guessed) password such 
as “joe”, a vigilant sysadmin would prevent him from doing so. (Enforce%). 
 “Software Patches” reflects the time spent per dayon finding and installing 
patches for newly-discovered vulnerabilities in anyof the system’s netware, operating 
systems, or applications. (Patch%). 
“Tolerance Efforts” depend on the particular tolerance measure; some measures 
are relatively low-maintenance (e.g. if graceful degradation has been built-in, then no 
further action is needed), but some are high-maintenance (e.g. if the system has a 
backup web server that runs a different operating system, the backup server has to be 
maintained as well). (Tol%). 
“Addressing Alarms” refers to the alarms raised by the firewall and IDS; 
sometimes these were in fact attacks, but often they were legitimate actions. A good 
sysadmin should sort through these. (Alarm%). In the new versions, we’ve gotten rid 
of “addressing alarms” as its own task; it’s now included in either “IDS Efforts” or 
“Firewall Efforts.” 
The various desired percentages, as well as the TotalSysAdminCapacity and 
SystemSize, are input into the HoursForTasks block. The outputs of this block 
describe how many SysAdmin pseudo-personnel-hours (or more precisely, skill-
motivation-personnel-hours each day) are actually allocated to each task.  
If the various desired percentages (inputs) add up to 100 or less, then all of the 
desired demands can be met, and the process is simple:  
Hours allocated to Firewall = (Firewall% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity. 
Hours allocated to IDS = (IDS% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity. 
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The firewall and IDS are independent of the size of system behind them. (Or are 
they?  Once we include analyzing alarms in Firewall Hours & IDS Hours, well, the 
bigger the system, the more alarms likely. In the new paper, I assumed staff-hours per 
machine for these as well.)  For the other efforts, however, we must factor in the 
system size; after all, to spend a total of two hours per day on updating antivirus 
definitions for a single computer is certainly sufficient; for a thousand computers, it 
probably won’t be. We thus talk of “hours allocated per system [per day].”  Note that 
for now, we assume that doubling the system size will simply halve the personnel-
hours available for a given task; in reality, larger system sizes tend to come with 
mechanisms for better management, so we might in the future consider a factor such 
as log(systemsize). For the moment, though, we’ve kept the divisor linear. The 
following hours are per-machine: 
Hours allocated to Antivirus = (Antivir% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 
Hours allocated to Encryption = (Encrypt% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 
Hours allocated to Enforcement Actions = (Enforce% / 100) * 
TotalSysAdminCapacity / SystemSize. 
Hours allocated to Software Patches  = (Patch% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 





Hours allocated to (False) Alarms = (Alarm% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 
(A larger system will generate more alarms, and thus needs more attention.) 
IF, however, the end-user specifies a series of percentages with the sliders that sum 
to >100%, not all of the desired hours will actually be allocated that way. A prompt 
can inform the end-user that the values have exceed 100%, and that s/he may wish to 
modify values before running the simulation. (This prompt was built into several 
earlier models; it was omitted from the Aug. 17 version for simpler presentation, but 
can be reincorporated if desired.)  If the end-user chooses to continue, priority will be 
assigned from left-to-right, i.e. first Antivir% of the  TotalSysAdminCapacity, if
available, will be allocated to antivirus; then up to Firewall%, if available, to firewall, 
and so on. 
(Extend description: looking inside the HoursForTasks block, we see a series of 
equations, converting the percentages into HoursDemanded. Below that, we see a 
series of holding tanks. All of the tanks are reset to their starting values at the end of 
each day by a periodic pulse. The first tank has starting value 
TotalSysAdminCapacity; the other tanks have starting value zero. At the beginning of 
each day, TotalSysAdminCapacity flows into the first tank; AntivirusHours 
Demanded is “wanted” from that tank; the quantity “gotten” is the hours actually 
allocated to antivirus. The remaining contents of the first tank flow into the second 
tank, where again a demanded quantity is “wanted”; up to that quantity is “gotten”, 
and the remainder flows into the third tank; and so on. Hours “gotten” are either used 




For the version in the archetypes paper: a new allocati n block was built, in which 
all demands are met if they sum to less than 100%; if they exceed 100%, then they are 
doled out in proportion to their demand, i.e. if the demands are: {30, antivirus; 40, 
tolerance; 50, IDS}; but the SysAdmin capacity is only 60; then it will allocate 
15/20/25, respectively. 
Additionally, the archetypes version adds in the factor of sysadmin inefficiency if 
pushed beyond optimal capacity. Hours allocated to a given task are decreased by a 
linear multiple of the total demand’s exceeding the optimal capacity. (Note that we 
haven’t yet included a factor to describe the inefficiency of X net demanded hours for 
ten different tasks, which has greater inefficiency than X net demanded hours for one 
task.) 
 
I actually didn’t use the allocation system in the n w (Escalation) paper, I just 
“fed” each task directly as many hours as were desired. 
 
The newest paper (DSN) once again made use of the allocation system – pushing 
the Sysadmin too far resulted in the “limit to growth.” In this paper, the limit set in 
much more quickly, as we rephrased things: “sysadmin hours” were for all tasks; as 
soon as security demands take too many of those hours, ther things go wrong 
because of ignored tasks. The rule used was thus the following (the numbers used 
here: 23%, 1.25, etc., were a combination of guesses on my part, and what made the 
graphs come out okay, i.e. GIVEN our guesses for how to describe a 200-machine 




wanted the limit to kick in towards the end of this period, and that the limiting effect 
be fairly strong.) 
 
Maximum optimal security load = OPTPERCENT * TotalSysadminCapacity. 
IF (total hours demanded for security > maximum optimal load), EfficiencyStretch 
= STRETCHCONSTANT * (total hours demanded for security – maximum optimal load).  
 
AvailableCapacity = TotalSysadminCapacity – EfficiencyStretch. 
 
VULNERABILITIES: Many attempted attacks will only succeed if the system has 
(known) vulnerabilities. These are grouped into four categories: 
“Mistakes” includes all user mistakes, such as not logging off, downloading a 
virus, and using weak passwords. (Mistakes block outputs MistakeFactor.) 
“Host-Configuration Vulnerabilities” include settings that the sysadmin didn’t set 
properly, such as leaving ports open, allowing everyone access to sensitive files, etc. 
(ConfigVulns block outputs HostConfigVulnsFactor.) 
“Network Vulnerabilities” include those flaws that have been discovered in the 
network software, which could be exploited by an attack; these can be corrected with 
patches. (NetVulns block outputs NetVulnsFactor.) 
“ Application Vulnerabilities” include those flaws discovered in application 
software, which could be exploited by an attack (e.g. a flaw in Apache could be 




to cause remote execution of code). These are also corrected with patches. (AppVulns 
block outputs AppVulnsFactor.) 
 
We measure each of these subclasses as a “factor” between 0 and 1, where 0 is best 
(no known vulnerabilities of this type exist on this system) and 1 is worst (i.e. the 
system is permeated with vulnerabilities of this type). An overall “vulnerability 
factor” (VulnFactor), also between 0 and 1, is computed from these: 
VulnFactor = Min{1, [  (MISTAKECOEFF * MistakeFactor)  
                                     +  (HOSTCONFIGCOEFF * HostConfigVulnsFactor)   
                   + (NETVULNSCOEFF * NetVulnsFactor) + 
                   + (APPVULNCOEFF * AppVulnFactor)] } 
The “Min” function keeps the overall VulnFactor to a maximum of 1. Note that it 
is possible to reduce one or two vulnerability subfactors, and yet still have an overall 
factor of 1 if the other subfactors have been ignored. We believe that this reflects the 
reality of system vulnerabilities. We have weighted host-configuration vulnerabilities 
most heavily, followed by mistakes and application vulnerabilities, and then finally 
network vulnerabilities. This was Rosenfeld’s impression of the most-frequently 
exploited vulnerabilities. (The host-configuration vulnerability is particularly 
pernicious, as an attacker often need not “breach” ny part of the system to perform 
an attack; therefore, such an attack is often not detected by an I.D.S.) [How did you 
obtain such a ranking? Is it more based on the number of vulnerabilities of each type 
present or on the impact that each of these vulnerability types has?]  I was thinking 




vulnerability. Thus my comment about “more pernicious as it doesn’t require a 
breach.”  Again, this is all my judgment here.  
 
Archetypes Version: To show the difference between those vulnerabilities fixed by 
enforcement (i.e. host config and mistakes), and those fixed by patches (i.e. netvulns 
and appvulns), two more derived values were created:  (A “strength” of 1 is best.) 
 ConfigStrength = 1 – (CONFIGHOSTCOEFF* ConfigVuln) – 
(CONFIGMISTAKECOEFF* MistakeFactor);  
 SWStrength = 1 – (SWAPPCOEFF* AppVulnFactor ) -  (SWNETCOEFF * 
NetVulnFactor); 
 
SWStrength is a straight average of how well the apps and the netware/OS has 
been patched. (Again, with the “1 minus thing” to switch a 1->0 scale (vuln of 0 is 
best) to a 0-> 1 scale (strength of 1 is best).)  For ConfigStrength, I weighted the 
average 60/40 between ConfigVulns and Mistakes; again, just my judgment as to how 
dangerous ConfigVulns are. 
 
Newest version (Escalation paper): I left the “SWStrength/ ConfigStrength” same 
as the previous paper, as it worked perfectly well for my purposes here.  
We now describe the workings of the individual vulnerability subfactors.  
Mistakes. User mistakes are given as a factor of three conditi s: The users’ 
Awareness of security issues, as a value 0-to-1, where 0 is no awareness, 1 is very 
high awareness; the users’ Concern for security issues, 0-to-1, (we assume at this 
Comment [i3]: Page: 1 




point that the lowest level of concern is 0, i.e. no concern; the issue of deliberate 
sabotage, where the user is “negatively concerned” with actively damaging the 
system, has not yet been incorporated into this model); and the sysadmin’s Hours 
Allocated to Enforcement Actions, in pseudo-personnel-hours per machine per day. 
With proper sysadmin enforcement actions in place, th  users’ ability to make 
dangerous mistakes can be sharply minimized or eliminated altogether. We then 
compute an overall Mistake Factor, as a value between 0 (no dangerous user 
mistakes) and 1 (dangerous user mistakes happen all the time).  
MistakeFactor = 1 – [ {(AWARENESS + CONCERN) / USERMISTAKEDIVISOR}  
              +{ Hours Allocated to Enforcement Actions / 
ENFORCEMENTMISTAKEDIVISOR} ] 
Archetype version: the 0.7 was changed to 1.5. [Where are these numbers coming 
from?] 
The MistakeFactor is then limited by a max of 1 and a min of 0. The numbers 
were designed as follows: even given perfect awareness and concern, i.e. Awareness 
+ Concern = 2, if there are no enforcement actions, the mistake factor will still be 
.091 (not 0) to account for human error; (for example, this author recalls once 
downloading a virus simply because he accidentally clicked the wrong button.)  
Conversely, given sufficient enforcement actions (we assume .7 pseudo-hours per 
system per day would suffice), the mistake factor will go to zero, regardless of user 
awareness or concern. Note that the mistake factor is “memoryless” and employs no 
holding tanks; we assume that if awareness, concern, or enforcement were to 
suddenly decrease today, the effects would be felt immediately.  
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While we would like to make Awareness and Concern variables that the end-user 
could adjust, for now we simply set both Awareness and Concern to 0.2. The User 
Training for Better Security Practices? switch adds TRAININGEFFECT to Awareness, 
raising it to 1. [Where are these numbers coming from?] (Future implementations 
may describe the effects of training over time, i.e. a gradual rise in awareness.)   
These numbers are all just guesses on my part about the “average” user’s awareness 
and concern, and how much training can help. (I wanted to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of full training, so I let it raise Awareness all the way to 1.) 
ConfigVulns has two inputs: Hours Allocated to Enforcement Actions (in pseudo-
hours per system per day), and A Host-Vulnerability Scanning Tool? (0 if not present, 
1 if present). A HostConfigVulnsFactor of 0 is best. The scanning tool assists the 
sysadmin by finding the vulnerabilities present; however, the sysadmin must still 
spend time fixing these vulnerabilities!  We thus model the scanning tools as an 
increase in the “effective hours” (or “virtual enforcement hours”) available for fixing 
vulnerabilities. If the scanning tool is not present, “virtual enforcement  hours” = 
hours allocated to enforcement actions. If the scanning tool is present, “virtual 
enforcement hours” =  CONFIGTOOLMULTIPLIER * hours allocated to enforcement 
actions.   
Yes, it was my assumption for the present that the tool can double the sysadmin’s 
effective hours here; just picked a number to try. 
 
The vulnerability level is then described using (1 – the level of a holding tank), i.e. 
the holding tank is “full” when all vulnerabilities have been patched, and “empty” 
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when no vulnerabilities have been patched. (All of the holding tanks in this model 
have the default setting of “want” connector not being able to reduce the tank value 
below zero.)  The holding tank has a “loss rate”; this describes the fact that over time, 
new vulnerabilities are discovered; additionally, new user accounts are created, etc., 
all requiring attention from the sysadmin to prevent additional vulnerabilities. We set 
the loss rate here to .05, i.e. if the sysadmin configured the system perfectly, but then 
ignored it for twenty days, it would now look very vulnerable. (For now we assume a 
linear loss rate. Further detail may modify this in the future.)  (Yes, all assumptions of 
mine which could use validation.)  The next question we ask is, how many pseudo-
personnel hours are required to maintain the tank at its “full” level of 1?  For 
configuration vulnerabilities, we assume it to be 1.5 pseudo-hours per system per day. 
(Or with the scanning tool, .75 pseudo-hours per day.)  We then have a “divisor” of 
(1.5 / .05) = 30, i.e.: input to the tank = Virtual Enforcement Hours / 30. 
The tank is designed that if the current level of the ank is already 1 (full), additional 
input (i.e. additional hours) will not raise the tank level further. Lastly, the initial level 
of the tank is also decided by the number of virtual enforcement hours. If 1.5 or more 
pseudo-hours are available, the initial level will be 1. Otherwise, the initial level will 
be (pseudo-hours allocated / 1.5). Expressed in terms of the “divisor” and “loss rate” 
constants, this is: 
StartLevel = Min{1, [ Hours / (Divisor * LossRate)] }.[I don’t understand this 




 What happens, as given, is that if the model starts ou  with enough staff-hours to 
keep the configvulns “happy”, it will start at “full” and stay that way. Otherwise, it 
will inevitably decline to zero.  
 This raises the question: if you go through a year of only spending half the time 
you should on patches (or tolerance, etc.), by the end of the year, how vulnerable is 
your software?  Totally?  50%  Not sure. 
 In the old models, anything that required sysadmin hours was designed that if it 
didn’t get enough of them, it would ultimately decline to zero no matter what in the 
long term. In the Escalation paper, this was changed for IDS, Firewall, NetVulns a d 
ConfigVulns: for all of them, the effectiveness TODAY of a given countermeasure is 
given by a maximum of two values: the tank level (which reflects what it had been 
given in the past), AND the number of hours given TODAY divided by the number of 
hours required to be fully happy. Thus, if I patch well for a long time, then ignore 
patches for a few days, the patch level will be 0.9 or so. On the other hand, I could 
have totally ignored patches for years, but if I spend some time on them today, 
patches will be somewhat effective today. Please let me know what you think of this. 
For the archetype version, to get better-looking results we often changed the start 
level to something specified, e.g. 0 or 1 or some constant in between that worked 
nicely. This describes a scenario of “new sysadmin walks in on a system that had 
been totally ignored for a long time”, or “incompeten  sysadmin ruins a system that 
had been fine.”   
The above scheme of holding tanks, loss rates, divisors, and starting levels, will be 




NetVulns are designed very much like configuration vulnerabilities, except here the 
inputs are Hours Allocated to Software Patches and the presence of A Network 
Vulnerability Scanning Tool?  Once again, the scanning tool increasesthe virtual 
hours available for patching network vulnerabilities as follows: 
Effective Netvuln-fixing  Staff-Hrs. = NETTOOLMULTIPLIER *Hours Allocated to 
Software Patches. The NetVulnsFactor is similarly given as (1 – tank level). (The 
output from the tank is limited to the range 0 to 1. However, the feature “if tank level 
= 1, don’t allow further input” was not added to the NetVulns block (or any other 
block in this model yet) due to time constraints; thus, as is, the theoretical tank level 
can exceed 1, but the most it will read out is 1.)  LossRate = 0.04 (i.e. totally 
vulnerable if ignored for 25 days), divisor = 15 (i.e. fully patched if given .6 pseudo-
hours per system per day), initial level = virtual hours / 0.6, limited between 0 and 1. 
Archetype Version: Divisor was changed to 32. [Where is all that coming from?] 
AppVulns has inputs Hours allocated to Software Patches and New Software is 
Installed Every X Days. As before, a tank 0-1 describes the “strength” of the software; 
it is replenished by “hours allocated to patches”, with a divisor of 33.33. The loss rate 
is .02. ADDITIONALLY, anytime new software is added, this causes an additional 
loss of 0.8. The addition of new software is modele as an event that occurs every Y 
days, where Y is Gaussian, mean New Software Installed Every X Days, std. deviation 
30%. Archetype Version: LossRate is 0.004. [Explain why you selected these values.] 
 
COUNTERMEASURES: Countermeasures behave much like vulnerabilities, only a 
factor of 1 is best (countermeasure is fully effective), 0 is worst. Each countermeasure 
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outputs its factor, 0-to 1; and has inputs for the hours allocated to it, as well as a 
binary value indicating whether it is present. (If the switch, e.g. Antivirus Software?, 
is off, the factor output will always be 0.)  All of the countermeasures are represented 
by holding tanks. A “limit” block applied to the tank’s contents level ensures that the 
output will be between 0 and 1. However, the feature “tank itself can not exceed 1”, 
i.e. “if tank capacity = 1, today’s input = 0”, was not yet built into the 
countermeasures as it was into the vulnerabilities. (This can be easily changed.)  
Thus, for now, if the sysadmin were to put “super” fforts into a countermeasure for a 
while, the tank level would exceed 1; the factor output will still be 1; however, the 
sysadmin could ignore the countermeasure for a short time and it will still have a 
factor of “1”, as the loss rate drains the tank from a value greater than 1 to 1. 
(Eventually, though, the tank will drain below 1.) 
Starting level of the tank, if not manually adjusted, will follow the same equation 
as the vulnerability tanks: (hours allocated) / (total hours needed for the 
countermeasure to be “happy”, = divisor * lossrate). (This is then limited between 0 
and 1.) 
Tolerance Mechanisms. These can be high-maintenance, s this includes diversity. 
Loss rate 0.1, divisor 6.67. [Why?]  It was just assumed that tolerance measures are 
high-maintenance, especially if we include diversity; so I picked values these values: 
if tolerance measures are ignored for ten days, they become useless (loss rate 0.1); 
and that 2/3 pseudo-staff-hours per machine are required to keep these tolerance 
measures fully maintained. 
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Encryption Software. Once in place, this is fairly low-maintenance. Loss rate 
0.001, divisor 66.6667. [Why?]  Again, I just picked numbers that would imply low-
maintenance, i.e. an encryption system, once ignored, takes > 2 years (i.e. 1000 days) 
to become useless (there still may be bug fixes, updates, and the like); and it doesn’t 
take much work to keep the encryption up (or deal with users having problems with 
it), so I just figured an average of .067 pseudo-staff-hours per machine per day. 
Antivirus Software. We assume that new definitions must be installed by the 
sysadmin. Loss rate 0.02 (i.e. useless after fifty da s, given that ~2.5 new viruses 
come out each day, looking at a list from McAfee or the like.)  Divisor 20. How much 
time per day per machine is needed to keep the antivirus up-to-date?  I assumed 0.4 
pseudo-staff-hours / machine / day.  
Firewall and IDS [Indeed, they should be separate.]. We described “firewall 
efforts” and “IDS efforts” each as separate from “hours for analyzing (false) alarms”, 
which includes the alarms generated by both. Thus, the FirewallIDS forms one unit, 
with inputs: Hours Allocated to Firewall, Hours Allocated to (False) Alarms, Hours 
Allocated to IDS, and the binary switches A Firewall?  and An Intrusion Detection 
System?. Outputs are FirewallFactor and IDSFactor, both within [0,1]; and 
FalseAlarms, measuring how many staff-hours-per-machine’s worth f alarms are 
generated on a given day. 
Firewall effectiveness and IDS effectiveness each start off as independent holding 
tanks similar to those of the other countermeasures. Thus, FirewallFactor and 
IDSFactor are simply the contents value of their respective tanks. Firewall has 
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LossRate 0.0333 and Divisor 20; IDS has LossRate 0.033 and divisor 8. [Why these 
numbers?]  
However, both the IDS and firewall generate more alarms as they become more 
effective.  
AlarmRate = (0.3 * FirewallFactor)+ (0.6 * IDSFactor).[No, they should not be 
mixed.] 
 If these alarms are not addressed, they become Ignored Alarms.  
IgnoredAlarms = AlarmRate – AlarmHours, with a minimum of 0. All of these are 
measured in staff-hours per machine per day. 
IgnoredAlarms leads to a steep decline in the effectiveness of the IDS and firewall, 
with several days’ delay. 
The “want” (i.e. drain) on firewall effectiveness is the “natural” loss rate due to the 
need for routine maintenance, patches and the like, which was given as 0.0333; plus 
0.25 * IgnoredAlarms, with a five-day delay on the latter. 
Similarly, drain on IDS effectiveness is 0.0333 (natur l loss rate), plus 0.33 * 
IgnoredAlarms, with a three-day delay on the latter. 
Based on this, running the model with a high number of hours dedicated to the IDS 
or firewall, but few hours to analyzing alarms, will result in IDS and firewall 
effectivenesses that show decaying nonnegative oscillations, i.e. high, then low, then 
medium, then low, and so on, until they reach a level of zero. 
Archetype Version: Here, we wanted to show gains per effort for a single variable, so 
we included alarm analysis into the IDS efforts (and hours). (The firewall model was 




tank with a starting level of zero, and an input divisor of 40. Loss rate is now entirely 
a factor of the IDS effectiveness: LossRate = 0.35* IDSlevel [i.e. the contents of the 
holding tank], with a 15-day delay. This causes the oscillations seen in the attack 
success rate of the Shifting the Burden IDS scenario.  
We then argue that even an ignored IDS will still catch some attacks; this 
assumption also keeps the oscillations in the archetypes paper from being too 
extreme. This is accomplished by simply letting IDSFactor = (contents of holding 
tank) + 0.6, with a maximum of 1. This means that a totally ignored IDS will still 
have 60% the effectiveness of a well-maintained one. (The author claims no sources 
in the literature to support this, other than “it made the graph look nice.”) 
 
Newest version: we’ve kept everything separate: addressing IDS alarms goes into 
IDS Efforts; addressing Firewall alarms goes into Firewall Efforts. Firewall has loss 
rate .033 (i.e. useless if ignored for 30 days, just my assumption) and divisor 20 (i.e. 
for full effectiveness, firewall should have 0.66 staff-hours / day; in this paper, I 
assumed .66 staff-hours per day per machine. (That’s too high, isn’t it?  Again, that’s 
skill-motivation-staff-hours, which is easily double the number of actual staff-hours.)  
For the IDS, loss rate 0.05 (i.e. useless if ignored after 20 days, again my 
assumption), and a divisor of 40, i.e. best to provide the IDS 2 staff-hours per day 
(per system).  
 
ATTACKS: We divide the attacks into three categories by their sophistication. 
(This three-way division is found in some DARPA presentations that have not yet 




vulnerabilities and require little action from the attacker other than downloading and 
running the attack. A “sitting-duck” server may be subject to 50 or more simple 
attacks per day. Dr. Cukier’s empirical findings support roughly this number. 
(Though his ~50 did not include viruses.) 
“Sophisticated Attacks” may involve finding new vulnerabilities, can often defeat 
many countermeasures, and usually come from a single knowledgeable attacker (such 
as one who might actually write the “kiddy scripts” used in the first category). The 
average company will sustain only a handful, at most, f sophisticated attacks per 
day. (Yup, just an assumption; Dr. Cukier is trying to get sophisticated attackers to hit 
his systems, but not much luck yet. Wasn’t there a quote from Dr. Cukier about 95% 
simple / 5% sophisticated or something like that?)  Certainly we must include 
computer viruses, the most costly computer-security b each as 
reported in the CSI/FBI survey, in our discussion. While a computer virus does 
require a sophisticated author if it will spread, it spreads in fairly simple, predictable 
ways, and is easily defeated by simple countermeasur s (antivirus) and patching 
vulnerabilities; we therefore include viruses in the simple, “script-kiddy” category. 
Lastly, we have Nationwide-level Attacks, which may be part of a war effort, 
global terrorism, possibly a multinational corporation attacking a competitor, and so 
on. Most companies will only see one of these every f w months or so, if at all. (That 
seemed like common sense.)  Attacks of this sophistication do not rely on 
vulnerabilities as they can “brute force” through most software; they can also defeat 




For the time being, we do not differentiate attacks other than their categories of 
Simple, Sophisticated, and Nationwide. The model’s end-user inputs AverageSimple, 
AverageSophisticated, and AverageNationwide via sliders. The outputs of the 
respective “attack generator blocks” are Simple/Sophisticated/Nationwide Attacks 
Attempted. To add realism to our model, some randomness occurs between the input 
Averages and the output Attempteds: 
All of the above behave the same way. If Average >= 1, then a number Y is output, 
where Y represents the number of attacks of that type attempted per day. Y is given 
by a Gaussian distribution, with mean Average and a standard deviation of 0.2 * 
Average. (i.e. “a standard deviation of 20%.”)   
If Average < 1, then exactly one attack is attempted every Z days, where Z follows 
a Gaussian distribution with a mean of (1/Average) and a std. dev. of 30%.  
Archetype Version: for simplicity, and to prevent oscillations in the graph due to 
randomness, we simply let AverageSimple = SimpleAttacksAttempted = 100. (We 
circumvent the “attack generator block.”)  All other attacks are set to 0.  
In the new (Escalation) paper, I had no randomness in Simple Attacks, but a 5% 
standard deviation in Sophisticated Attacks. Just nmbers I picked to demonstrate 
some randomness; I don’t know how much the numbers vary day-to-day in real-life. 
 
ATTEMPTED VS. SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS, or ATTACK DEFENSE. Even if 
perfectly effective, a given countermeasure is only so successful at thwarting 
attempted attacks. For example, if we say 100 attacks re attempted per day, we 




thwart all X of those viruses, i.e. X% of the total attacks, but it can not defeat more 
than X% of the attacks because (100-X) attacks are not viruses. As for what 
percentage of attacks are not successful due to a given countermeasure, the only 
numbers available are those of experts’ opinion and the CSI/FBI survey. The CSI/FBI 
survey is of limited use, however, as it records what percentage of correspondents 
reported observing a given type of attack on their system. Thus, we know that 78% of 
the businesses surveyed detected a virus last year, and 37% detected a DoS; that does 
not mean that 78% of the attacks out there are viruses or that 37% of them are DoSs!  
(Otherwise, the numbers exceed 100% quite rapidly.)  Nonetheless, the numbers can 
be used as a very rough approximation for the prevalence of a given attack. 
Otherwise, the numbers given here represent the author’s numerical interpretations of 
M. Cukier’s descriptions of “fully effective”, “partially effective”, or “not effective” 
for each countermeasure against each category of attack.  
Similarly, certain countermeasures may be very effectiv  against simple attacks, 
but not against sophisticated ones. We therefore hav  three different blocks labeled 
SimpleSuccess, SophistSuccess, and NatnwideSuccess, respectively. (Extend’s limits 
on the number of characters in a hierarchical block’s name necessitated some creative 
spellings here.)  Each of these takes as inputs Attempted XYZ Attacks, where XYZ is 
simple/sophisticated/nationwide. They also have inputs for the factors of all relevant 
countermeasures and vulnerabilities. The primary output is the number of successful 
attacks of a given category. The other outputs apper on the bottom of the 
AttackSuccess block, directly beneath the inputs for the various countermeasures and 




to the corresponding countermeasure or lack of vulnerability. Additionally, it appears 
that a “thinner” block has been attached to the bottom of each Attack Success block. 
This functions as an accumulator, showing how many ttacks have been attempted, 
successful, or not-successful-due-to-a-given-factor, over the entire simulation period.  
Each AttackSuccess block is designed in the same way, as a linked serie  of 
holding tanks: at the beginning of each day, all tanks are reset to zero. Then, a certain 
number of attacks (attempts) are input to the firstholding tank; some are removed by 
the first countermeasure (in proportion to how effectively it is functioning, e.g. is the 
AntivirusFactor 1, i.e. it has been well-maintained, or something lower?); the 
remaining tank contents (i.e. remaining attacks) are transferred to the second tank, 
where some are removed by the second countermeasure, nd so on; those that remain 
after all the tanks are done are deemed Successful Attacks.  
For simple attacks, we have the following procession: As an attempted attack 
enters the system, it first encounters the firewall, then an IDS; if it passes those, it will 
be scanned by an antivirus. If it still passes through, it may be designed to exploit a 
given vulnerability in the system; if that vulnerability is not present, it will be 
thwarted here. If it still succeeds, encryption may sometimes help as follows: even if 
the system is breached and data is illegally accessed, an attacker will find the 
encrypted data meaningless; confidentiality is thus maintained. Finally, if all else 
fails, tolerance measures will mitigate the damage in many cases. Thus, starting with 
attempted simple attacks, we have the following: [Not completely right. In particular, 
the antivirus focuses mainly on email attachments. O herwise, the antivirus can detect 
Comment [i11]: Page: 1 




the corruption of the computer. We can work this out d ring our next meeting, OK?]  
We’re still working on this, but the models haven’t changed it yet. 
Remove (FirewallFactor * 90%) of the attempted attacks. I.e. if the Firewall is 
fully effective, it will catch 90% of the attempted simple attacks; if it’s only 50% 
effective (supposing it hasn’t been well-maintained), then it will catch only 45% of 
attempted attacks. Of those remaining, remove (IDSFactor * 60%); of those 
remaining, remove (AntivirusFactor *  78%); of those remaining, remove ((1 – 
VulnFactor) * 90%); this represents those attacks that were designed to exploit a 
given vulnerability; if that vulnerability is not found, the attack will not succeed.  
Archetypes Version: in order to differentiate between the results of enforcement 
actions (which influence config vulns and mistakes) and patches (which influence 
NetVulns and AppVulns), we have each defeat attacks separately, rather than taking 
90% * (1 – VulnFactor). Instead, remove (SWStrength * 60%), then (ConfigStrength 
* 80%). In displaying those attacks defeated by ConfigStrength, we adjust the 
equations to show total attacks defeated by ConfigStrength, not those attacks defeated 
by ConfigStrength that were not previously defeated by SWStrength. 
Then remove (EncryptFactor * 40%). (Encryption is only useful in preventing 
theft of data; it does very little, for example, against a DDoS attack.)  Lastly, remove 
(ToleranceFactor * 75%). Take this result and apply the “floor” function, i.e. largest 
integer that is less than or equal to it. (Thus, if after all the countermeasures, we have 
2.2 attacks succeeding, count that as 2. If we have 0.9 attacks succeeding, count that 
as 0.)  Archetype version: to make the lines smoother, we leave out the floor, and 




have the number of SuccessfulSimpleAttacks. (The various summed-over-time outputs 
are found simply by inserting accumulation tanks at the appropriate point in the 
chain.)   
 
All of these percentages were either my assumptions, some comment from Dr. 
Cukier about “very effective/somewhat effective/not effective”, and occasionally, the 
survey (see above about 78% saw viruses.)    
For Sophisticated and Nationwide attacks, many less countermeasures are 
effective. Furthermore, even a single attack stands a good chance of succeeding. This 
is represented as follows: after reducing the appropriate percentages due to 
countermeasures and vulnerabilities, we are left with hat should be X successful 
attacks. If X >=1, round X to the nearest integer; that is how many attacks of this type 
are successful today. If  0 < X < 1, one attack will succeed an average of X% of the 
time. This is accomplished by selecting a random value r uniformly distributed on 
[0,1]; if r < X, the attack succeeds; otherwise, it does not.  
For sophisticated attacks, the antivirus is ineffectiv  because all viruses are treated 
as simple attacks. An IDS can be defeated by a clever attacker, so it is not included. 
Encryption (which we assume can not be defeated without a supercomputer of some 
type (Dr. Cukier agreed with this; I’ve heard in the news that every now and then a 
team of experts with 100 computers has cracked a given file encrypted with RSA, 
after working on it for a few months.)  which is beyond the reach of a single 
sophisticated attacker) is still as effective as with simple attacks; the same goes for 




Lastly, some sophisticated attacks are designed to exploit known vulnerabilities, but 
often a sophisticated attacker can find his/her ownnew vulnerabilities in the software. 
We thus are left with the following: 
Remove (FirewallFactor * 30%) of attempts; of the remaining, remove ( (1 – 
VulnFactor) * 50%); of the remaining, remove (EncryptFactor * 40%); lastly, of the 
remaining, remove (ToleranceFactor * 75%). The remaining value is rounded to the 
nearest integer if it is >= 1, or used as a probability if it is < 1, as described above. 
The result is the number of SuccessfulSophisticatedAttacks. Only source other than 
Dr. Cukier’s comments or my guesses I can add here is this: Encryption is helpful for 
whatever percentage of attacks sought to steal sensitiv  data. What is that percentage?  
Survey talks dollar costs of various attacks (e.g. theft of data vs. DoS), but not the 
percentage breakdown of the number of attacks themselves. 
In the case of Nationwide attacks, we assume that network and application 
vulnerabilities are irrelevant as the code is subject to “strong smart force”, the 
nationwide-scale attackers may have access to the cod being used; similarly, the 
nationwide attacker possesses a supercomputer, quantum computer, or some other 
method of defeating commercially available cryptography. The only countermeasures 
that are effective (and partially at that) are the fir wall (if it is a hardware firewall of 
proprietary design, as M. Cukier described in an experience of his)  and tolerance 
measures.  
Remove (Firewall Factor * 20%), then of the remaining, remove 
(ToleranceFactor * 50%). Apply the rounding or probability as described above; the 




about Tolerance being fully effective against simple & sophisticated attacks; halfway 
effective against nationwide attacks. 
Lastly, the three categories of successful attacks an be summed; each 
AttackSuccess block is connected to an addition block. The result is All Successful 
Attacks (Per Day). Similarly, if one wishes to see all successful attacks over the entire 
simulation period, the various Successful ABC Attacks (Sum Total), for ABC = 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
An enterprise computer system is highly complex, consisting of multiple hosts 
with different platforms and different applications, all networked and most likely 
connected to the Internet. These components have flaws that make the system 
vulnerable and allow attackers to exploit these vulnerabilities. 
Humans and machines form an even larger and more complex system with many 
different components and interactions. Control actions and reactions on one side of 
this system might have not only a local effect, butcould also affect the rest of the 
system, often resulting in feedback loops. These eff cts manifest themselves over 
time with different delays. The properties of the system (security being one of them) 
will emerge from its structure and all these interactions between its components. 
Some of the events in such systems are non-deterministic. This, and the fact that 
we do not have complete and fully accurate knowledge about these systems, leads to 
a level of information uncertainty that must be acknowledged and handled 
appropriately. Due to all of the above intricacies of such a system, it is extremely 
difficult to understand and analyze its emerging prope ties and the properties of the 
services it provides.  
It is a hard task to characterize and assess the security of such a system, let alone to 
predict malicious acts and to design a strategy for eliminating or at least reducing 




as national infrastructures, military or other government systems, emergency systems, 
or banks. 
Protection against attacks can be achieved by preventing, detecting, and tolerating 
them. Tolerating attacks might require the system to function in a degraded mode 
once under attack. If attacks defeat all lines of defense and eventually succeed, then 
the system must be able to recover quickly to an operational and secure state. Of 
course, all actions needed for proper prevention, detection, and tolerance have costs 
associated with them, including the price of buying and maintaining tools, the effort 
and time to install and run them, and personnel training. A strategy for security 
achievement and risk reduction can comprise a combination of the aforementioned 
actions. Given resource constraints, as well as trade-offs that might be needed 
between security on one hand and other operational properties (for example usability 
or performance) on the other hand, designing such a strategy is a very challenging 
task and requires extensive knowledge and experience. 
 
1.2 Approach 
To support this decision-making process of designin an appropriate security 
strategy, we developed a quantitative executable model of an organization’s 
operational computer security. Like all models, this is an abstraction of the real 
system, focused on representing the security-significa t aspects of the system and 
associated processes. The model targets and represents th  perspective of the person 
who must make decisions regarding actions that mustbe taken for security assurance 




for the model parameters, corresponding to different usage, vulnerabilities, attacks, 
and defense profiles. The simulator can be run and different “what-if” scenarios can 
be executed. Simulation will help a security manager, s curity engineer, or system 
administrator answer questions such as: if my enviro ment is characterized by these 
values, then what methods and tools to select and apply for managing security risks 
and satisfy the users needs of my system? How will the selected actions work 
together? What is their effectiveness and cost effici ncy? To what changes is my 
environment most sensitive? If I make specific changes in my security strategy, what 
will be their impact? What changes if my system gets attacked more/less or if the 
time to exploit changes? Should I hire more system ad inistrators? Should I spend 
more on training them? 
The model aims first at understanding security riskeduction in computer systems, 
then at diagnosing such systems and identifying their weaknesses, as well as 
prospectively examining the effectiveness of different solutions. The description of 
the behaviors this model can exhibit is founded upon the notion of system archetypes.  
 
1.3 Archetypes 
Archetypes are a concept related to systems thinking, developed in the mid 1980s, 
in an attempt to describe complex behavior and to convey ideas in an easier and more 
efficient manner. Archetypes are frequently-observed patterns of systems behavior 
and are a “natural vehicle for clarifying and testing mental models” about systems or 
situations [For61]. The systems literature describes ten distinct archetypes, as listed 




categorized into one of four “core generic” archetyp  classes: “Underachivement” 
includes Limits to Growth, Attractiveness Principle, Tragedy of the Commons, and 
Growth and Underinvestment; and “Relative Archievement” includes Success to the 
Successful. “Out-of-Control” includes Fixes that Fail, Shifting the Burden, and 
Accidental Adversaries; and lastly, “Relative Control” includes Escalation and 
Accidental Adversaries. [Wol03] acknowledges that the more common description of 
archetypes (i.e. that of [Bra02]) is more intuitive and easier to grasp and apply to 
simulation, so it is used here. Archetypes have been mainly applied in business or 
industrial processes. There has recently been some work performed at MIT in 
applying systems thinking and archetypes to systems safety [Mar03], but in security 
this is a new idea. 
Beyond the common archetypes of [Bra02], we keep in mind that other archetypes 
may be observed in security. This would not be surprising, as [Mar03]’s application 
of archetypes to safety engineering uncovered several s curity-specific archetypes. 
This thesis, however, restricts itself to the application of common archetypes to 
security. While Appendix I describes how each of the ten archetypes might be applied 
to security, this thesis gives a detailed understanding of the following archetypes: 
Symptomatic Fixes (also known as Shifting the Burden), Escalation, Limits to 
Growth, and a combination of the latter two. 
We use archetypes for understanding and modeling security aspects (needs, 
problems, actions) in the context of an enterprise that uses computers/information 
technology systems for running its business and needs to ensure the security of its 




related organizational behavior and trends and using archetypes for documenting and 
understanding the domain, the problems, and their potential solutions. Mental models 
might be able to handle archetypes in isolation, but for the entire system (which 
contains combinations of such archetypes) mental models are not adequate due to the 
complexity, non-determinism, and uncertainty of thesystem. Computer simulation is 
in fact already recommended in [Sen94] for extending o e’s grasp of archetypes. 
 
1.4 The Model 
For our model, we employ the continuous modeling feature of the Extend 
simulation environment [Ima05]. This is a graphical simulation tool that focuses on 
the levels of holding tanks and their inputs and outputs, governed by constants, 
equations, delays, and random values. (A screenshot of a holding tank and its inputs 
and outputs can be found in Appendix II.) The level of each holding tank changes at 
each simulation step, and a typical simulation run ca consist of hundreds or even 
thousands of such steps. The result is an easy-to-use way to set up and numerically 
solve systems represented by a series of differential equations. The feedback loops 
stressed by system dynamics and archetypes can easily be represented by a holding 
tank whose output is connected to its input. Thus, continuous modeling with Extend 
is a good fit for the system dynamics modeling approach described above. 
Out model consists of approximately 350 Extend basic “blocks”, such as constants 





In the model, staff-hours (of the system administrators) can be allocated to various 
tasks related to the security of a typical system. We model the following seven 
countermeasures: 
• “Firewall Efforts.”   Overseeing and maintaining the system’s firewall.  
• “Antivirus Efforts.”   Maintaining the system’s antivirus software, keeping it 
updated, resolving user issues related to the antivirus. 
• “Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Efforts.”  Maintaining the IDS, 
installing new signatures, resolving alarms. 
• “Encryption Efforts.”   Maintaining the system’s encryption software. 
•  “Enforcement Actions.”   This includes tasks such as: scanning for and 
fixing configuration vulnerabilities, which are effctively “doors” to the 
system that were inadvertently left open; monitoring the users to prevent 
unsafe practices, such as downloading viruses or using “weak” passwords 
which are easily guessed; applying proper access control to prevent 
unauthorized use; and more generally, devising and e forcing a company 
security policy. See [Dan04] for more on these tasks. All of these require no 
additional hardware or software per se, only a great deal of attention from the 
support staff (or system administrators). 
These appear as the five most prevalent “security technologies” used in Gordon’s 
survey ([Gor05a]) of 700 corporate, governmental, and cademic institutions, where 
we have subsumed Gordon’s “Access Control Lists” under our term “Enforcement 




• “Software Patches.” Downloading and installing patches to correct 
vulnerabilities in the operating system(s) and applications; resolving problems 
caused by patches. 
Lastly, we consider a somewhat different approach that has only recently been 
discussed by the security community: 
• “Tolerance Measures.”  This includes designs to t lerate an attack (rather 
than prevent or detect it), even if it succeeds. Multiple layers, graceful 
degradation of performance, and (in some instances) backups are all tolerance 
measures.  
In our current model, the effectiveness of each countermeasure is a factor only of 
the countermeasure’s presence or absence (implementd as a series of Y/N switches 
in the model) and the number of staff-hours per machine allocated to the 
corresponding task. Although the IDS and firewall seem independent of the system 
size, additional machines will mean additional alarms, which will require more 
attention. Additionally, the system has an overall vu nerability measure, which is 
reduced by the number of staff-hours per machine allocated to enforcement actions 
and software patches.  
The attacks on the system are divided into two categori s: “Simple” (or “kiddy-
script”) attacks tend to rely on known vulnerabilities and require l ttle action from 
the attacker other than downloading and running the a tack. “Sophisticated attacks” 
may involve finding new vulnerabilities, can often defeat many countermeasures, and 
usually come from a single knowledgeable attacker, such as one who might actually 




costliest type of attack according to the respondents of [Gor05a], are written by some 
very sophisticated attackers, an existing virus propagates in well-understood ways 
and can be easily defeated by the proper countermeasures; we thus include viruses in 
the “simple attack” category.  
For both categories (simple and sophisticated), a specified number of attacks are 
considered to be attempted against the system each day. (Alternatively, the simulation 
can also be set to add some random variation to the specified number of attempts.)  
Given the effectiveness of each of the various countermeasures, and the system’s 
vulnerability (or lack thereof), a fraction of those attacks will succeed. The primary 
outputs of our current model, then, are the numbers of “successful simple attacks” 
and “successful sophisticated attacks.”  Note that a result of “n successful simple 
attacks” may not appear as n separate incidents. Several of these may exploit the 
same vulnerability, turn out to be variants of the same virus, and so on. For now, the 
number of successful attacks should be taken only as our metric of the quality of 
countermeasures versus attempted attacks. 
  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the 
Symptomatic Fixes (or “Shifting the Burden”) archetype; describes one instance of it 
in computer security as we have modeled it; discusses the results of several different 
simulations based on it; and considers how this archetype might apply elsewhere in 
security. Chapter 3 goes through a similar approach wit  the Escalation archetype. 




described that describes a combination of Limits to Growth and Escalation. Chapter 5 
outlines related work, and Chapter 6 gives conclusions and some future work. This is 
followed by Appendices I, II, and III, a bibliography, and finally a list of this author’s 





































Chapter 2: Symptomatic Fixes Archetype 
 
2.1 Symptomatic Fixes Description 
In this archetype, the symptoms of a problem are observed. Rather than analyze the 
root cause of the problem, the manager (or “decision-maker”, or “actor”) attempts to 
fix the symptom. This “shifting of the burden” from the problem’s actual cause to its 
symptom often distracts the manager from the former; it can also mask the symptoms 
of the original problem, making it more difficult to diagnose.  
Armed with an understanding of this archetype, a manager will consider the 
possibility that the most readily apparent solution may not ultimately be the best one. 
Instead, time must be taken to analyze, and only then properly treat, the root cause. 
For a simple illustration in computer security, we paint a scenario in which a 
company’s computer system (or just “system”) is continually falling prey to 
successful attacks known as “kiddy-scripts.” These attacks are launched by novice 
attackers, and generally only succeed if the system contains vulnerabilities such as 
software that is not up-to-date. The successes of these attacks should be seen as a 
symptom of a deeper problem. Reducing the system’s vulnerability to thwart these 
attacks could be considered a fundamental solutions; such a fundamental solution 
would include the frequent installation of software patches. It is possible (in fact, 
likely) that implementing such a solution properly will take time and thus not yield 
dramatic gains very quickly; in the long run, however, positive effects of this solution 




reduce overall system vulnerability vis-à-vis kiddy-scripts, though it is certainly not 
the only action. 
Alternatively, it is all-too-possible for a company to instead view the successful 
attacks as the only issue here and therefore install an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) to detect the occurrence of these attacks – a symptomatic fix. The company’s 
support staff (or “system administration staff”) is then too distracted from installing 
patches. In time, many new vulnerabilities will be discovered in the software run by 
the system; once published, these will be exploited by new “kiddy-script” attacks. 
Invariably, a certain percentage of attacks do evad an IDS, and thus, as the known 
vulnerabilities in the system increase, the number of successful attacks will also 
increase, despite the company’s continued efforts to install, maintain, and improve 
their IDS. These effects are displayed in Figure 1, an “influence diagram” showing 
the effects of given variable on one another over time.  
In this diagram, we begin in the center with the problem symptom of successful 
simple attacks. In the loop beneath the symptom, we see the fundamental solution: 
increased successful simple (or “kiddy-script”) attacks cause an increased need for 
the fundamental solution of applying software patches, and, in fact, applying this 
solution will reduce the problem symptom. Such a loop can be described as “more of 
A leads to less of B leads to less of A, and so on until equilibrium is reached”, and is 
known as a “balancing loop.” Alternatively, the symptomatic solution is found in the 
loop above the problem symptom. If we focus on thisloop itself, it appears to offer 
the same advantages as the fundamental fix, sometimes more easily or more rapidly 




Unfortunately, though, we also see that an increased use of the IDS can increase a 
side effect: the distraction of the support staff from other tasks, including patch 
application. This, of course, reduces the chance of a fundamental fix being applied. 
Starting at the top of the diagram and proceeding around its periphery clockwise, we 
see: increased IDS efforts leads to an increase in support staff distraction, therefore 
less patches are applied; the problem symptom will re-emerge, and more of the 
symptomatic fix will be attempted. This loop can be described as “more of A causes 
more of B causes more of A, and so on”, and is known as a “reinforcing loop.” 
[Wol03] includes this archetype under his more generic t rm “Out-of-Control”, as a 
balancing loop is desired to control the problem syptom, but it is not obtained. 
 
Fig. 1. Influence Diagram for a “Symptomatic Fixes” Situation. 
 
2.2 Simulation Setup 
 
To see quantitative results, an Extend model was used simulating a system 
containing on the order of 200 machines, sustaining 100 simple attacks per day. A 




well the IDS has been maintained), and a certain percent will be defeated if the 
system’s software is well-patched. Note that even if we say “n% of the attempted 
attacks succeeded”, the system’s users may not observe for 100 attempted attacks, n 
separate failures, as many of these attempts might target a small set of specific 
vulnerabilities and exploit them in the same way. Similarly, no single countermeasure 
should be expected to reduce the attack success rate to 0 by itself, as there are enough 
different types of attack that any single countermeasure can be defeated. We use the 
percentage of successful attacks only as a measure of the system’s defenses and 
vulnerabilities. It is assumed that the software of this system is initially patched 
partially; therefore there is room for improvement if further patching is undertaken, 
while a loss will be felt if patching is ignored (as the discovery of new vulnerabilities 
will bring the software’s status from “partially patched” to “mostly unpatched.”) The 
model was executed for the equivalent of 6 months (real time) with different 
scenarios. (Each execution of this type runs in under 30 seconds on a conventional 
Pentium III computer running Windows 2000 Professional.)  
For examining the effect of different effort allocation to the fundamental and 
symptomatic solution, we executed the simulation for four scenarios s1, s2, s3, and 
s4. In all four scenarios, the system is under pressur  for the first d1 days while the 
rate of successful attacks rises. This is due to the discovery of additional 
vulnerabilities. On day d1+1, however, the company embarks on some course of 
action. Here we chose d1 = 9, to demonstrate the effects over several days of taking 




In our first scenario, “s1”, from day d1+1 onwards, the company has its support 
staff dedicate a certain number of staff-hours per day to installing software patches to 
all the system’s computers. This effort is held consta t throughout the six-month 
period. The “if-then” rule that describes the organiz tion’s efforts in this scenario is 
given by:  
IF: (Day> d1) 
THEN: Staff-Hours for Patches := x1.  
For the hypothetical situation that we are modeling, we considered 3 staff-hours a 
reasonable value for x1 given the description of our system. This is considere  the 
“fundamental fix” scenario, or the “solution” to the Symptomatic Fixes archetype. 
In our second scenario, “s2”, the company deploys an IDS on day d1+1. For the 
next 170 days, efforts are gradually increased to maintain and improve the IDS: as 
new attacks are discovered, new plug-ins are added; as a consequence, more alerts 
that are signaled by the IDS must be analyzed, requiring more effort (although some 
of them might be just false alarms). In an attempt to keep the IDS functioning well, 
the company increases its IDS efforts with the following rule:  
Begin with y0 staff-hours for the IDS.  
FOR: every day 
IF: (Successful Attacks today > Successful Attacks two days ago) 
THEN: increase staff-hours for IDS by y.  
We have assigned the values y0 = 1.5, y = 0.03. (This will lead to a gradual 
increase from moderate IDS effort at day ten to a strong IDS effort of approximately 




less efforts are available for patches: Staff-hours for Patches := 4 – Staff-Hours for 
IDS, to a minimum of zero. We consider this our case of “increasing efforts to the 
symptomatic fix while decreasing efforts for the fundamental solution”, or a strong 
instance of the “problem” archetype. 
Our third scenario, s3, takes this a step further: as of day d1+1, the same IDS 
efforts are made as in s2, but no patch efforts are made at all. Here we interpret the 
increasing side-effect loop in Figure 1 as the strengthening over time of the “mental 
barrier” (as [Wol03] calls it) that prevents consideration of the fundamental solution. 
Additionally, the side-effect loop is common for this archetype but not required, see 
[Sen90]. In any case, s3 is an even more extreme cas  of the problem archetype for 
Symptomatic Fixes. 
Lastly, our fourth scenario s4 considers an alternaive solution, one which the 
archetype literature concedes as sometimes viable. If the company understands its 
priorities, then it may be possible to use both the fundamental solution and a small 
dose of the quick fix. This would be codified by the following rules:  
Staff-hours for Patches := 4 – Staff-Hours for IDS, as before.  
The difference is the rule for IDS efforts:  
Begin with y0 staff-hours for the IDS.  
FOR: every day 
IF: {  
 (Successful Attacks Today > Successful Attacks two days ago) 
AND (staff-hours for IDS <= z)  },  




The value of y is the same 0.03, but y0 is now reduced to 0.2. As in s1, we assume 
that a proper effort for patches can not be made with less than three staff-hours, so we 
set z to 1. s4 can thus be described as “symptomatic fix supplementing the 
fundamental fix.”  (Note that no “burden” is being shifted per se if the company 
understands what is fundamental and what is not.)   
 
2.3 Results and Discussion 
 
 The primary outputs of these four scenarios, i.e. number of attacks successful per 
day, are plotted for comparison in Figure 2. We can also integrate under the curves of 
Figure 2, giving us the number of cumulative successful attacks for each of the four 
scenarios; these will be displayed in Table I below. 
 
Fig. 2. Successful Attacks per Day for the Four Symptomatic Fixes Scenarios 
 
Several important features can be observed in Figure 2. Firstly, when comparing 
the fundamental solution (s1) to the symptomatic fixes (s2 and s3), we see that the 
symptomatic fixes appear to do a much better job initially (e.g. looking at Day 30, s2 
and s3 are approximately 10 successful attacks lower than s1), but by the end of the 




22 successful attacks lower than s2, and 32 lower than s3. This demonstrates a 
common pattern in the performance of symptomatic fixes – while the symptomatic fix 
can cause temporary drops in the problem rate, the overall trend over time is for the 
problem rate to increase. (Diagrams similar to Figure 2 are seen in describing this 
archetype in [Sen94] and [Bra02].) While the security staff is distracted by the rises 
and falls in the performance of the IDS, the system’s current software vulnerabilities, 
as well as those newly discovered, are neglected, lea ing to a rise in the percentage of 
attacks that are successful. The overall trend is a line r increase; this is not surprising, 
as we have modeled the vulnerabilities in unpatched software as increasing linearly in 
time. Comparing s1 against s2 and s3 also stresses the importance of behavioral 
monitoring over time. Were we to stop the simulation after one month or so, our 
conclusions would be very different as to what measures are most effective!  
Focusing on s3, we see that it presents an even more extreme case of s2’s failures, 
as the patch efforts have been eliminated entirely. Lastly, we turn our attention to s4. 
Recall that s4 begins with less IDS efforts than s2 and s3; it therefore appears initially 
to allow more attacks to succeed, e.g. at Day 16, s4 is 2 successful attacks higher than 
s3, and 3 higher than s2. However, by the end of the simulation period, s4 is clearly 
the winner in reducing successful attacks. Notice as well the height for the “waves” of 
symptomatic fixes: they are greatest in s3, smaller in s2, and smaller still in s4; this 
height represents the degree of the “crisis/fix” pattern, which is lowest when the 
proper application of fundamental fixes prevents cri is action (s4), and greatest when 




s1, notice how they approach each other asymptotically – in the long run, adding the 
symptomatic fix will cease to provide any good beyond the fundamental solution. 
We now turn our attention to the effort required in each of these scenarios. s1 
consisted simply of a constant 3 staff-hours per day for patches, and nothing else. 
Figure 3 shows the efforts of the support staff, in staff-hours per day, invested in s2, 
in which IDS efforts decreased patch efforts. 
 
Fig. 3. Efforts per Day for s2, the IDS-Decreases-Patches Scenario 
 
Notice how patch efforts decrease steadily until approximately Day 120, at which 
point they stay at zero for the remainder of the simulation. Until Day 120, any efforts 
for IDS came out of efforts for patches, so total efforts were constant; after Day 120, 
the total efforts are all IDS efforts. Figure 3 further highlights the attractiveness of the 
symptomatic fix, as the initial IDS effort requires l ss staff-hours per day (less than 2) 
than what would be required of a fundamental fix (a steady 3 for s1). In the long run, 
however, staff-hours are continuously added to the IDS effort in an attempt to raise its 
results; by the time six months have passed, the company realizes that it is investing  
6 staff-hours per day into the IDS. We can also integrate the curves in Figure 3 to 
measure cumulative effort of the simulation period, t  be shown in Table I. 





Fig. 4. Efforts per Day for s3, the IDS-only Scenario 
Observe that by Day 180, approximately 6.25 staff-hours are being used for IDS 
efforts. In s2 (see Figure 3), that number was only approximately 5.8. The same rule 
produced both figures: “increase IDS efforts every day that successful attacks are 
higher than they were two days ago.” Compared to s3, s2 allowed for some patches as 
well, so there were less days when this trigger occurred, therefore less IDS efforts 
were demanded over the course of the simulation. 
Lastly, Figure 5 displays the efforts of s4, which combined IDS and patch efforts 
with an emphasis on the latter. 
 
Fig. 5. Efforts per Day for s4, the IDS-Supplements-Patches Scenario 
 
Notice how few increases are made to IDS efforts. Again, this happens because the 
trigger condition of successful attacks being too high is very rarely met, due to the 
appropriate patching strategy. 
We now compare all four scenarios in terms of their cumulative effort and 




Considering cumulative values, we see indeed that cumulative successful attacks 
are lower for s1, the fundamental solution, than for symptomatic fix scenarios s2 and 
s3. 
Table I: Cumulative Successful Attacks and Efforts for All Four Scenarios 




s1 3833 513 
s2 4007 740 
s3 5232 689 
s4 2345 684 
 
Noticing that s1 requires over 100 less staff-hours’ worth of effort than s2 or s3, 
we see that in the long run, the fundamental solution is not only more effective than 
the symptomatic fix; it is less costly as well. The only question remaining is in 
comparing s1, “fundamental solution alone”, with s4, “fundamental solution 
combined with symptomatic fix.” A company will have to decide for itself whether 
the additional 151 staff-hours of efforts are worth the reduction in 1500 successful 
attacks. How such calculations are made is touched upon in related work, below. In 
any case, simulation allows the company to consider th  effects of its actions, and 
choose its optimal course with these effects in mind. 
By analogy with these results, when other variables of interest in the system have a 
similar evolutionary trend, the Symptomatic Fixes archetype might be manifesting 
itself. In that case, the situation must be diagnosed and the real cause and the 
corresponding solution must be examined; this solution has to be applied, thus fixing 




to make sure that the diagnosis was correct and that the solution was correctly 
implemented. 
Lastly, the above simulations show the applicability of the model as a decision 
tool, by allowing one to see the effects of different proposed solutions before 
implementing them. In the example presented here, the decision was regarding the 
allocation of effort to different security efforts (IDS and patches). The model might 
also be useful in exploring and making security policies, as well as for training 
security staff.  
 
2.4 Other Instances of Symptomatic Fixes in Security 
 
We have presented only one possible instance of Symptomatic Fixes here, and thus 
we have opened the door to many related opportunities. Our simulation model 
includes many security-related tasks not described h re (such as user training, 
enforcement of the security policy, and maintaining tolerance measures such as 
backups, to name a few), and in place of the Patch Efforts described here, this 
simulation could be run with other tasks or some combination thereof, as well as 
considering more-sophisticated attacks. Just as different parties may see different 
tasks as “the” fundamental solution ([Sen94]), attacks of different sophistication may 
have different “fundamental solutions.”  
Additionally, [Sen90] finds that the best way to describe the history of a particular 
company’s strategies is by combining the Symptomatic Fixes archetype with another 
archetype, namely Limits to Growth. Thus, the applicability of this combination and 




A variant on Symptomatic Fixes described in [Sen90] and [Sen94] is known as 
Shifting the Burden to the Intervener, in which the fundamental fix involves the 
internal actors repairing problems, and the symptoma ic fix involves outsiders. This 
brings to mind some sentiments in the security community about security being 
incorporated into system design at each step of the process, rather than ignoring 
security and relying on an expert to add security features shortly before release or 
deployment.  
Lastly, there has been much discussion in the security community (see [Hun06]) 
regarding whether better security behavior should be taught to the users of a system, 
or placed entirely on the shoulders of the system ad inistrator. Similarly, in a system 
where the roles of system administrator and security officer are divided, the 
interactions between them may follow archetypal patterns. We had begun to 
document anecdotal accounts of such interactions, and our model leaves room to add 
detail to its human-factors portion of the model, including the interactions between 
users, system administrators, and security officers. Shifting the Burden to the 
Intervener could thus shed light on these human interactions.  
For additional information of Symptomatic Fixes as it pertains to security, please 







Chapter 3: Escalation Archetype 
 
3.1 Escalation Description 
 
In the Escalation archetype, each of two parties makes efforts and achieves results 
towards reaching its own well-defined goals. However, each party desires greater 
results than its counterpart. Thus, each party continues to increase its efforts, with 
neither party achieving dominance for an extended priod. This can theoretically 
continue ad infinitum.  
As an instance of this archetype in security, we investigate the action-reaction 
effects of attacks on an organization’s computer system and the organization’s 
attempts to better defend its assets, all the while advertising its strengths in an attempt 
to attract more business. We begin with a company that spends little on security 
measures, but sustains few attempted attacks because it’s not a very well-known or 
worthwhile target. While some simple “kiddy-script” attacks blindly go after any 
available computer system and can be seen as the ever-present “attack noise”, other 
simple attacks (such as a “Zombie DDoS”, see [Gib02]) are consciously directed at an 
organization by an attacker. These are more likely if the organization is better-known. 
Furthermore, an organization will be targeted by sophisticated attacks if its assets are 
valuable (e.g. credit card numbers stored on its servers), or if its defenses are 
considered formidable, in which case breaching them poses a worthwhile challenge. 
We suppose that the organization decides to attract new customers by increasing 




and/or asset desirability of the organization rise, th  motivation to attack its system is 
increased, raising both the quantity and sophistication of attempted attacks. To 
counteract these, the company increases security spending again. Alas, this furthers 
the motivation to attack, leading to another increase in attempts. This process can 
continue for several more rounds. 
These effects are displayed in Figure 6, an influence diagram showing the effects 
of given variable on one another over time. (Similar influence diagrams are drawn for 
archetypes in [Bra02].) 
 
 
Fig. 6. Influence Diagram for Escalation 
 
The upper loop in Figure 6 reads as follows: “Increasing the organization’s 
security efforts will decrease the number of successful attacks against it. An increase 
in successful attacks leads to a greater threat to the organization. The greater the 
threat, the more security efforts will be added to counter it.”  Thus, if the attackers’ 




efforts will decrease the number of successful attacks, decreasing the threat to the 
organization, decreasing the need for additional security efforts. This forms a 
“balancing” or “negative” loop, as after several rounds of such behavior, no further 
efforts will be required.  
A similar pattern is found in the lower loop: “Increased successful attacks cause 
the organization to advertise less. (We assume the resources that would have been 
funneled into advertising are now needed to recover from all of the attacks.)  
Advertising efforts increase the motivation to attack the organization, leading to more 
efforts on the part of the attackers, and therefore more successful attacks.”  Thus, the 
attacker behavior in and of itself should also form a balancing loop, as enough 
successful attacks will prevent any advertising, at which point the organization is no 
longer a very visible or worthwhile target, so attack efforts are not increased again.  
However, in our scenario, both the organization andthe attackers respond to one 
another, violating the assumptions we had made for balancing loops. Traversing the 
outermost loop of Figure 6 describes the overall behavior: an increase in the 
organization’s security efforts increase its advertising efforts (or otherwise raise its 
prominence and asset desirability), increasing the motivation and therefore the efforts 
to attack the organization, leading to a rise in successful attacks. The organization 
feels threatened and therefore increases its security efforts, and the spiral continues 
from there. As both the organization’s and the attackers’ efforts continue to increase 
in time, this forms a positive loop. The number of successful attacks, however, 
reflects the ratio of attackers’ efforts to the organization’s security efforts, and thus 




Control”, as each party’s balancing loop is used in an attempt to gain control over the 
relative quantity “success of one party / success of the other party.” 
 
3.2 Simulation Setup 
Clearly in our case, the number of successful attacks becomes the barometer of 
“success of attackers compared to success of defenders.”  Increased efforts by 
attackers over time can be modeled by an increasing number of attempted attacks, 
both simple and sophisticated. The organization’s efforts can be fulfilled by: 
introducing countermeasures that were not previously present; changing the 
allocation of support staff-hours to various tasks; training the support-staff (which, to 
a point, increases their effectiveness); and increasing the staff-hours available for 
security tasks. The latter may require hiring in the long run, but in the short term may 
often be achieved simply by encouraging overtime, reassigning personnel within the 
company, etc.  
In the simulation scenarios presented here, we have simplified by limiting the 
organization to one action, namely increasing staff-hours, and did not include other 
actions. We assume that all countermeasures are present, but they all begin with 
inadequate support staff. In time, increasing the saff-hours to each task will result in 
a greater number of attacks not successful. We havefurther simplified by scripting 
the actions of both the organization and the attackers as an automated series of “If-
Then” rules, so the simulation runs without external i tervention. The rules we use 




and they quantitatively capture the qualitative behavior described in Figure 6. These 
rules are as follows: 
The organization decides to increase efforts:  
FOR: every x1 days 
IF: (Successful Simple Attacks > x2) 
THEN: increase staff-hours allocated to Antivirus, Firewall, IDS, Enforcement   
  Actions, and Software Patches by w
v
= {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}, respectively. 
These tasks begin with 0w
v
 staff-hours allocated at the start of the simulation.  
These countermeasures and vulnerability-reduction tasks are very effective at 
preventing or detecting simple attacks. Faced with sophisticated attacks, however, 
their effects are diminished: the antivirus does not address these attacks, which aren’t 
viruses; the IDS and firewall can sometimes be deceiv d; and enforcement actions 
and software patches can only reduce known vulnerabilities, whereas the 
sophisticated attacker may discover and exploit new vulnerabilities. Thus, the 
company responds to sophisticated attacks in a different way than to simple attacks:  
FOR: every x1 days  
IF: (Successful Sophisticated Attacks > x3)  
THEN: increase staff-hours allocated to Encryption by v1 and Tolerance by v2. 
Tolerance and Encryption are allocated 0v
v
 staff-hours at the beginning of the 
simulation.  
We assume that these countermeasures are no less eff ctiv  against sophisticated 




unbreakable by any private individual with a handful of computers, no matter how 
clever, and tolerance works despite the success of the attack.  
As some tasks may require more staff-hours than others to be done well, different 
numbers can be specified for each task. In any case, decisions to increase staff-hours 
are implemented as follows: Any increase in staff-hours requires a d1 day delay to 
reassign personnel. d2 days after the increase occurs, the company advertises its 
added security efforts.  
This leads the attackers to launch additional attacks, according to the following 
assumed behavior: Begin with y1 simple attacks. Any day that advertising is present, 
increase the simple attacks by y2%.  
 Simple attacks can be increased rapidly, as this merely requires directing 
automated “kiddy-scripts” against the system. The number of sophisticated attacks, 
however, grows at a different (generally slower) rate: Begin with y3 sophisticated 
attacks. Any day that advertising is present, wait d3 days as sophisticated attacks are 
prepared; then increase the sophisticated attacks by y4%.  
In our execution, the number of simple attacks attempt d is given by the above 
rules. To allow for some randomness, we chose to let th  number of attempted 
sophisticated attacks vary by a (Gaussian) standard eviation of 5%. Additionally, if 
the number of successful sophisticated attacks is found to be between 0 and 1, then a 
random number is drawn to determine if the attack succeeds.  
We simulate a system of approximately 200 machines, choosing a simulation 
period of six months (180 days). Keeping these numbers in mind, we have run the 
simulation with the following values: x1 = 7, x2 = 4, x3 = 1, 0w
v






= {1.1, 1.3, 3.7, 1.5, 1.5}, 0v
v
 = {0.72, 0.87}, v1 = 1.8, v2 = 2.2, y1 = 20, y2 = 
29.8, y3 = 0.6, y4 = 9, d1 = 14, d2 = 5, and d3 = 2. In our opinion, these values, used 
with the above rules over a 180-day period, describe a linear progression from 
minimal attention to complete dedication vis-à-vis staff-hours for security tasks.  
 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
 
Successful attacks per day are used as our measure of “organization’s efforts vs. 







Fig. 7. Successful Attacks per Day, First Escalation Scenario 
 
Certainly from Day 90 onwards, the system reaches a sort of equilibrium, as 
successful attacks hover around 13. This is a result of the matched opposing efforts of 
the organization and the attackers. Yet while the ov rall metric (i.e. successful 
attacks) does not change much, both efforts are ongoing. Figure 8 shows the efforts of 






Fig. 8. Staff-Hours per Day, First Escalation Scenario 
 
According to the rules and the specific values of the variables described above, the 
first decision to increase staff-hours occurs at Day 7, and is implemented fourteen 
days later; thus, the first increase is seen at Day 21. After that, increases can occur as 
often as every seven days: decisions to increase are m de every seven days, and 
previous weeks’ decisions will be implemented while waiting the fourteen days for 
this week’s implementation. Overall, the organization’s efforts grow, fairly linearly, 
up to approximately 220 staff-hours per day. Assuming eight-hour days, this 
translates into twenty-seven people, which is high but not unreasonable for a system 
of 200 machines. Of course, this growth is matched by the increase in both simple 
and sophisticated attacks. Figure 9 shows the attemp ed simple attacks. 
 





The number of attempted simple attacks can rise rathe  drastically, as this only 
requires that novice users unleash their automated processes against the system. This 
reaches almost 9,000 attempted attacks on the entire system per day, or 45 attempts, 
including viruses, per machine. While we stress the behavioral trends here much 
more than the specific numerical results, these numbers can be “reality-checked” 
against some empirical findings involving honeypots. [Dac04] observed attacks from 
6,285 IP addresses over four months, averaging over two new attack sources per hour. 
Similarly, [Pou04a] observed 28,722 new attack sources over sixteen months. 
[Pou05] found 924 attack sources per day in Germany, d [Pou04b] mines a year of 
collected data and concludes with a very conservative estimate of 753 attack tools 
available to simple attackers. In light of these results, and considering that in our case, 
the organization has “begged for attacks” by advertising, our numbers seem fairly 
realistic (or in agreement with the existing empirical data.)   
Figure 10 shows the daily average of attempted sophi ticated attacks.  
 
Fig. 10. Attempted Sophisticated Attacks per Day, First Escalation Scenario 
 
The growth of attempted sophisticated attacks is much slower, as it requires higher 
human effort and expertise. 
We also observe that the linear increase in the Organization’s Efforts (i.e. staff-




attacks). This is the case because in our model, a line r growth in countermeasure 
effectiveness leads to a lower percentage of successful attacks – an exponential 
decline.  
Our simulation resulted in an overall relatively constant average number of 
successful attacks, an equilibrium of sorts between the results of the two striving 
parties (organization and attacker). Given these reults, an organization may attempt 
to “beat” this escalation by increasing its efforts beyond the values given here; or it 
may consider cutting costs by reducing its efforts, if the results will be the same. We 
therefore ask how this equilibrium is affected if we modify the values representing 
the amount and frequency of increases in security efforts. 
Firstly, we ask how much can be gained by the organization if it increases its 





 instead. Figure 11 shows the results. 
 
Fig. 11. Successful Attacks per Day: Results of 10% Increase in Efforts 
 
Compared to Figure 7, Figure 11 has a similar overall shape, but the average 
number of successful attacks hovers around 10, versus the 13 of Figure 7. Thus, by 





Secondly, we ask how much is lost if the organization does not increase its efforts 




 instead. Figure 12 shows 
the results. 
 
Fig. 12. Successful Attacks per Day: Results of 10% Decrease in Efforts 
 
Suddenly, the equilibrium has risen to approximately 25 successful attacks. (It is 
not even clear whether an equilibrium exists by the end of the period, given the 
graph’s steep climb from Day 140 onwards.)  Thus, for a company considering 
changing its efforts, simulation here has shown that a small increase in efforts will not 
do much good, but a small decrease in efforts will cause much harm. This echoes 
[Sen90]’s discussion of “leverage”, the large effects of small changes. A benefit of 
simulation is thus demonstrated. 
Lastly, we test the sensitivity of this equilibrium by modifying a different value. 
Instead of the amount of the efforts’ increase (i.e. w
v
), we change the frequency of 
increased efforts. x1, the delay between increases (if increases are required), had been 
7. We now change it to 6, and run the simulation. Intuitively, since the organization’s 
reaction is more frequent, we expect the number of successful attacks to decrease. 





Fig. 13. Successful Attacks per Day: Results of More Frequent Efforts 
 
Clearly, by Day 160, the equilibrium has been upset. The increase in attempted 
attacks is outpacing the increased efforts of the organization, and successful attacks 
begin to climb. This is due to the fact that the organization’s more frequent efforts 
consisted of security spending followed by advertising, which attracted more frequent 
efforts of the attackers that it could not match. Tis example illustrates not only the 
utility of simulation for predicting the effects ofsmall changes, but also the benefits 
of simulation in revealing unexpected behavior. This example also demonstrates a 
systems concept: sometimes the best way to survive an Escalation scenario is to not 
react as often, even if a reaction appears necessary. [Sen90] gives a case study of two 
manufacturers of a new design of stroller, both of which are making a respectable 
profit margin on their sales. Then the manufacturers ntered Escalation, lowering 
their prices in an attempt to raise market share. Little time passed before both 
manufacturers no longer had a profit margin. The risk of reaction (reduced profit 
margin) had not been weighed against the risk of no reaction (reduced market share), 
and perhaps a slower reaction may have offered the greatest overall gain. Similarly, 




opponent. Simulation thus grants the would-be entrant into Escalation the opportunity 
to pause and consider such outcomes.  
Returning to our security scenario, we had described th  increase in attacks as due 
to the organization’s advertising. While some companies (e.g. search engines) cannot 
exist without high visibility, our results behoove an organization to consider the 
effects of its advertising and whether they outweigh the risk of additional attacks. 
Additionally, the automated “if-then” rule for advertising used here was to advertise 
anytime an increase in efforts is made. While the influence diagram of Figure 6 
indicates that enough successful attacks will prevent further advertising, our if-then 
rules had assumed that point was not yet reached in the system, e.g. it only occurs 
when successful attacks reach 60 or higher. 
Alternatively, a rule can be constructed which states, “Advertise only if successful 
attacks are below a certain threshold.” Such a ruleis included as part of the 
Escalation behavior in Chapter 4.  
All of the above scenarios involved automated rules to govern the choices of both 
organization and attackers. As an alternative, the model also allows for a rule of 
“pause the simulation whenever a certain condition occurs.”  In our case, then, pauses 
may be configured, for example, whenever the successful attacks (simple, 
sophisticated, or sum of the two) exceed a threshold value. The simulation then 
pauses, and the end-user of the simulation may consider making changes such as 
introducing a new countermeasure or increasing staff-hours before resuming the 
simulation. The behavior over time of the aggregated ttackers can also be paused and 




company considering the impact of various choices that it could make, the attacker 
behavior is out of its hands and would thus presumably be represented by automated 
rules.  
Lastly, here we assume that the organization is free to increase its efforts without 
any additional constraints. Practically, such increases may carry risks other than those 
of increased attacks; such risks are described by another archetype, Limits to Growth, 
and are described in the next chapter. 
 
3.4 Other Instances of Escalation in Security 
 
On the Escalation archetype, [Sen90] lists the international arms race s the most 
obvious example of Escalation, and  [Hof05] specifies an “information technology 
security arms race.”  This arms race consists of advances in attack technology, which 
necessitate improvements in security technology. For example, [Hof05] argues that 
“with the advent of binary differs . . . patching is no longer a viable defense strategy”, 
and instead advocates recent advances in Intrusion Prevention Systems. But this 
“race” develops over the course of a decade or longer: see [Dwa05] for a timeline 
from the 1980s to today. Given the vast unpredictabli y of long-term innovation, this 
is hardly something a single organization can simulate to aid its decision-making; we 
have thus chosen not to model it here.  
[Sen90] also suggests a generic solution to this archetype’s woes: often there can 
be an agreement to reverse the cycle, as each party agrees to simultaneously “ease 




the notion of “we’ll use less security technology if ou agree to attack our computers 
less” is obviously not applicable in this case, particularly when the anonymous 
attacks, attackers, and motivations are myriad. This option is therefore not considered 
in our scenario. 
For additional information on Escalation in computer security, please see 





















Chapter 4: Limits to Growth and Escalation Archetypes, 
Combined 
 
4.1 Limits to Growth Description 
In the Limits to Growth archetype, a growing action is applied, which leads to 
increased gains or results. These gains encourage further growth, forming a 
reinforcing loop. However, the gains soon reach some natural limit, at which point the 
limiting process places downward pressure on further gains. Despite continued 
growth action, the gains will plateau and, in some cases, decline.  
As an instance of this archetype in security, we consider the effects of security 
demands on an organization’s computer staff of a fixed size. Suppose that an 
organization has a certain number of employees dedicated to various computer-
related tasks such as technical support, hardware maintenance and upgrades, and 
security-related tasks such as monitoring a firewall or an IDS, or maintaining 
antivirus software. Initially, the organization pays modest attention to security, but 
then decides to make some investment in it. Whether  investment includes 
purchasing equipment (IDS, encryption or antivirus software, and the like), security 
training, overtime, or higher salaries for employees who focus on security, it always 
involves reassigning personnel to security. Encouraged by the noticeable gains in 
security, further investments lead to more reassignments of personnel to security. 
This continues to be a good strategy until insufficient personnel are available for non-




in the computer system, forcing the security personnel to pause their efforts as these 
problems are addressed. Reassigning more employees to s curity (or demanding more 
of the current security employees) will bring no further gains; in fact, the additional 
technical problems as well as the support staff’s decreased efficiency from facing 
demands it can not meet may result in a decline in ga s. An influence diagram for 







Fig. 14. Influence Diagram for Limits to Growth 
 
Traversing the left side clockwise reads: “security investments increase the staff’s 
security efforts, decreasing the number of successful attacks. More successful attacks 
would decrease the management’s perceived benefit of security investments. More 
perceived benefits of investments leads to further investments.” Reversing the double 
negative yields: “investments leading to efforts leading to gains in security (i.e. less 
successful attacks), increasing the perceived benefit of investments and therefore 
leading to further investments” – this is a reinforcing loop. The right-hand loop, 
however, describes how increasing the staff’s security efforts can conflict with non-
security-related tasks, due to a personnel shortage. As indicated by the upward arrow, 




conflicts will cause problems that diminish the staff’s security efforts. A balancing 
loop is thus formed, as security efforts will (uncosciously) decrease as long as the 
conflict of resources with non-security tasks is present. Given a constant number of 
attempted attacks, implementing this archetype should result in a continuous 
reduction of successful attacks (i.e. increase of gains for security investments) until 
insufficient personnel are available for other tasks; at that point, the number of 
successful attacks will cease to fall further, and may in fact begin to rise. [Wol03] 
includes this archetype in the category “Underachievement”, as a reinforcing loop is 
desired for growth, but it is not successful. 
The simulation model can incorporate this Limit to Growth with the following 
property: Some value p is the highest percentage of staff efforts that can optimally be 
reallocated to security with no ill effect. If total demand for security efforts exceed 
(p/100)*SysAdminCapacity, then the “effective” hours for security are given by the 
SysAdminCapacity, minus some constant k times the excess demand. In the 
simulation described below, we have used p = 23 and k = 1.2, believing these values 
to be a reasonable description of a typical system. 
 
4.2 Combined Archetypes 
While the use of an archetype can present a complex system in readily-grasped 
terms, a given scenario or story may not neatly fit into a given archetype. The general 
archetypes of [Sen90], [Sen94], and [Bra02] are uniq e only in that they have been 
frequently observed in diverse settings, and that tey provide useful “building blocks” 




beginning with the influence diagram of one easily-observed archetype (or simply a 
balancing or reinforcing loop), then “widening and deepening” the diagram by adding 
additional “loops” to describe the observed behavior. Thus, a combination of 
archetypes is often the simplest way to grasp a system’  behavior when two or more 
different behavior patterns are exhibited simultaneously. (Such a combination, that of 
Limits to Growth with Shifting the Burden, can be found in [Sen90].) 
Observe that both Escalation and Limits to Growth hinge on the organization’s 
security investments and successful attacks; we thus connect their influence diagrams 
through these values. The resulting combined diagram is shown in Figure 15.  
Fig. 15. Influence Diagram for Combined Limits to Growth and Escalation 
 
Observe that the two influence diagrams largely address different issues, except for 
the upper-left-hand corner of Figure 15, which links successful attacks to security 




attacks increase the threat, increasing investments), Limits to Growth assumes a 
“negative” effect (successful attacks decrease perceived benefit, reducing 
investments). 
In combining the two archetypes it becomes clear tht both patterns may be true 
for different organizations with different cultures, or for different levels of 
management. Additionally, recall that an the influenc  diagram shows only 
“increases” and “decreases”, but quantitatively some links may be stronger than 
others. Thus, both patterns may be present within a si gle organization; a visible shift 
from increases to decreases in investment, or vice versa, will occur at times when the 
weight of one pattern exceeds that of the other. For example, when the organization’s 
management first invests in security, its perceived benefit is low, so further 
investments hinge on a reduction in attacks; later, s curity investments are believed 
an appropriate cure if successful attacks rise; finally, successful attacks may reach 
some upper limit at which point the management begins to lose its faith in 
investments and reduce them.  
The overall trend of this combined archetype, when vi wed in terms of successful 
attacks, will look as follows: a stable oscillation (due to Escalation) until security 
efforts exceed their optimal value (for the given staff size), followed by a rise in 
successful attacks (from Limits to Growth). At this point, several possibilities exist: 
the organization may continue (for a short duration) to advertise, leading to further 
attempted attacks; it may follow the “threat” pattern and push for more security 
investments; and/or it may follow the “perceived benefit” pattern and reduce security 




successful attacks will be followed by either a leveling off or a rise in successful 
attacks; the former would occur if the organization halts both advertising and 
investments, keeping attempted attacks constant. The highest risk, leading to a 
significant increase in successful attacks, occurs if the organization continues 
advertising, raising the attempted attacks, as its continued investments cause more 
woes for its computer staff, further diminishing their effective efforts.  
 
4.3 Simulation Setup 
The behavior of the organization’s management (which invests in security and 
demands staff-hours for it) and the aggregated attackers (who attempt the attacks) are 
then given by a series of rules (similar to those of Section 3.2), following the 
escalatory behavior described above. Here we demonstrate one possible outcome by 
assuming that the perceived benefit or “faith” in investments is held constant, and 
thus the decision regarding further investments is determined only by the threat to the 
organization. This decision is modeled by the following rule: The simulation begins 
with an initial demand of 0w  staff-hours for security. Every x1 days, { IF (Successful 
Simple Attacks > θ1), THEN increase staff-hours demanded for “simple” security 
tasks by w . Additionally, IF (Successful Sophisticated Attacks > θ2), THEN increase 
staff-hours demanded for “sophisticated” security tasks by v.} A delay of 1d  days is 
incurred for personnel reallocation.  
(The description of tasks as “simple” or “sophistica ed”, as well as the task-by-task 




The organization’s advertising efforts are modeled by the following rule: Every x2 
days, IF (Successful Simple Attacks < θ3), THEN decide to advertise. A delay of d2 
days is incurred before the advertising occurs.  
Lastly, the aggregated attackers’ response is modeled as follows: The initial value 
of Simple Attacks Attempted / Day is a0. Each day, IF (Advertising occurs), THEN a 
delay of d3 days occurs as the word spreads and new attack tools are accumulated, 
where upon Simple Attacks Attempted / Day is increased by a%. The initial value of 
Sophisticated Attacks Attempted / Day is b0. Each day, IF (Advertising occurs), 
THEN a delay of d4 of days occurs as the word spreads and new attacks re 
engineered, whereupon Sophisticated Attacks Attempted / Day is increased by b%.  
We simulate a system of approximately 200 machines. We have chosen a period of 
six months (180 days) for our simulation. Successful attacks per day are used as our 
measure of “attackers’ gains vs. organization’s gains.”  
With these values in mind, we first simulated a “baseline scenario” characterized 
by the following values: x1 = 7, x2 = 7; w0 = 29.8, w= 9.1, v = 1.6; θ1 = 6, θ2 = 2, θ3 = 
18; d1 = 14, d2 = 1, d3 = 2, d4 = 7; a0 = 15, a = 26; b0 = 0.6, b = 7. These values 
describe, in our opinion, an organization’s 180-day progression from minimal 
security efforts to full security efforts; a realistically aggressive advertising campaign; 
common delays for each action described; and a progression in terms of attack 
attempts from the minimal attack “noise” received by an inconspicuous organization 





4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
The results of this simulation are shown in Figure 16. 
Fig. 16. Successful Attacks per Day, Escalation with Limits to Growth 
 
The number of successful attacks seems to oscillate f irly stably until 
approximately Day 145, at which point it rises dramatically. Until Day 145, the 
number of successful attacks hovers at about 11, which is this system’s equilibrium of 
escalation: security efforts, followed by advertising, followed by new attack attempts, 
followed by further security efforts. Around Day 145, however, the Limits to Growth 
archetype emerges: the demand for staff-hours exceeds th  optimal load the staff can 
bear, the staff’s performance deteriorates, and successful attacks rise. Note that 
successful attacks exceed θ3=18, the organization’s threshold for cessation of 
advertising, at approximately Day 155.  
Correspondingly, the number of attempted attacks (simple plus sophisticated) is 
shown in Figure 17 
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Fig. 17. Attempted Attacks per Day, Escalation with Limits to Growth 
 
The number of attempted attacks escalates as often as every seven days (the 
organization’s wait time between advertisements) until approximately Day 155. At 
that point, the company halts its advertising, and  constant 1925 attacks per day are 
attempted for the remainder of the period. Yet, returning to Figure 16, successful 
attacks are found to rise several times between Days 155 and 180. As the organization 
continues to reallocate staff to security and increase its demands on them, the 
personnel shortage for other tasks leads to more technical problems, sidetracking the 
increasingly overwhelmed security staff; attempted attacks thus become successful as 
the state of the countermeasures deteriorates and system vulnerability rises. Limits to 
Growth leads here to a decline in gains, not to a plateau. 
By examining the behavior of the system, one can realiz  the problem of the 
increase in “successful attacks” around day 145. In response to this problem, the 
organization should take some action. Below we show  the use of simulation can 
support decisions regarding what action best fits the goals and context of a given 
organization. 
Firstly, as our system was described, the increase in attempted attacks came not 




advertising. While this may not be the case for all organizations, certainly any 
organization considering advertising must weigh potential benefits (such as increased 
clientele) against the possibility of (and its preparedness for) Escalation.  
Secondly, even when Escalation is called for, it may be wise to escalate less 
strongly. The organization’s rule for increasing security efforts was given as: “Every 
x1 days, if successful (simple, sophisticated) attacks are greater than (θ1, θ2), increase 
efforts by (w, v).” Increasing the period x1 (i.e. reducing the frequency of possible 
escalation), raising the thresholds θ1 and θ2 (reducing the frequency of when 
escalation is called for), and/or reducing w and v (the quantities of escalation when it 
is employed) are all possible solutions. When a threat is perceived, the effect of 
reaction must be weighed against the risk of no action, and sometimes the greatest 
overall gain is achieved by a slower or weaker reaction. Similarly, when we turn to 
Limits to Growth, it is noted that if the limits will not be (or cannot be, as in [Mar03]) 
removed, then reducing the growth action will delay the onset of the limiting factors, 
as well as slowing the deterioration of growth once the limits manifest themselves. A 
reduction solution thus heeds both archetypes. To see which of these three reductions 
is most effective here, all three were simulated: rucing the frequency of increased 
efforts, raising the threshold for increased efforts, and reducing the quantity of efforts. 
Experimenting with each solution individually as well as combined with others, we 
found that our system responded most favorably to simply reducing the quantity of 
escalationw by 30%: each time the organization decides to increase its security 
efforts, it does so by 6.4 staff-hours, as opposed to the 9.1 of the baseline case. The 
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Fig. 18. Results of Reduced Escalation (Successful Attacks per Day) 
Note that the equilibrium number of successful attacks has risen to about 15 (as 
opposed to the 11 in Figure 16), but there is no dramatic climb in successful attacks 
by Day 180. The weaker reaction has not pushed demands on the staff beyond their 
point of optimality in these six months. This approach can thus be thought of as 
“partly losing Escalation, but winning Limits to Growth.” Note as well that the 
number of successful attacks reaches θ3=18, the advertising threshold, several times, 
leading to less advertising and thus less attempted attacks. Integrating Figures 16 and 
18, we find that the number of cumulative successful attacks is less for reduced 
escalation (~2650) than for full escalation (~2800). Given a particular organization’s 
structure, goals, and priorities, the above tradeoffs (equilibrium number of attacks, 
rise in attacks, advertising opportunities, cumulative attacks) should be considered to 
find whether reduced escalation is more in its interest than full escalation.  
Thirdly, a solution commonly found for Limits to Growth is to cease the growth 
action, and instead concentrate on removing the limiting condition. In our case, this 
would translate into hiring additional support staff. [Sen90] stresses the concept of 
“leverage”, i.e. an organization’s efforts will yield maximal gains if it carefully 
chooses where and when to apply those efforts. While hiring too early is prohibitively 




gains will begin. Additionally, the stronger the limit has become, the harder it is to 
remove it; in our case, once the support staff is overwhelmed with demands, it will 
not have time to introduce new hires to the intricacies of the computer system. Thus, 
the point of highest leverage for hiring is when it will take effect just before the 
demands on personnel exceed their optimal load. This requires great prediction skills 
on the part of the manager, including a sense of “feedback” regarding the support 
staff’s load. Otherwise, the best strategy is to hire as soon as possible once a decline 
in gains is visible. This also requires the manager to realize that indeed, gains have 
diminished since the optimal personnel load was reach d. As opposed to the previous 
strategies, which are executed before-the-fact, this strategy describes how an 
organization might now respond to problems. Following full escalation, Figure 16 
showed a rise in attacks around Day 145. Figure 19 shows the results if the 
organization responds rapidly and additional personnel are available as of Day 155. 
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Fig. 19. Full Escalation, with Hiring at Day 155 
 
The oscillations and steep rise occur as in Figure 16, followed by a steep drop in 
attacks due to the hiring. Integrating, we find a total of approximately 1,880 




comes with the cost of hiring.) The sooner the hiring, the less of the peak around Day 
150; the longer the wait to hire, the greater the peak.  
Figures 16, 18, and 19 have shown the results of the three above scenarios in terms 
of the number of successful attacks. An organization must also consider factors such 
as labor costs, and thus Figure 20 displays the cumulative staff-hours employed for 
each scenario: “baseline” (full escalation, without hiring), “reduced escalation”, and 
“escalation with hiring.” Note that the efforts of “baseline” and “hiring” will coincide 
until Day 155, at which point the curve for “hiring” will grow more steeply. 
Fig. 20. Cumulative Staff-Hours for Each Scenario 
 
Thus, given the number of successful attacks and number of staff-hours employed, 
both per-day and cumulatively, an organization can o sider its best options as it 
encounters this combination of archetypes.  
For additional information on the combination of Escalation and Limits to Growth 
as it occurs in security, please see [Ros06c], fromwhich this chapter was excerpted. 
Chapter 5:  Related Work 
 

















5.1 System Dynamics and Archetypes  
System dynamics thinking is introduced in [For61]. An introduction to archetypes 
can be found in [Sen90], with added details and recommendations in [Sen94], while 
[Bra02] extends this work to list ten different archetypes. [Wol03] argues that all 
existing archetypes can be included in one of four “co e generic” archetype categories 
such as “Underachievement” or “Out-of-Control”; however, [Wol03] acknowledges 
that the more-specific, more-familiar ten archetypes (such as “Escalation” or “Limits 
to Growth”) are more rapidly applied to real systems, and we have thus used them 
here. [Mar03] applies systems thinking and archetypes to safety engineering. Some 
archetypes found in safety are clearly those seen els where (such as “Eroding 
Goals”), but others seem unique to safety. (This is the case partly because safety 
measures can be a victim of their own success – when no accidents occur, there can 
be pressure to reduce safety measures.) For now we have focused on the more-
common archetypes of [Bra02] regarding security, but fut re work may find that new 
archetypes apply to safety as well.  
5.2 Sources of Data  
Empirical data regarding computer security are still fairly rare as of now. 
Anecdotes detailing attacks and their responses, such as [Gib02], are very illustrative 
of the attacker/defender interaction, but few such anecdotes have been published. 
Some information regarding what is general practice in the security world today 
can be found in [Gor05a], a survey of several hundred organizations. For example, 
our model includes IDSs but not biometrics because the former is found to be 




Most data on attacks are gathered from analyzing “honeypots” or “honeynets”, 
systems designed to be attacked. Such studies include o r own laboratory’s [Pan05], 
as well as [Dac04], [Pou04a], [Pou04b], and [Pou05].  
Hypothesized attacker behavior is described in [Jon97], based on empirical 
findings from controlled attack experiments. This focuses on the behavior of the 
individual attacker, while more data are needed on the aggregated effects of multiple 
attackers. 
To help meet the dearth of empirical data regarding security, nine teams are 
collaborating on the projects DETER and EMIST [Baj04]. DETER involves building 
a massive (currently approximately 200 machines, intended to reach 1000 machines) 
“researcher- and vendor-neutral” network testbed for emulating various types of 
attacks, countermeasures, and network topologies. Meanwhile, the EMIST project 
seeks to formalize methodologies for measuring these ffects. Combined, these 
projects should provide a wealth of useful, unbiased, and well-accepted emulated 
attack data. Both studies will enrich our model with quantifiable values, e.g. honeynet 
findings might show that 20 buffer-overflow attacks of a certain type are attempted 
each day, and the DETER/EMIST findings would tell us that the attack will succeed 
80% of the time if the network has Topology A but only 60% of the time with 
Topology B. 
Regarding user factors, [Lar03a] uses surveys to understand Internet usage, and 
[Lar03b] conducts studies with test websites to investigate users’ privacy behaviors 








5.3 Economics and Security 
 
[Cam03] considers the effects of public disclosure regarding security breaches on a 
company’s stock prices. [Gor02], [Gor05b], and [Bod05] all use economic analysis in 
determining how much security investment is worthwhile for a company, given its 
priorities; however, details are not provided as to what should be done specifically 
with the investments. This provides the connection p i t to our model. 
Economic requirements are also used to lead to assumptions or specifications for 
related computer security, e.g. determining the subjective cost and total welfare 
regarding network routing [Fei05] or requirements on trusted platforms placed by 




5.4 Other Modeling Approaches in Security 
 
One approach in security has been to probabilistically quantify an attacker’s 
behavior and its impact on a system’s ability to prvide certain security-related 
properties. Attempts have been made to build models that take into account both the 
attacker and the system being validated. A general model of an intrusion-tolerant 
system is proposed in [Gon01] to describe security exploits by considering attack 
impacts; the system state is represented in terms of failure-causing events. [Jha01] 
proposes a combination of state-level modeling, formal logic, and Bayesian analysis 




quantify system survivability. Finally, Ortalo et al. [Ort99] propose modeling known 
vulnerabilities in a system using a “privilege graph”. By combining a privilege graph 
with simple assumptions concerning an attacker’s behavior, the authors then obtain an 
“attack state graph.” Parameter values for such a graph have been obtained 
experimentally; once obtained, an attack state graph can be analyzed using standard 
Markov techniques to obtain several probabilistic measures of security. [Ste04] uses a 
probabilistic model for validating an intrusion-tolerant system that combined 
intrusion tolerance and security, allowing the designers to make choices that 
maximize the intrusion tolerance before they implement the system. Compared to 
these models, the model presented here is more generic i  its inclusion of other 
human elements such as users and system administrator . Additonally, other than 
[Ort99] which uses data collected empirically to assess some of the parameters values 
in the model, the other ones are not developed to easily be linked to empirical data. 
Cyberciege ([Nav06], [Irv05]), developed by the Naval Postgraduate School, is a 
computer game with a very engaging user interface and virtual world, intended for 
training students to understand security engineering. Cyberciege focuses on detailed 
access control, user-by-user, for a small number of users. Each piece of hardware is 
hand-selected from a list of fictional brands (e.g. “BitFlipper router”), and physical 
security measures are implemented on a user-by-user basis. The determination of 
whether an attack succeeds is by comparing asset deirability and how well standard 
procedures have been followed. Cyberciege’s level of detail models the role of an 




model abstracts one level higher, to the manager who oversees several hundred 
machines. 
In a similar vein, Fred Cohen & Associates offer a security simulator [Coh06] on 
their website (http://all.net/games/index.html). Fully described in [Coh99], this 
simulator gives examples of how a single attack of varying sophistication might 
succeed against different computers with different countermeasures. The defender 
strength, i.e. to what degree the defender does the right thing, is specified as a 
percentage by the user before running the simulator. If an attack succeeds, the dollar 
loss due to the attack is estimated based on the atacker profile, e.g. how much will a 
successful attack by a private investigator cost? Our approach attempts to add in more 
empirical data, as described in Section 5.2. Additionally, our work extends the 
“defender strength” idea by allowing for strengths of each countermeasure: a system 
may have a 90% effective firewall but only a 70% effective IDS. Furthermore, rather 
than specify a value for defender strength, the user of our model inputs managerial 
decisions such as how much effort is allocated to which security tasks and how 
skilled the staff is – the model then uses these inputs to determine the resulting 












The archetype and results of simulation execution presented here show the value of 
systems dynamics modeling for enterprise security. The evolution over time of two 
slightly different “what-if” scenarios may result in very different pictures, reinforcing 
the value of simulation. Systems thinking, combined with simulation, can assist an 
organization in placing its efforts in the places that will give the most “leverage” to 
their goals, and in diagnosing and solving problems. This approach thus leads to a 
more enlightened weighing of costs vs. benefits for the proposed decisions that an 
organization might make.  
System dynamics simulation is also an intuitive and powerful tool for 
understanding computer security, as well as for training professionals. In time, our 
model will mesh with much other research currently being done by others, leading to 
gains in a wide variety of directions. 
 
6.2 Future Work 
 
A great deal of future work remains as well, including:  
• “Deepening” the simulation model with more detail, e.g. where linear rates 
had been assumed, perhaps logarithmic or exponential would be more 
accurate. The documentation of the simulation model alr ady reveals several 




• “Broadening” the model to include such factors as: 
o User details describing their interaction with the security policy. 
o Asset properties. Currently we only show successful attacks; future 
work can link this to system availability, confidentiality, and integrity. 
o Internal attacks. Currently it is assumed that the fir wall is X% 
effective against all simple attacks, for example, which assumes that 
all simple attacks come from outside the firewall.  
• Obtaining additional empirical data for use as parameters in the simulation 
model. Sources for such data, including work from our wn research group, 
are described in Section 5.2. 
• Modeling other instances of the above archetypes, modeling other archetypes, 
other combinations of archetypes, and looking for new archetypes. Appendix I 
gives a few ideas for modeling other archetypes. 
• Documenting real-world case studies in security, using archetypes to explain 
the situations, and using simulation to suggest improvements. (For example, 
[Sen94] first describes the story of an airline’s failure, applies archetypes to 
describe it, and then builds a simulator through which it is shown, for 
example, that had the airline not cut its ticket prices quite so steeply, it would 
not have gone bankrupt.) We have already begun interv ewing one system 
administrator and documenting his case study, but otaining the necessary 






Appendix I: Archetypes 
 
 
Here we briefly describe each of the ten archetypes of [Bra02], giving one possible 
example from security.  
 
Shifting the Burden, or Symptomatic Fixes. We witness a problem symptom, 
and rather than think about the root cause, we try to fix the symptom. Doing so 
distracts us from the actual cause of the problem, or masks the symptoms so it’s 
harder to diagnose the problem. Suppose a system is continually falling victim to 
successful “script-kiddy” attacks (symptom). The company may install an I.D.S. to 
catch the attacks (symptomatic fix), when in reality the attacks wouldn’t make it into 
the system if the company had a good firewall, and wouldn’t succeed if they kept 
their vulnerabilities down. (Fundamental fixes.)  
Fixes that Fail. Here, the attempted fix actually worsens the underlying problem 
in time. The newly-installed I.D.S may have a high false-alarm rate and require a 
great deal of the sysadmin’s attention. The sysadmin is now too busy to attend to 
other duties (such as addressing vulnerabilities), so the number of successful attacks 
actually increases.  
Success to the Successful. There is a tendency to believe that if putting some 
money into Approach A yields good results, then putting more money into Approach 
A (and ignoring Approach B) will further improve results. For example: for an 
investment of $100, a Host-Vulnerability-Scanner will yield more improvements than 
an IDS. But continued investment into the Host-Vuln-Scanner (diverting funds from 




Limits to Growth . Increased efforts and investments produce increased results, 
until the system reaches its natural limit. At that point, results will either plateau or 
decline. For example, given an inexperienced sysadmin staff of a fixed size, training 
them will result in significant gains to the network’s security. But eventually, their 
size (rather than skill) becomes the limiting factor, so further training will accomplish 
nothing.  
Attractiveness Principle. Increased efforts are no longer producing results, with 
two different limits fighting growth. The manager must decide which limit to address 
first/more. Suppose we have a simultaneous investment in both more/better sysadmin 
staff, and some technology (maybe a firewall). At some point, the Return on 
Investment will drop; at that point, we must decide which factor is more of a limiting 
one.  
Growth and Underinvestment. A successful approach may initially seem to fail 
if it wasn’t given proper investment/support/capacity. For example, a company may 
double its system size; if the SysAdmin size (which is the capacity in our case) is kept 
constant, overall performance will drop. If, instead, the SysAdmin size is properly 
increased, the company will see a gain.  
Eroding Goals. If a goal is not immediately met, it can be tempting to reduce the 
initial goal. A manager may try for an Availability (or confidentiality, etc.) Level of 
3, find that the expenses next month are too high, so s/he drops the goal to Level 2. 
The next month, the company is hit with a massive attack, causing more loss than had 




catches 100% of all attacks. What, that gives too many false alarms?  Okay, maybe 
90%. Still too many alarms?  Okay, maybe set it to 80%.”)    
Escalation. Party A puts in more efforts, yielding more result ; this threatens Party 
B, who does likewise, and so on. (The U.S./ U.S.S.R. arms race during the Cold War 
is a good example.)  If a company increases its security efforts and publicizes how 
secure it is, or otherwise makes itself more of an attractive target, it will receive more 
sophisticated attacks, which will require more security investments, and so on.  
Accidental Adversaries. Two parties initially agree towards cooperation, but then 
Party A perceives an offense (often unintentional) from Party B; it then retaliates, and 
the situation escalates from there. An example herewould be the SysAdmin and User, 
who agree they want the company to succeed, but then the user accidentally breaches 
the security policy, leading the SysAdmin to impose a harsher security policy and 
other enforcement measures. The user (or another user) may become annoyed and 
retaliate.  
Tragedy of the Commons. If two efforts independently consume a common 
resource without respecting one another, both will see reduced gains as the resource 
runs out. In our case, if a company decides to invest more in IDS as well as Host-
Checking-Tool, but maintains the size of its SysAdmin (which is the “common” 







Appendix II: Model Screenshots 
 
The basic building blocks for continuous modeling in the Extend simulation 
environment include holding tanks, constants, and equations, to name a few. 
As one example, we show a simplified version of how the antivirus software 
effectiveness is modeled. Suppose that this system needs its virus definitions updated 
on a daily basis; if so, an antivirus that has been totally neglected for too long of a 
period will become close to useless, as it fails to catch the majority of viruses 
circulating the Internet today. Thus, antivirus effectiveness is reduced each day by 
some average “daily loss rate” which describes the occurrence of new viruses, and 
increased each day by the number of staff-hours updating its definitions (or otherwise 
maintaining it) that day. The effectiveness is then measured on a 0-to-1 scale and 











Fig. 21. Sample Screenshot of Holding Tank, Equation, and Constant Blocks 
 
Notice the number of staff-hours in, subject to some function, the holding tank for 




tank are given, limited to the range between 0 and 1, and output as today’s “antivirus 
level.” 
To allow for greater abstraction, all of the above blocks can be inserted into a 




Staff-Hrs per Machine 
per Day for Antivirus
 
Fig. 22. Sample Hierarchical Block, Antivirus 
 
Here we see only the input and the output; the remaining holding tank, equation 
block, etc. are all hidden inside the hierarchical block. 
 In our model, a certain number of attacks of a given sophistication level are 
attempted each day. Depending on the effectiveness of the various countermeasures 
and the system’s vulnerabilities, a certain number succeed. Another hierarchical 
block, which performs this evaluation, is shown in F gure 23. 
Fig. 23. Sample Hierarchical Block, Simple Attack Success 
The block on the far-right of Figure 23 is an output lotter, used to generate many of 
the figures presented in this thesis. 
The model has a great deal of constant parameters; for example, the antivirus daily 





ConfigVulnLevel, loss if ignored .05, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 1.5 / machine 
NetVulns, loss if ignored .04, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.6 / machine 
AppVulns, loss if ignored .004, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.13 / machine 
AppVuln, loss from new S/W 0.8
ToleranceLevel, loss if ignored .1, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.67 / machine 
EncryptionLevel, loss if ignored .001, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.067 / machine 
Antiviruslevel, loss if ignored .02, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.4 / machine 
FirewallLevel, loss if ignored .033, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 0.66 / machine 
IDSLevel, loss if ignored .05, linear 
", staff-hrs needed to maintain 2 / machine 
Fig. 24. Sample from Spreadsheet with Parameter Values 
Lastly, while certain parameter values (such as antivirus loss rate) reflect the 
reality of the system, others (such as machine size, taff size and the presence of 
countermeasures) reflect decisions that a manager might ake. To allow for easy 
“what-if” simulation, these parameters were extracted o a user-friendly Graphical 













Appendix III: Model Documentation 
 
 
OVERVIEW:   The end-user of the model sets several sliders and switches to 
describe the system, countermeasures, allocation of sysadmin to various tasks, and 
attacks. The end-user can then see the costs of this configuration. A certain number of 
attacks are then attempted on the system each day; given the details of the system and 
its countermeasures, the end-user can see how many of those attacks succeed, or how 
many were blocked by a given countermeasure. The end-user can also track the 
effectiveness of a given countermeasure over time.  
 





Table II: Slider Inputs for the Model Graphical User Interface 
Name in Model Type Meaning 




Slider, 0-80 Personnel-hours (or “man-hours”) of System 
Administration and Security Officer staff 
employed per day. A SysAdminSize of 40 
describes 5 people working 8 hrs/day each 
day, or 10 people working 4 hrs/day, etc. 
SysAdminSkill Slider, 1-5 Average overall skill of the System 
Administration and Security Officers Staff. 
The 1-5 scale is ours.  
SysAdmin Motivation Slider, 1-5 How motivated the SysAdmin staff is to 
protect the system; we impose a 1-5 scale. 
New Software is 




Interval (in days) between installation of new 
software (which contains new vulnerabilities). 





Further descriptions of the system, e.g. Windows vs. Linux, would be a critical 
step in adding detail to the model; it will hopefully be considered in a future 
implementation. 
 
COUNTERMEASURE INPUTS:   We include several common 
countermeasures. In the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey of 494 
U.S. corporations, universities, government bodies, etc., the most common security 
technologies used (Fig. 16), by percentage of respondents, were: Antivirus software 
(99%); Firewalls (98%); Server-based access control lists (71%); Intrusion detection 
(68%); Encryption for data in transit (64%). We view the access control lists as part 
of the “SysAdmin’s Enforcement Actions” and not a separate technology per se, as it 
is built into most operating systems today. For simplicity’s sake, we chose to include 
both data-in-transit encryption and file-encryption as “encryption software.”   
A significant countermeasure not described directly in the CSI/FBI survey is the 
emerging field of attack tolerance (as opposed to prevention or detection). This could 
include designs for graceful degradation under attack; redundancy and diversity (in 
some cases); and other technologies allowing the system to succeed despite the 
attack. We thus include a countermeasure entitled “olerance mechanisms.”   
Additionally, as 70% of the survey respondents (Fig. 17 in the FBI survey) 
identified some type of network security training for their users as important, we have 




Lastly, we have included vulnerability-scanning tools which can assist the system 
administrator in finding vulnerabilities to fix. These include host-configuration 
vulnerability scanning tools, such as FERRET; and network-vulnerability scanning 
tools, such as NESSUS.  
For all of the above countermeasures, we presently assume that they are either 
present in full strength, or not at all. (They’re controlled by binary switches.)  Future 
implementations of the model may modify this. The countermeasures are given in 
Table III. 
COST/EXPENSE EQUATIONS & OUTPUTS: Given the above descriptions, 
we can now compute the system’s expenses. (For now, we simply tally the number of 
successful attacks, rather than describing the monetary loss they cause the company; 
this too will hopefully be improved in a future model.)   
Table III: Countermeasures Included in the Model 
Name in Model Type Meaning 
A Firewall? Y/N Switch “1” if the system has a firewall; “0” if it 
doesn’t.  




Y/N Switch “1” if an Intrusion Detection System is 
present. 
Encryption Software? Y/N Switch “1” if encryption software is installed. 
Tolerance 
Mechanisms? 
Y/N Switch “1” if tolerance mechanisms are present. 
A Host-Vulnerability 
Scanning Tool? 
Y/N Switch “1” if the sysadmin uses a tool such as 





Y/N Switch “1” if the sysadmin uses a tool such as 
NESSUS to check for network vulnerabilities. 
User Training for 
Better Security 
Practices? 







Expenses reflect all the money spent on the system over the duration of the 
simulation (usually ~100 days). StaffCost is the cost per day of employing the 
sysadmin staff. PurchaseCost is the cost to purchase the various countermeasures, 
which we assume is a one-time payment. We then have: 
Expenses = (StaffCost * Time) +  PurchaseCost.  
    ($)        =  ($/day) * (days)   +   ($) 
In Extend terms, Expenses is an accumulating tank; StaffCost is the input, and 
PurchaseCost is the initial level. 
 
StaffCost = STAFFCOSTPERHOUR * SysAdminSize.  
     ($)  =  ($/hr) * (personnel-hours)  
The cost of employing the sysadmin staff per day. We assume an average cost of 
$35 per personnel-hour.  
For PurchaseCost, we assume that Tolerance Measures, Encryption Software, and 
an Antivirus must be purchased for every machine in the system to be effective. (The 
effects of installing an antivirus on only half, 1/3, etc. of the machines would be 
another interesting question for future work.)   
Per-system purchase costs = SystemSize *  
{ (Tolerance Measures?)*TOLCOST + (Encryption  Software?)*ENCRYPTCOST  
+ (Antivirus?)* ANTIVIRUSCOST }. 




We simply assume for now that tolerance measures cost $300/system. For 
encryption software, PGP is very commonly used (try Google searches for 
“encryption software” and the like); the most basic version of PGP Desktop 
Professional 9 costs $200; we have used the value $220 to allow for a few more 
features. For the antivirus, Norton Antivirus, one of the most popular products on the 
market, costs $40 /machine in the 5-user pack. (Sources: manufacturer’s websites.)   
We do not include the host-configuration or network-vulnerability scanning tools 
in costs or expenses, as the most popular products used (i.e. FERRET and NESSUS) 
are available for free. The remaining two PurchaseCost items are the firewall and 
IDS, whose cost is independent of the size of the system behind them.  
PurchaseCost = per-system purchase costs + (A Firewall?)* FIREWALLCOST + (An 
IDS?)* (IDSCost). 
     ($)  = ($)           +(1/0)*$   + (1/0)* $. 
We assume that a high-quality firewall costs $10,00 given Dr. Cukier’s 
experience with proprietary firewalls. For the IDS cost, we take the price of the Cisco 
4250, which is $30,000. 
  
SYSADMIN ALLOCATION: We describe the SysAdmin staff’s “capacity” to 
maintain and protect the system as a function of its size, skill, and motivation: 
TotalSysAdminCapacity = SysAdminSize * SysAdminMotivation * ln( 
SysAdminSkill + 1). 
(Note that TotalSysAdminCapacity is measured in pseudo-personnel hours, as it 




phenomenon that beyond a certain point, additional training accomplishes very little. 
We use (skill+1) so that a skill level of 1, the lowest, doesn’t result in an ln(1) = 0 
term.) 
The end-user then decides what percentage of the TotalSysAdminCapacity should 
be dedicated to what task, using the sliders in the gre n box. The sysadmin needs to 
spend time and attention to deal with any given countermeasure (or its side effects!). 
We refer to these as “countermeasure efforts.”  Obviously, more efforts are needed 
during deployment than afterwards, but for now, we simply describe “efforts-per-
day.”  (One approach would be to consider an average effort over the product’s 
lifetime, including its deployment, but this again is for future work.)    The order of 
the various efforts is consistent with that of the model, but it has no particular 
significance.  
“Antivirus Efforts” consist primarily of keeping all of the antivirus definitions up-
to-date. The percentage of TotalSyadminCapacity dedicated to Antivirus Efforts is 
called Antivir%.  
“Firewall Efforts” consist of tasks needed to maint the firewall, primarily 
through applying new patches as firewall vulnerabilities are discovered. (Firewall%). 
“IDS Efforts” consist of maintaining the intrusion detection system, mostly by 
downloading new signatures. (IDS%). 
“Encryption Efforts” consist of updating and maintai ing the encryption software 
(quite possibly including helping users who run into difficulty using it). (Encrypt%).  
“Enforcement Actions” include setting proper access control; monitoring the 




users. For example, if a user tried using a “weak” (i.e. easily guessed) password such 
as “joe”, a vigilant sysadmin would prevent him from doing so. (Enforce%). 
 “Software Patches” reflects the time spent per dayon finding and installing 
patches for newly-discovered vulnerabilities in anyof the system’s netware, operating 
systems, or applications. (Patch%). 
“Tolerance Efforts” depend on the particular tolerance measure; some measures 
are relatively low-maintenance (e.g. if graceful degradation has been built-in, then no 
further action is needed), but some are high-maintenance (e.g. if the system has a 
backup web server that runs a different operating system, the backup server has to be 
maintained as well). (Tol%). 
“Addressing Alarms” refers to the alarms raised by the firewall and IDS; 
sometimes these were in fact attacks, but often they were legitimate actions. A good 
sysadmin should sort through these. (Alarm%). In the new versions, we’ve gotten rid 
of “addressing alarms” as its own task; it’s now included in either “IDS Efforts” or 
“Firewall Efforts.” 
The various desired percentages, as well as the TotalSysAdminCapacity and 
SystemSize, are input into the HoursForTasks block. The outputs of this block 
describe how many SysAdmin pseudo-personnel-hours (or more precisely, skill-
motivation-personnel-hours each day) are actually allocated to each task.  
If the various desired percentages (inputs) add up to 100 or less, then all of the 
desired demands can be met, and the process is simple:  
Hours allocated to Firewall = (Firewall% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity. 
Hours allocated to IDS = (IDS% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity. 
Comment [i2]: Page: 1 
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The firewall and IDS are independent of the size of system behind them. (Or are 
they?  Once we include analyzing alarms in Firewall Hours & IDS Hours, well, the 
bigger the system, the more alarms likely. In the new paper, I assumed staff-hours per 
machine for these as well.)  For the other efforts, however, we must factor in the 
system size; after all, to spend a total of two hours per day on updating antivirus 
definitions for a single computer is certainly sufficient; for a thousand computers, it 
probably won’t be. We thus talk of “hours allocated per system [per day].”  Note that 
for now, we assume that doubling the system size will simply halve the personnel-
hours available for a given task; in reality, larger system sizes tend to come with 
mechanisms for better management, so we might in the future consider a factor such 
as log(systemsize). For the moment, though, we’ve kept the divisor linear. The 
following hours are per-machine: 
Hours allocated to Antivirus = (Antivir% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 
Hours allocated to Encryption = (Encrypt% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 
Hours allocated to Enforcement Actions = (Enforce% / 100) * 
TotalSysAdminCapacity / SystemSize. 
Hours allocated to Software Patches  = (Patch% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 





Hours allocated to (False) Alarms = (Alarm% / 100) * TotalSysAdminCapacity / 
SystemSize. 
(A larger system will generate more alarms, and thus needs more attention.) 
IF, however, the end-user specifies a series of percentages with the sliders that sum 
to >100%, not all of the desired hours will actually be allocated that way. A prompt 
can inform the end-user that the values have exceed 100%, and that s/he may wish to 
modify values before running the simulation. (This prompt was built into several 
earlier models; it was omitted from the Aug. 17 version for simpler presentation, but 
can be reincorporated if desired.)  If the end-user chooses to continue, priority will be 
assigned from left-to-right, i.e. first Antivir% of the  TotalSysAdminCapacity, if
available, will be allocated to antivirus; then up to Firewall%, if available, to firewall, 
and so on. 
(Extend description: looking inside the HoursForTasks block, we see a series of 
equations, converting the percentages into HoursDemanded. Below that, we see a 
series of holding tanks. All of the tanks are reset to their starting values at the end of 
each day by a periodic pulse. The first tank has starting value 
TotalSysAdminCapacity; the other tanks have starting value zero. At the beginning of 
each day, TotalSysAdminCapacity flows into the first tank; AntivirusHours 
Demanded is “wanted” from that tank; the quantity “gotten” is the hours actually 
allocated to antivirus. The remaining contents of the first tank flow into the second 
tank, where again a demanded quantity is “wanted”; up to that quantity is “gotten”, 
and the remainder flows into the third tank; and so on. Hours “gotten” are either used 




For the version in the archetypes paper: a new allocati n block was built, in which 
all demands are met if they sum to less than 100%; if they exceed 100%, then they are 
doled out in proportion to their demand, i.e. if the demands are: {30, antivirus; 40, 
tolerance; 50, IDS}; but the SysAdmin capacity is only 60; then it will allocate 
15/20/25, respectively. 
Additionally, the archetypes version adds in the factor of sysadmin inefficiency if 
pushed beyond optimal capacity. Hours allocated to a given task are decreased by a 
linear multiple of the total demand’s exceeding the optimal capacity. (Note that we 
haven’t yet included a factor to describe the inefficiency of X net demanded hours for 
ten different tasks, which has greater inefficiency than X net demanded hours for one 
task.) 
 
I actually didn’t use the allocation system in the n w (Escalation) paper, I just 
“fed” each task directly as many hours as were desired. 
 
The newest paper (DSN) once again made use of the allocation system – pushing 
the Sysadmin too far resulted in the “limit to growth.” In this paper, the limit set in 
much more quickly, as we rephrased things: “sysadmin hours” were for all tasks; as 
soon as security demands take too many of those hours, ther things go wrong 
because of ignored tasks. The rule used was thus the following (the numbers used 
here: 23%, 1.25, etc., were a combination of guesses on my part, and what made the 
graphs come out okay, i.e. GIVEN our guesses for how to describe a 200-machine 




wanted the limit to kick in towards the end of this period, and that the limiting effect 
be fairly strong.) 
 
Maximum optimal security load = OPTPERCENT * TotalSysadminCapacity. 
IF (total hours demanded for security > maximum optimal load), EfficiencyStretch 
= STRETCHCONSTANT * (total hours demanded for security – maximum optimal load).  
 
AvailableCapacity = TotalSysadminCapacity – EfficiencyStretch. 
 
VULNERABILITIES: Many attempted attacks will only succeed if the system has 
(known) vulnerabilities. These are grouped into four categories: 
“Mistakes” includes all user mistakes, such as not logging off, downloading a 
virus, and using weak passwords. (Mistakes block outputs MistakeFactor.) 
“Host-Configuration Vulnerabilities” include settings that the sysadmin didn’t set 
properly, such as leaving ports open, allowing everyone access to sensitive files, etc. 
(ConfigVulns block outputs HostConfigVulnsFactor.) 
“Network Vulnerabilities” include those flaws that have been discovered in the 
network software, which could be exploited by an attack; these can be corrected with 
patches. (NetVulns block outputs NetVulnsFactor.) 
“ Application Vulnerabilities” include those flaws discovered in application 
software, which could be exploited by an attack (e.g. a flaw in Apache could be 




to cause remote execution of code). These are also corrected with patches. (AppVulns 
block outputs AppVulnsFactor.) 
 
We measure each of these subclasses as a “factor” between 0 and 1, where 0 is best 
(no known vulnerabilities of this type exist on this system) and 1 is worst (i.e. the 
system is permeated with vulnerabilities of this type). An overall “vulnerability 
factor” (VulnFactor), also between 0 and 1, is computed from these: 
VulnFactor = Min{1, [  (MISTAKECOEFF * MistakeFactor)  
                                     +  (HOSTCONFIGCOEFF * HostConfigVulnsFactor)   
                   + (NETVULNSCOEFF * NetVulnsFactor) + 
                   + (APPVULNCOEFF * AppVulnFactor)] } 
The “Min” function keeps the overall VulnFactor to a maximum of 1. Note that it 
is possible to reduce one or two vulnerability subfactors, and yet still have an overall 
factor of 1 if the other subfactors have been ignored. We believe that this reflects the 
reality of system vulnerabilities. We have weighted host-configuration vulnerabilities 
most heavily, followed by mistakes and application vulnerabilities, and then finally 
network vulnerabilities. This was Rosenfeld’s impression of the most-frequently 
exploited vulnerabilities. (The host-configuration vulnerability is particularly 
pernicious, as an attacker often need not “breach” ny part of the system to perform 
an attack; therefore, such an attack is often not detected by an I.D.S.) [How did you 
obtain such a ranking? Is it more based on the number of vulnerabilities of each type 
present or on the impact that each of these vulnerability types has?]  I was thinking 




vulnerability. Thus my comment about “more pernicious as it doesn’t require a 
breach.”  Again, this is all my judgment here.  
 
Archetypes Version: To show the difference between those vulnerabilities fixed by 
enforcement (i.e. host config and mistakes), and those fixed by patches (i.e. netvulns 
and appvulns), two more derived values were created:  (A “strength” of 1 is best.) 
 ConfigStrength = 1 – (CONFIGHOSTCOEFF* ConfigVuln) – 
(CONFIGMISTAKECOEFF* MistakeFactor);  
 SWStrength = 1 – (SWAPPCOEFF* AppVulnFactor ) -  (SWNETCOEFF * 
NetVulnFactor); 
 
SWStrength is a straight average of how well the apps and the netware/OS has 
been patched. (Again, with the “1 minus thing” to switch a 1->0 scale (vuln of 0 is 
best) to a 0-> 1 scale (strength of 1 is best).)  For ConfigStrength, I weighted the 
average 60/40 between ConfigVulns and Mistakes; again, just my judgment as to how 
dangerous ConfigVulns are. 
 
Newest version (Escalation paper): I left the “SWStrength/ ConfigStrength” same 
as the previous paper, as it worked perfectly well for my purposes here.  
We now describe the workings of the individual vulnerability subfactors.  
Mistakes. User mistakes are given as a factor of three conditi s: The users’ 
Awareness of security issues, as a value 0-to-1, where 0 is no awareness, 1 is very 
high awareness; the users’ Concern for security issues, 0-to-1, (we assume at this 
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point that the lowest level of concern is 0, i.e. no concern; the issue of deliberate 
sabotage, where the user is “negatively concerned” with actively damaging the 
system, has not yet been incorporated into this model); and the sysadmin’s Hours 
Allocated to Enforcement Actions, in pseudo-personnel-hours per machine per day. 
With proper sysadmin enforcement actions in place, th  users’ ability to make 
dangerous mistakes can be sharply minimized or eliminated altogether. We then 
compute an overall Mistake Factor, as a value between 0 (no dangerous user 
mistakes) and 1 (dangerous user mistakes happen all the time).  
MistakeFactor = 1 – [ {(AWARENESS + CONCERN) / USERMISTAKEDIVISOR}  
              +{ Hours Allocated to Enforcement Actions / 
ENFORCEMENTMISTAKEDIVISOR} ] 
Archetype version: the 0.7 was changed to 1.5. [Where are these numbers coming 
from?] 
The MistakeFactor is then limited by a max of 1 and a min of 0. The numbers 
were designed as follows: even given perfect awareness and concern, i.e. Awareness 
+ Concern = 2, if there are no enforcement actions, the mistake factor will still be 
.091 (not 0) to account for human error; (for example, this author recalls once 
downloading a virus simply because he accidentally clicked the wrong button.)  
Conversely, given sufficient enforcement actions (we assume .7 pseudo-hours per 
system per day would suffice), the mistake factor will go to zero, regardless of user 
awareness or concern. Note that the mistake factor is “memoryless” and employs no 
holding tanks; we assume that if awareness, concern, or enforcement were to 
suddenly decrease today, the effects would be felt immediately.  
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While we would like to make Awareness and Concern variables that the end-user 
could adjust, for now we simply set both Awareness and Concern to 0.2. The User 
Training for Better Security Practices? switch adds TRAININGEFFECT to Awareness, 
raising it to 1. [Where are these numbers coming from?] (Future implementations 
may describe the effects of training over time, i.e. a gradual rise in awareness.)   
These numbers are all just guesses on my part about the “average” user’s awareness 
and concern, and how much training can help. (I wanted to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of full training, so I let it raise Awareness all the way to 1.) 
ConfigVulns has two inputs: Hours Allocated to Enforcement Actions (in pseudo-
hours per system per day), and A Host-Vulnerability Scanning Tool? (0 if not present, 
1 if present). A HostConfigVulnsFactor of 0 is best. The scanning tool assists the 
sysadmin by finding the vulnerabilities present; however, the sysadmin must still 
spend time fixing these vulnerabilities!  We thus model the scanning tools as an 
increase in the “effective hours” (or “virtual enforcement hours”) available for fixing 
vulnerabilities. If the scanning tool is not present, “virtual enforcement  hours” = 
hours allocated to enforcement actions. If the scanning tool is present, “virtual 
enforcement hours” =  CONFIGTOOLMULTIPLIER * hours allocated to enforcement 
actions.   
Yes, it was my assumption for the present that the tool can double the sysadmin’s 
effective hours here; just picked a number to try. 
 
The vulnerability level is then described using (1 – the level of a holding tank), i.e. 
the holding tank is “full” when all vulnerabilities have been patched, and “empty” 
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when no vulnerabilities have been patched. (All of the holding tanks in this model 
have the default setting of “want” connector not being able to reduce the tank value 
below zero.)  The holding tank has a “loss rate”; this describes the fact that over time, 
new vulnerabilities are discovered; additionally, new user accounts are created, etc., 
all requiring attention from the sysadmin to prevent additional vulnerabilities. We set 
the loss rate here to .05, i.e. if the sysadmin configured the system perfectly, but then 
ignored it for twenty days, it would now look very vulnerable. (For now we assume a 
linear loss rate. Further detail may modify this in the future.)  (Yes, all assumptions of 
mine which could use validation.)  The next question we ask is, how many pseudo-
personnel hours are required to maintain the tank at its “full” level of 1?  For 
configuration vulnerabilities, we assume it to be 1.5 pseudo-hours per system per day. 
(Or with the scanning tool, .75 pseudo-hours per day.)  We then have a “divisor” of 
(1.5 / .05) = 30, i.e.: input to the tank = Virtual Enforcement Hours / 30. 
The tank is designed that if the current level of the ank is already 1 (full), additional 
input (i.e. additional hours) will not raise the tank level further. Lastly, the initial level 
of the tank is also decided by the number of virtual enforcement hours. If 1.5 or more 
pseudo-hours are available, the initial level will be 1. Otherwise, the initial level will 
be (pseudo-hours allocated / 1.5). Expressed in terms of the “divisor” and “loss rate” 
constants, this is: 
StartLevel = Min{1, [ Hours / (Divisor * LossRate)] }.[I don’t understand this 




 What happens, as given, is that if the model starts ou  with enough staff-hours to 
keep the configvulns “happy”, it will start at “full” and stay that way. Otherwise, it 
will inevitably decline to zero.  
 This raises the question: if you go through a year of only spending half the time 
you should on patches (or tolerance, etc.), by the end of the year, how vulnerable is 
your software?  Totally?  50%  Not sure. 
 In the old models, anything that required sysadmin hours was designed that if it 
didn’t get enough of them, it would ultimately decline to zero no matter what in the 
long term. In the Escalation paper, this was changed for IDS, Firewall, NetVulns a d 
ConfigVulns: for all of them, the effectiveness TODAY of a given countermeasure is 
given by a maximum of two values: the tank level (which reflects what it had been 
given in the past), AND the number of hours given TODAY divided by the number of 
hours required to be fully happy. Thus, if I patch well for a long time, then ignore 
patches for a few days, the patch level will be 0.9 or so. On the other hand, I could 
have totally ignored patches for years, but if I spend some time on them today, 
patches will be somewhat effective today. Please let me know what you think of this. 
For the archetype version, to get better-looking results we often changed the start 
level to something specified, e.g. 0 or 1 or some constant in between that worked 
nicely. This describes a scenario of “new sysadmin walks in on a system that had 
been totally ignored for a long time”, or “incompeten  sysadmin ruins a system that 
had been fine.”   
The above scheme of holding tanks, loss rates, divisors, and starting levels, will be 




NetVulns are designed very much like configuration vulnerabilities, except here the 
inputs are Hours Allocated to Software Patches and the presence of A Network 
Vulnerability Scanning Tool?  Once again, the scanning tool increasesthe virtual 
hours available for patching network vulnerabilities as follows: 
Effective Netvuln-fixing  Staff-Hrs. = NETTOOLMULTIPLIER *Hours Allocated to 
Software Patches. The NetVulnsFactor is similarly given as (1 – tank level). (The 
output from the tank is limited to the range 0 to 1. However, the feature “if tank level 
= 1, don’t allow further input” was not added to the NetVulns block (or any other 
block in this model yet) due to time constraints; thus, as is, the theoretical tank level 
can exceed 1, but the most it will read out is 1.)  LossRate = 0.04 (i.e. totally 
vulnerable if ignored for 25 days), divisor = 15 (i.e. fully patched if given .6 pseudo-
hours per system per day), initial level = virtual hours / 0.6, limited between 0 and 1. 
Archetype Version: Divisor was changed to 32. [Where is all that coming from?] 
AppVulns has inputs Hours allocated to Software Patches and New Software is 
Installed Every X Days. As before, a tank 0-1 describes the “strength” of the software; 
it is replenished by “hours allocated to patches”, with a divisor of 33.33. The loss rate 
is .02. ADDITIONALLY, anytime new software is added, this causes an additional 
loss of 0.8. The addition of new software is modele as an event that occurs every Y 
days, where Y is Gaussian, mean New Software Installed Every X Days, std. deviation 
30%. Archetype Version: LossRate is 0.004. [Explain why you selected these values.] 
 
COUNTERMEASURES: Countermeasures behave much like vulnerabilities, only a 
factor of 1 is best (countermeasure is fully effective), 0 is worst. Each countermeasure 
Comment [i6]: Page: 1 





outputs its factor, 0-to 1; and has inputs for the hours allocated to it, as well as a 
binary value indicating whether it is present. (If the switch, e.g. Antivirus Software?, 
is off, the factor output will always be 0.)  All of the countermeasures are represented 
by holding tanks. A “limit” block applied to the tank’s contents level ensures that the 
output will be between 0 and 1. However, the feature “tank itself can not exceed 1”, 
i.e. “if tank capacity = 1, today’s input = 0”, was not yet built into the 
countermeasures as it was into the vulnerabilities. (This can be easily changed.)  
Thus, for now, if the sysadmin were to put “super” fforts into a countermeasure for a 
while, the tank level would exceed 1; the factor output will still be 1; however, the 
sysadmin could ignore the countermeasure for a short time and it will still have a 
factor of “1”, as the loss rate drains the tank from a value greater than 1 to 1. 
(Eventually, though, the tank will drain below 1.) 
Starting level of the tank, if not manually adjusted, will follow the same equation 
as the vulnerability tanks: (hours allocated) / (total hours needed for the 
countermeasure to be “happy”, = divisor * lossrate). (This is then limited between 0 
and 1.) 
Tolerance Mechanisms. These can be high-maintenance, s this includes diversity. 
Loss rate 0.1, divisor 6.67. [Why?]  It was just assumed that tolerance measures are 
high-maintenance, especially if we include diversity; so I picked values these values: 
if tolerance measures are ignored for ten days, they become useless (loss rate 0.1); 
and that 2/3 pseudo-staff-hours per machine are required to keep these tolerance 
measures fully maintained. 
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Encryption Software. Once in place, this is fairly low-maintenance. Loss rate 
0.001, divisor 66.6667. [Why?]  Again, I just picked numbers that would imply low-
maintenance, i.e. an encryption system, once ignored, takes > 2 years (i.e. 1000 days) 
to become useless (there still may be bug fixes, updates, and the like); and it doesn’t 
take much work to keep the encryption up (or deal with users having problems with 
it), so I just figured an average of .067 pseudo-staff-hours per machine per day. 
Antivirus Software. We assume that new definitions must be installed by the 
sysadmin. Loss rate 0.02 (i.e. useless after fifty da s, given that ~2.5 new viruses 
come out each day, looking at a list from McAfee or the like.)  Divisor 20. How much 
time per day per machine is needed to keep the antivirus up-to-date?  I assumed 0.4 
pseudo-staff-hours / machine / day.  
Firewall and IDS [Indeed, they should be separate.]. We described “firewall 
efforts” and “IDS efforts” each as separate from “hours for analyzing (false) alarms”, 
which includes the alarms generated by both. Thus, the FirewallIDS forms one unit, 
with inputs: Hours Allocated to Firewall, Hours Allocated to (False) Alarms, Hours 
Allocated to IDS, and the binary switches A Firewall?  and An Intrusion Detection 
System?. Outputs are FirewallFactor and IDSFactor, both within [0,1]; and 
FalseAlarms, measuring how many staff-hours-per-machine’s worth f alarms are 
generated on a given day. 
Firewall effectiveness and IDS effectiveness each start off as independent holding 
tanks similar to those of the other countermeasures. Thus, FirewallFactor and 
IDSFactor are simply the contents value of their respective tanks. Firewall has 
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LossRate 0.0333 and Divisor 20; IDS has LossRate 0.033 and divisor 8. [Why these 
numbers?]  
However, both the IDS and firewall generate more alarms as they become more 
effective.  
AlarmRate = (0.3 * FirewallFactor)+ (0.6 * IDSFactor).[No, they should not be 
mixed.] 
 If these alarms are not addressed, they become Ignored Alarms.  
IgnoredAlarms = AlarmRate – AlarmHours, with a minimum of 0. All of these are 
measured in staff-hours per machine per day. 
IgnoredAlarms leads to a steep decline in the effectiveness of the IDS and firewall, 
with several days’ delay. 
The “want” (i.e. drain) on firewall effectiveness is the “natural” loss rate due to the 
need for routine maintenance, patches and the like, which was given as 0.0333; plus 
0.25 * IgnoredAlarms, with a five-day delay on the latter. 
Similarly, drain on IDS effectiveness is 0.0333 (natur l loss rate), plus 0.33 * 
IgnoredAlarms, with a three-day delay on the latter. 
Based on this, running the model with a high number of hours dedicated to the IDS 
or firewall, but few hours to analyzing alarms, will result in IDS and firewall 
effectivenesses that show decaying nonnegative oscillations, i.e. high, then low, then 
medium, then low, and so on, until they reach a level of zero. 
Archetype Version: Here, we wanted to show gains per effort for a single variable, so 
we included alarm analysis into the IDS efforts (and hours). (The firewall model was 




tank with a starting level of zero, and an input divisor of 40. Loss rate is now entirely 
a factor of the IDS effectiveness: LossRate = 0.35* IDSlevel [i.e. the contents of the 
holding tank], with a 15-day delay. This causes the oscillations seen in the attack 
success rate of the Shifting the Burden IDS scenario.  
We then argue that even an ignored IDS will still catch some attacks; this 
assumption also keeps the oscillations in the archetypes paper from being too 
extreme. This is accomplished by simply letting IDSFactor = (contents of holding 
tank) + 0.6, with a maximum of 1. This means that a totally ignored IDS will still 
have 60% the effectiveness of a well-maintained one. (The author claims no sources 
in the literature to support this, other than “it made the graph look nice.”) 
 
Newest version: we’ve kept everything separate: addressing IDS alarms goes into 
IDS Efforts; addressing Firewall alarms goes into Firewall Efforts. Firewall has loss 
rate .033 (i.e. useless if ignored for 30 days, just my assumption) and divisor 20 (i.e. 
for full effectiveness, firewall should have 0.66 staff-hours / day; in this paper, I 
assumed .66 staff-hours per day per machine. (That’s too high, isn’t it?  Again, that’s 
skill-motivation-staff-hours, which is easily double the number of actual staff-hours.)  
For the IDS, loss rate 0.05 (i.e. useless if ignored after 20 days, again my 
assumption), and a divisor of 40, i.e. best to provide the IDS 2 staff-hours per day 
(per system).  
 
ATTACKS: We divide the attacks into three categories by their sophistication. 
(This three-way division is found in some DARPA presentations that have not yet 




vulnerabilities and require little action from the attacker other than downloading and 
running the attack. A “sitting-duck” server may be subject to 50 or more simple 
attacks per day. Dr. Cukier’s empirical findings support roughly this number. 
(Though his ~50 did not include viruses.) 
“Sophisticated Attacks” may involve finding new vulnerabilities, can often defeat 
many countermeasures, and usually come from a single knowledgeable attacker (such 
as one who might actually write the “kiddy scripts” used in the first category). The 
average company will sustain only a handful, at most, f sophisticated attacks per 
day. (Yup, just an assumption; Dr. Cukier is trying to get sophisticated attackers to hit 
his systems, but not much luck yet. Wasn’t there a quote from Dr. Cukier about 95% 
simple / 5% sophisticated or something like that?)  Certainly we must include 
computer viruses, the most costly computer-security b each as 
reported in the CSI/FBI survey, in our discussion. While a computer virus does 
require a sophisticated author if it will spread, it spreads in fairly simple, predictable 
ways, and is easily defeated by simple countermeasur s (antivirus) and patching 
vulnerabilities; we therefore include viruses in the simple, “script-kiddy” category. 
Lastly, we have Nationwide-level Attacks, which may be part of a war effort, 
global terrorism, possibly a multinational corporation attacking a competitor, and so 
on. Most companies will only see one of these every f w months or so, if at all. (That 
seemed like common sense.)  Attacks of this sophistication do not rely on 
vulnerabilities as they can “brute force” through most software; they can also defeat 




For the time being, we do not differentiate attacks other than their categories of 
Simple, Sophisticated, and Nationwide. The model’s end-user inputs AverageSimple, 
AverageSophisticated, and AverageNationwide via sliders. The outputs of the 
respective “attack generator blocks” are Simple/Sophisticated/Nationwide Attacks 
Attempted. To add realism to our model, some randomness occurs between the input 
Averages and the output Attempteds: 
All of the above behave the same way. If Average >= 1, then a number Y is output, 
where Y represents the number of attacks of that type attempted per day. Y is given 
by a Gaussian distribution, with mean Average and a standard deviation of 0.2 * 
Average. (i.e. “a standard deviation of 20%.”)   
If Average < 1, then exactly one attack is attempted every Z days, where Z follows 
a Gaussian distribution with a mean of (1/Average) and a std. dev. of 30%.  
Archetype Version: for simplicity, and to prevent oscillations in the graph due to 
randomness, we simply let AverageSimple = SimpleAttacksAttempted = 100. (We 
circumvent the “attack generator block.”)  All other attacks are set to 0.  
In the new (Escalation) paper, I had no randomness in Simple Attacks, but a 5% 
standard deviation in Sophisticated Attacks. Just nmbers I picked to demonstrate 
some randomness; I don’t know how much the numbers vary day-to-day in real-life. 
 
ATTEMPTED VS. SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS, or ATTACK DEFENSE. Even if 
perfectly effective, a given countermeasure is only so successful at thwarting 
attempted attacks. For example, if we say 100 attacks re attempted per day, we 




thwart all X of those viruses, i.e. X% of the total attacks, but it can not defeat more 
than X% of the attacks because (100-X) attacks are not viruses. As for what 
percentage of attacks are not successful due to a given countermeasure, the only 
numbers available are those of experts’ opinion and the CSI/FBI survey. The CSI/FBI 
survey is of limited use, however, as it records what percentage of correspondents 
reported observing a given type of attack on their system. Thus, we know that 78% of 
the businesses surveyed detected a virus last year, and 37% detected a DoS; that does 
not mean that 78% of the attacks out there are viruses or that 37% of them are DoSs!  
(Otherwise, the numbers exceed 100% quite rapidly.)  Nonetheless, the numbers can 
be used as a very rough approximation for the prevalence of a given attack. 
Otherwise, the numbers given here represent the author’s numerical interpretations of 
M. Cukier’s descriptions of “fully effective”, “partially effective”, or “not effective” 
for each countermeasure against each category of attack.  
Similarly, certain countermeasures may be very effectiv  against simple attacks, 
but not against sophisticated ones. We therefore hav  three different blocks labeled 
SimpleSuccess, SophistSuccess, and NatnwideSuccess, respectively. (Extend’s limits 
on the number of characters in a hierarchical block’s name necessitated some creative 
spellings here.)  Each of these takes as inputs Attempted XYZ Attacks, where XYZ is 
simple/sophisticated/nationwide. They also have inputs for the factors of all relevant 
countermeasures and vulnerabilities. The primary output is the number of successful 
attacks of a given category. The other outputs apper on the bottom of the 
AttackSuccess block, directly beneath the inputs for the various countermeasures and 




to the corresponding countermeasure or lack of vulnerability. Additionally, it appears 
that a “thinner” block has been attached to the bottom of each Attack Success block. 
This functions as an accumulator, showing how many ttacks have been attempted, 
successful, or not-successful-due-to-a-given-factor, over the entire simulation period.  
Each AttackSuccess block is designed in the same way, as a linked serie  of 
holding tanks: at the beginning of each day, all tanks are reset to zero. Then, a certain 
number of attacks (attempts) are input to the firstholding tank; some are removed by 
the first countermeasure (in proportion to how effectively it is functioning, e.g. is the 
AntivirusFactor 1, i.e. it has been well-maintained, or something lower?); the 
remaining tank contents (i.e. remaining attacks) are transferred to the second tank, 
where some are removed by the second countermeasure, nd so on; those that remain 
after all the tanks are done are deemed Successful Attacks.  
For simple attacks, we have the following procession: As an attempted attack 
enters the system, it first encounters the firewall, then an IDS; if it passes those, it will 
be scanned by an antivirus. If it still passes through, it may be designed to exploit a 
given vulnerability in the system; if that vulnerability is not present, it will be 
thwarted here. If it still succeeds, encryption may sometimes help as follows: even if 
the system is breached and data is illegally accessed, an attacker will find the 
encrypted data meaningless; confidentiality is thus maintained. Finally, if all else 
fails, tolerance measures will mitigate the damage in many cases. Thus, starting with 
attempted simple attacks, we have the following: [Not completely right. In particular, 
the antivirus focuses mainly on email attachments. O herwise, the antivirus can detect 
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the corruption of the computer. We can work this out d ring our next meeting, OK?]  
We’re still working on this, but the models haven’t changed it yet. 
Remove (FirewallFactor * 90%) of the attempted attacks. I.e. if the Firewall is 
fully effective, it will catch 90% of the attempted simple attacks; if it’s only 50% 
effective (supposing it hasn’t been well-maintained), then it will catch only 45% of 
attempted attacks. Of those remaining, remove (IDSFactor * 60%); of those 
remaining, remove (AntivirusFactor *  78%); of those remaining, remove ((1 – 
VulnFactor) * 90%); this represents those attacks that were designed to exploit a 
given vulnerability; if that vulnerability is not found, the attack will not succeed.  
Archetypes Version: in order to differentiate between the results of enforcement 
actions (which influence config vulns and mistakes) and patches (which influence 
NetVulns and AppVulns), we have each defeat attacks separately, rather than taking 
90% * (1 – VulnFactor). Instead, remove (SWStrength * 60%), then (ConfigStrength 
* 80%). In displaying those attacks defeated by ConfigStrength, we adjust the 
equations to show total attacks defeated by ConfigStrength, not those attacks defeated 
by ConfigStrength that were not previously defeated by SWStrength. 
Then remove (EncryptFactor * 40%). (Encryption is only useful in preventing 
theft of data; it does very little, for example, against a DDoS attack.)  Lastly, remove 
(ToleranceFactor * 75%). Take this result and apply the “floor” function, i.e. largest 
integer that is less than or equal to it. (Thus, if after all the countermeasures, we have 
2.2 attacks succeeding, count that as 2. If we have 0.9 attacks succeeding, count that 
as 0.)  Archetype version: to make the lines smoother, we leave out the floor, and 




have the number of SuccessfulSimpleAttacks. (The various summed-over-time outputs 
are found simply by inserting accumulation tanks at the appropriate point in the 
chain.)   
 
All of these percentages were either my assumptions, some comment from Dr. 
Cukier about “very effective/somewhat effective/not effective”, and occasionally, the 
survey (see above about 78% saw viruses.)    
For Sophisticated and Nationwide attacks, many less countermeasures are 
effective. Furthermore, even a single attack stands a good chance of succeeding. This 
is represented as follows: after reducing the appropriate percentages due to 
countermeasures and vulnerabilities, we are left with hat should be X successful 
attacks. If X >=1, round X to the nearest integer; that is how many attacks of this type 
are successful today. If  0 < X < 1, one attack will succeed an average of X% of the 
time. This is accomplished by selecting a random value r uniformly distributed on 
[0,1]; if r < X, the attack succeeds; otherwise, it does not.  
For sophisticated attacks, the antivirus is ineffectiv  because all viruses are treated 
as simple attacks. An IDS can be defeated by a clever attacker, so it is not included. 
Encryption (which we assume can not be defeated without a supercomputer of some 
type (Dr. Cukier agreed with this; I’ve heard in the news that every now and then a 
team of experts with 100 computers has cracked a given file encrypted with RSA, 
after working on it for a few months.)  which is beyond the reach of a single 
sophisticated attacker) is still as effective as with simple attacks; the same goes for 




Lastly, some sophisticated attacks are designed to exploit known vulnerabilities, but 
often a sophisticated attacker can find his/her ownnew vulnerabilities in the software. 
We thus are left with the following: 
Remove (FirewallFactor * 30%) of attempts; of the remaining, remove ( (1 – 
VulnFactor) * 50%); of the remaining, remove (EncryptFactor * 40%); lastly, of the 
remaining, remove (ToleranceFactor * 75%). The remaining value is rounded to the 
nearest integer if it is >= 1, or used as a probability if it is < 1, as described above. 
The result is the number of SuccessfulSophisticatedAttacks. Only source other than 
Dr. Cukier’s comments or my guesses I can add here is this: Encryption is helpful for 
whatever percentage of attacks sought to steal sensitiv  data. What is that percentage?  
Survey talks dollar costs of various attacks (e.g. theft of data vs. DoS), but not the 
percentage breakdown of the number of attacks themselves. 
In the case of Nationwide attacks, we assume that network and application 
vulnerabilities are irrelevant as the code is subject to “strong smart force”, the 
nationwide-scale attackers may have access to the cod being used; similarly, the 
nationwide attacker possesses a supercomputer, quantum computer, or some other 
method of defeating commercially available cryptography. The only countermeasures 
that are effective (and partially at that) are the fir wall (if it is a hardware firewall of 
proprietary design, as M. Cukier described in an experience of his)  and tolerance 
measures.  
Remove (Firewall Factor * 20%), then of the remaining, remove 
(ToleranceFactor * 50%). Apply the rounding or probability as described above; the 




about Tolerance being fully effective against simple & sophisticated attacks; halfway 
effective against nationwide attacks. 
Lastly, the three categories of successful attacks an be summed; each 
AttackSuccess block is connected to an addition block. The result is All Successful 
Attacks (Per Day). Similarly, if one wishes to see all successful attacks over the entire 
simulation period, the various Successful ABC Attacks (Sum Total), for ABC = 
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